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This work develops a phenomenological account of mindfulness, and related phenomena. It 
is divided into two main parts. The aim of part one is to articulate a pre-phenomenological 
sketch of mindfulness (and related phenomena) by (1) drawing on passages from some of the 
classic works of Western literature and everyday life, (2) through an interpretation of the 
Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and (3) by the means of a critical analysis of the contemporary attempts to 
account for these phenomena. Part two adds further detail to the sketch by entering a dialogue 
with the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. A key distinctions made here is between the 
transcendental horizon (which is filled in by our possibilities) and the open horizon (which is 
filled in by thingly possibilities). This difference allows cultivating mindfulness to be defined 
as the practice of tuning-out of the transcendental horizon and tuning-in to the open horizon. 
Mindfulness—the potential fruit of tuning-in-tuning-out—is defined as the feeling of being 
tuned-in to the open horizon (or to thingly possibilities).A key findings of this research is that 
tuning-in-tuning-out is a difference practice than the phenomenological epoché; whereas the 
latter discloses the transcendental horizon, the former discloses the open horizon—on which 
the transcendental horizon (and the practice of the epoché) is dependent. These findings open 
up the possibility of a phenomenological description of certain phenomena that are closely 
related to mindfulness (and with which mindfulness may be confused). Some of these 
phenomena are: Mindful attention, which is defined as the function of foregrounding a sub-
horizon within the open horizon and the pushing of the other sub-horizons into the 
background. Concentration (samādhi): the narrowing down of the open horizon to one of its 
sub-horizons. Insight (vipassanā): the activity of isolating a sub-horizon, discerning its thingly 
possibilities, zooming out, isolating a second sub-horizon and discerning its thingly 
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INTRODUCTION 
Two factors were central in bringing this work into existence. The first was the love I 
developed for the practice of phenomenological seeing, the practice of looking deeply into 
what at first appear as the most ordinary things until something like a hidden dimension 
announces itself therein, “a secret glimmering” to borrow the words of the Japanese poet 
Matsuo Basho (1966). The second is the sense of wonder, joy, meaningfulness and clarity that 
the practice of mindfulness (together with the other aspects of the Buddhist path) introduced 
into my life. I was introduced to both around the same time, over a decade ago. And, from the 
very beginning, I felt a deep connection running between them: when the practice of 
mindfulness was going well, phenomenological seeing became natural, almost effortless; 
while a decline in my practice singled the return of the ordinary, mundane way of relating to 
the world, and this made it almost impossible to relate to things in the phenomenological way. 
This dynamic interplay was at first only implicit in the background of my awareness. But 
gradually it became more and more explicit until eventually it articulated itself in the form of 
the question: What is the nature of this dynamic relationship that binds mindfulness and 
phenomenological seeing together? This question lead to a more fundamental one: 
Phenomenologically speaking, what is mindfulness? And, being someone deeply immersed in 
the works of classical phenomenology1, I was naturally to ask: what are the implications of 
these questions for our understanding of the main phenomenological themes (such as the 
practice of the epoché)? 
 
1 I am using the term ‘classical phenomenology’ to refer to the philosophical movement inaugurated 
by Edmund Husserl and which was continued, in one form or another, by such figures as Max Scheler, 
Martin Heidegger, Jean Paul Sartre and Maurice Mearleau-Ponty, just to give a few of the better known 
names. This term also encompasses the contemporary philosophers who continue to engage and 
develop this tradition, such as Anthony Steinbock and Dan Zahavi. 
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I wrote this work in order to answer these questions, which can also be phrased as its two 
main objectives: (1) to articulate a phenomenology of mindfulness, and other closely related 
phenomena and (2) to work out the implications of this phenomenology for some the main 
themes that preoccupied, and continue to preoccupy, classical phenomenology. 
This work is divided into two main parts, each of which is made up of three chapters. This 
division is based on the way that I believed (at the time of commencing this work) a 
phenomenological investigation ought to proceed.2 According to this view, a 
phenomenological study of X presupposes that X is already understood in a pre-
phenomenological manner. This ‘pre-phenomenological sketch’ serves the phenomenological 
study as a map or a guide. With this in mind, the main task of Part I can be described as the 
task of articulating a pre-phenomenological sketch of mindfulness and related phenomena. 
Part II aims to develop this sketch phenomenologically. But this requires some qualification.  
I used to believe that a pre-phenomenological sketch should not make use of 
phenomenological ideas and concepts at all (either those that are to be found in the classical 
phenomenological texts or which stem from our own earlier phenomenological 
investigations). Rather, the pre-phenomenological sketch is to be derived solely from the 
naïve, pre-phenomenological understanding of the phenomenon; the way that the 
phenomenon is understood in ordinary life; the way it appears in the lifeworld. No matter how 
sophisticated such a pre-phenomenological understanding may be on its own terms, it will 
remain phenomenologically naïve until it is subjected to a phenomenological critique and 
 
2 The findings of this work have caused me to abandon the idea that phenomenological descriptions must proceed 
in this way, on the basis of a pre-phenomenological sketch. I now believe that the most important and powerful 
phenomenological insights arise spontaneously from the feeling of being tuned-in to life. Even the true theme of 
our phenomenological investigations arises from the things themselves, and not from some arbitrary choice of 
subject matter. For the immediate purposes, however, this point can be put aside. 
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analysis, which takes these ideas and concepts back to the phenomenal ‘sources’ wherein they 
have their origin. In practice, however, I found this dictum impossible to follow.  
My heavy involvement with phenomenology has had the effect of sedimenting certain 
phenomenological concepts—such as retention, lived body, readiness-to-hand and so on—
into my lifeworld. In other words, my engagement with the phenomenological tradition has 
shaped my pre-phenomenological understanding of phenomena. Perhaps this would not be a 
cause for alarm if every time that a phenomenological concept appeared before my mind I 
was to follow it back to its original source and validate it in experience. But that is not what 
is/was happening. Rather I was using phenomenological concepts blindly or emptily, and was 
therefore in the position of someone using a mathematical formula without doing the proof. 
For example, I could speak of ‘protentions’ and ‘retentions’ simply because it made sense in 
certain contexts to do so and without actually waking up to these elements of experience. This 
caused me no small degree of bother. Try as I might, however, I found it impossible to filter 
out the phenomenological element from my initial encounter with the phenomenon, whether 
that encounter was ‘direct’ or second hand and encountered through the writings of others. In 
either case, the background phenomenological concepts kept on flowing in. Reflecting further 
on this predicament, I reasoned that as in any case ‘bracketing’ of empty concepts should 
come after the pre-phenomenological sketch, there is no need to force myself to bracket 
anything at this stage of the process. If this is how the phenomenon appears to me then this is 
how it appears. Differently put, in my attempt to formulate the pre-phenomenological sketch 
I was facing the following choice: either forcefully and artificially filter out the 
phenomenological concepts, and pretend that they did not feature in my initial experience of 
the phenomenon or go right ahead and express without reservation how the phenomenon 
appears, phenomenological concepts and all. The latter struck me as the natural course of 
action. The implication of this for the current work is that the pre-phenomenological sketch 
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developed in Part I does resort to certain phenomenological notions. This is especially true of 
the second chapter. But I do not consider this use of phenomenological concepts to be 
phenomenology in the strict sense of the term.3 This is because, for the most part, these 
concepts are not derived from actual concrete phenomenological investigations but are simply 
applied to certain issues because doing so makes sense ‘intellectually’. In contrast, the main 
ideas and concepts that constitute the phenomenological account developed in Part II are (or 
at least aspire to be) phenomenological in the proper sense. 
The first chapter of Part I does not so much aim to answer a question as to convey a feeling; 
the feeling of what it is like to be mindful. Towards this end it appeals primarily to certain 
passages from classic works of Western literature that, or so I claim, capture the essence of 
this feeling. This chapter also takes the first step towards giving a definite form to this feeling 
and in that way it throws down the first blots of ink on the pre-phenomenological sketch of 
mindfulness. 
The second chapter aims to sharpen these lines by considering how the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta 
(which, according to Bhikkhu Bodhi (2011), is “…the most influential text in the Pāli Canon 
on the systematic practice of mindfulness…”) describes ‘sati’, the term that is usually 
translated into English as ‘mindfulness’. This is one of the very few, and certainly the most 
important, original Buddhist texts that this work will draw upon and engage with. This raises 
the following questions: 
 Why restrict the discussion to a single Buddhist text in this way? And given that Buddhist 
ideas and doctrines (including the ideas about mindfulness) evolved in many ways throughout 
the centuries, how can I describe the objective of this work as being the articulation of a 
phenomenology of mindfulness itself, and not just of one the many things that can be called 
 
3 But there are occasions in Part I where I do enter the things themselves, even if briefly. An example is the 
analysis of a phenomenon that I call ‘thematisation’ in chapter two. 
14 
‘mindfulness’? On this theme, Georges Dreyfus (2011) writes: 
 
Buddhism is a plural tradition that has evolved over centuries to include a large variety of views 
 about mindfulness. Hence, there is no one single view that can ever hope to qualify as “the 
 Buddhist view of mindfulness.” 
 
I am prepared to agree with Dreyfus that there are a ‘wide variety of views about 
mindfulness’, both within and outside of Buddhism. But does it follow from this that no view 
can ever hope to qualify as the Buddhist view of mindfulness? How we answer this question 
will depend on what is meant by ‘Buddhist view’. Allow me to explain. 
I accept as a basic truth that there is a difference between the word itself, on the one hand, 
and the phenomenon to which the word refers, on the other.4 The word ‘mindfulness’ is not 
the phenomenon to which the word refers. This allows me to describe the approach that I will 
take towards the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta and the Buddhist tradition in general. Whoever spoke the 
words recorded in this text (and this person is widely believed to be the historical Buddha 
himself) was using these words in order to draw the attention of his audience towards a 
particular phenomenon, a particular dimension of their experience. The crucial question, as 
far as I am concerned, is this one: what phenomenon did this person have in mind when using 
the term ‘sati’ and related notions? To what was this person trying to direct the attention of 
his audience? The presupposition of this work is that it is possible, by following the ‘clues’ 
that the Buddha left behind, to circumscribe and describe the element of our experience that 
he was trying to point out. In one sense, then, to isolate this phenomenon is to give an account 
of the Buddhist view of mindfulness. But this is not incompatible with the idea that the 
 
4 But I leave open the possibility that the difference between and the relation of the word and its referent can be 
understood in a number of different ways. 
15 
meaning of this word evolved and changed over the centuries. 
In using the term ‘sati’ the Buddha did not simply try to point out a particular phenomenon. 
He was also concerned to bring this phenomenon into view from a particular perspective. 
Mindfulness offers a range of possibilities. But, in the context of the Buddha’s teachings, 
certain of these possibilities are more important than others (such as the possibility of 
developing mindfulness into wisdom).  Now, as the Buddha’s teachings were taken up and 
developed throughout the centuries, it is possible that while the word ‘sati’ or ‘mindfulness’ 
continued to pick out the same phenomenon that the Buddha was pointing at, the phenomenon 
now came into view from a different perspective; that some of its other possibilities came to 
be emphasised. This is one sense in which the conception of what mindfulness is may have 
evolved and changed. Another possibility is that the referent of the word completely altered; 
that ‘mindfulness’ came to refer to something other than what the Buddha had in view. And 
yet another possibility is that the referent of the word was completely lost, that people started 
to value the word for its own sake instead of using it in order to reach the thing itself.  
These issues—of how the word changed and what it came to refer to in the later Buddhist 
and non-Buddhist traditions—will not concern us here. To repeat, this work aims to bring into 
view the phenomenon that the person who spoke the words recorded in the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta 
was pointing at with ‘sati’ (and related notions). To articulate such a description is to set the 
stage for future work, work that can enquire into such question as whether different traditions 
still have this phenomenon in view and, if so, then in what way and from what perspective. 
This does not mean, however, that the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta will be the only Buddhist text that 
this work will engage with. It will draw on other Buddhist sources, ancient and modern. But 
it will do so by using these sources in order to enrich the description of the phenomenon that 
the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta helped us pick out and isolate in the first place. 
Chapter three of Part I is an interpretation of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. This text defines ‘sati’ 
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by situating it in the wider context of a kind of contemplative state (anupassanā). Within this 
contemplative state, sati necessarily co-exists with certain other factors: the object being 
contemplated, freedom from desires and discontent (vineyya abhijjhādomanassa), a specific 
kind of effort (ātāpi) and clear comprehension (sampajāna). Unfortunately, however, these 
terms do not carry their meaning on their sleeves, and it is not straightforward to know what 
aspects of our experience they are meant to be pointing out. This is why an interpretation is 
necessary, a theme that Bodhi (2011) touches upon in the following passage: 
For four centuries, the Buddhist scriptures were preserved and transmitted orally, from one generation 
of reciters to the next. This method of transmission required that the compilers of the Buddha’s 
discourses compress the main points into simple repetitive formulas that were conducive to easy 
memorization. Thus when we consult the texts to find out what they mean by sati, what we mostly 
encounter, instead of lucid explanations, are operational demonstrations that indicate, in practical terms, 
how sati functions in Buddhist psychology and meditation practice. It is from these that we must tease 
out the word’s implications, testing them against each other and evaluating them by personal reflection 
and experience.  
While chapter two sheds much light on the nature of mindfulness, it also leaves a number 
of crucial questions unanswered, including: what kind of awareness is mindfulness 
awareness? And what is the nature of the relationship that obtains between mindfulness and 
wisdom? Chapter three of Part I considers what the contemporary literature has to say about 
these issues. Here the general view seems to be that the key to making sense of mindful 
awareness and of its relation to wisdom lies in understanding the relation of mindfulness and 
attention. And the general tendency is to conceive of this relation as being one of identity: 
mindfulness is a form of attention. But the contemporary literature is split on the question of 
the kind of attention that mindfulness is to be identified with. Some conceive it as ‘bare 
attention’, attention as it is in the absence of all cognitive activity, while for others ‘mindful 
attention’ involves a special kind of cognition. I agree that the question of the relationship 
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between mindfulness and attention is an important one. But I question whether it is the most 
important question that a phenomenology of mindfulness needs to concern itself with. And I 
also question the other presuppositions of the contemporary view by asking: does attention 
constitute the very definition of mindfulness or, rather, is it the case that attention only takes 
a specific form, the form of ‘mindful attention’, when it occurs within a mind in which 
mindfulness has been established? I raise a similar question regarding the cognitive processes 
that, according to some contemporary thinkers, accompany mindfulness and in terms of which 
they try to explain the kind of wisdom that mindfulness can give rise to. Do these cognitive 
processes belong to the very definition of mindfulness or, rather, does cognition only take the 
form of ‘mindful cognition’ or ‘mindful reflection’ when it occurs within a mind that has 
established itself in the mindful attitude?   
The first part of chapter three is mostly critical; arguing for what mindfulness is not. But 
at the end of this critique the question still remains: what is mindfulness in positive terms? In 
the concluding part of chapter three, I raise the possibility that mindfulness exemplifies a kind 
of feeling that Matthew Ratcliffe (2008) calls ‘the feeling of being’ or ‘existential feeling’. 
Feelings of being are differentiated from other feelings in that they are not directed at 
particular objects or situations within the world but rather determine the all-encompassing 
sense of what it means to be in the ‘world’ in the first place. And existential feelings are 
differentiated between themselves by the kind of possibility that they open up or disclose. 
Here I propose that mindfulness can be understood as the feeling of being tuned-in. This raises 
the question: what kind of a possibility does mindfulness, as the feeling of being tuned-in, open 
up or disclose? And in what sense can mindfulness be described as an all-encompassing shift 
in the way that one finds oneself in the world? These issues are addressed in Part II. 
According to the letter of phenomenology, with pre-phenomenological sketch in hand, the 
next step should be to go directly to the phenomenon itself in order to ask it directly: what are 
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you? Can you please hold still so that we can fill in this sketch? And, in fact, when I first 
began to reflect on the phenomenological nature of mindfulness, this is the route I took. And 
some of the main ideas that the reader will meet in Part II (such as the notion of ‘thingly 
possibilities’) emerged from these early attempts to describe the phenomenon directly. But it 
quickly became clear to me that mindfulness cannot be constrained to an isolated chapter of 
phenomenology, as if a phenomenology of mindfulness did not have major implications for 
the fundamental themes of phenomenology. With this in mind, I found that the most natural 
way to approach the task at hand was by way of an ‘internal critique’ of the phenomenological 
tradition. As I understand it, an internal critique involves, first, paying close attention to the 
classical descriptions and pointing out certain gaps therein. Then, second, showing that, when 
we look in the right way, novel structures begin to peer through these gaps. The third step 
involves articulating a phenomenological description of mindfulness in terms of these 
structures. While I believe that such gaps appear throughout the entire phenomenological 
literature that I am familiar with, the scope of this work constrains it to working only with a 
few key ideas of Husserlian phenomenology. 
These ideas are: the natural and transcendental attitudes and the phenomenological epoché 
(the procedure that is meant to lead the phenomenologists from the former to the latter). The 
first chapter of Part II is largely (but not solely) an exposition of these Husserlian ideas. Its 
objective is to present these ideas from an angle that allows the aforementioned gaps to clearly 
come into view and it does so by asking: what conditions the possibility of the epoché? More 
precisely, what kind of a possibility does the practice of the epoché presuppose? And from 
what perspective does this kind of possibility come into view?  
It is in response to these questions that the second chapter of Part II articulates a 
phenomenological account of mindfulness, including both the practice of cultivating 
mindfulness and the state of being mindful. Then, on this basis, it attempts a complementary 
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description of concentration and tries to spell out how it relates to and arises from 
mindfulness. It also raises the question: do mindfulness and concentration exhibit other 
forms? It answers in the affirmative and sketches out a description of another form that these 
phenomena can take.  
The last chapter left us without an answer to some important questions. What is the 
phenomenological nature of the practice of insight (vipassanā) that mindfulness makes 
possible? And how does mindfulness make this kind of insight possible (how, in other words, 
does vipassanā arise on the basis of and from within the feeling of being tuned-in)? And: What 
is the relation between this kind of insight practice and the practice of phenomenological 
seeing? Finally: Can our phenomenological descriptions of mindfulness and related 
phenomena help with understanding the positive nature of ‘ātāpi’, the kind of effort that goes 
into the practice of cultivating mindfulness? The third and final chapter of Part II attempts to 
deal with these questions by scrupulously observing two individuals as they go about actually 
engaging in this kind of practice: Edmund Husserl himself and the great meditation master 

















Drawing primarily on passages from Western literature, chapter I tries to show that the 
seeds of mindfulness are already present in ordinary experience and that, in the right 
circumstances, these dormant seeds can bloom into life. At that point a shift in perspective 
takes place, taking the person in whom it occurs away from the ordinary to the mindful way 
of being in the world. This way of being is characterised by: a feeling of being tuned in to the 
natural rhythm of things (a kind of immersion in the phenomena), a blurring of the difference 
between self and other, where the engaged agent takes the form of a detached witness, and 
other qualities besides. Just as it can happen that, in certain circumstances, sleep simply takes 
over without preliminaries, so these literary passages suggest that becoming mindful is a 
spontaneous and passive event; it is something that happens to one, rather than being 
something that one cultivates intentionally. 
Just as it is possible to intentionally cultivate the conditions under which the state of sleep 
appears (i.e. crawling your legs together, breathing deeply and slowly etc.) so a key teaching 
of the Buddha is that the conditions of mindfulness too can be intentionally cultivated. The 
difference between the practice of cultivating mindfulness and the state of being mindful (the 
fruit of the practice) sets the stage for chapter II which attempts to formulate a preliminary 
definition of both phenomena through an interpretation of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. Here the 
practice of cultivating mindfulness is defined as the practice of tuning-out of our possibilities 
and tuning-in to the intrinsic intelligibility of the phenomenon or simply tuning-out-tuning-in. 
Mindfulness is defined from two perspectives. ‘Subjectively’, it is the state of lucid awareness 
and clear comprehension. ‘Objectively’, it is a vivid presentation of the phenomenon’s 
intrinsic intelligibility.  
The main objective of chapter III is to undertake a critical analysis of the way that the 
contemporary literature addresses the questions: what is this lucid awareness in terms of which 
mindfulness is to be defined? And what is the relation between this lucid awareness and 
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cognition? On this issue, the contemporary literature can be divided into two opposing camps, 
which I call the ‘Quietists’ and the ‘Cognitivists’. According to the Quietists, lucid awareness 
is ‘bare’ attention, which is characterised by the absence of all cognitive activity, such as 
thinking, remembering, judging and so on. While there are stronger and weaker readings of 
the Cognitivist position, all in this group agree that lucid awareness is not exclusive of 
cognitive activity and that the most important forms of mindfulness demand that a kind of 
cognition be brought into play. Despite all their differences, however, the Quietists and the 
Cognitivists share the presupposition that mindfulness can be explained as the presence or 
absence of such familiar experiences as attention, working memory, judgment, including the 
various combinations and higher-order modifications of these experiences. This way of 
looking at things, I argue, misses certain key distinctions. The first being the distinction 
between the experience of establishing mindfulness (a term that encompasses both the 
spontaneous arising and the intentional cultivation of the conditions under which mindfulness 
comes to be) and mindfulness itself. The other is the distinction between mindfulness and the 
effects that this being in state has on the ‘stream of consciousness’, on such familiar 
experiences as attention, judgment and so on. In particular, not seeing this distinction leads 
the contemporary literature into conflating mindful attention (the form that attention takes 
within mindfulness) and mindfulness itself. The final part of chapter III proposes that 
mindfulness is an example of a kind of feeling that Matthew Ratcliffe has called ‘existential 
feeling’ or ‘feeling of being’. Mindfulness is the feeling of being tuned-in. 
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CHAPTER I: 
Mindfulness in Literature and Everyday Life 
 
Mindfulness is not accessible only to Buddhist monks and their ilk. It is a possible way of 
relating to the world that is open and available to all of us, right here in the midst of ordinary 
life. In fact some of the best Western writers have taken note of this possibility and tried to 
describe it. Their efforts constitute the crux of this chapter. With the help of these passages, 
this chapter aims to awaken in you, the reader, the feeling of what it is like to be mindful. This 
means that the literary passages, as superbly put together as they are, are not here simply for 
your aesthetic pleasure. They are here to steer a hidden part of yourself into life. Having woken 
up the feeling, this chapter will begin to give it a definite form by extracting some of the key 
characteristics that these passages attribute to it. The ensuing chapters will make this form 
more and more definite until, hopefully, the phenomenon of mindfulness stands clearly before 
the mind, distinguishing itself from everything else with which it may be and tends to be 
confused. 
The following passages allow of different interpretations. What I interpret to be 
descriptions of mindfulness someone else may interpret as descriptions of something else.5 I 
mention this to prevent the reader from being distracted by the thought that I am twisting the 
meaning of the following passages in order to serve my own ends. I am not trying to say that 
these passages must be interpreted as descriptions of mindfulness. Nor am I claiming that their 
authors had that purpose in mind. But I do believe that they can be taken in that way, and that 




5 The very possibility of this fact—that the ‘same’ description can refer to quite different phenomena—itself 
calls out for an explanation. But I will not go into this here. 
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 I will begin with a personal example. This is my father’s encounter with, what I believe 
to be, mindfulness. A little background first. My family comes from Kasindol, a small town 
not very far from Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina. A vibrant little river splits the town in 
half as it stretches in two contrary directions. In one direction, the river surges towards the 
rustle and bustle of Sarajevo, with its pubs and cafes. My father tells me how he would spend 
time at such places, drinking rakija—the Yugoslav version on vodka—smoking cigarettes and 
getting involved in the social and political events of his day. But it quickly becomes clear to 
anyone who takes the time to know him that that is not where his most cherished memories 
rest. He speaks with awe and wonder about that which he found when he followed the river 
in the other direction. In that direction, the Kasindol river leads into a thick, largely unexplored 
forest, where he fished trout, picked mushrooms and received other gifts that nature sent his 
way. When his legs became heavy, he recalls with nostalgia shimmering behind his eyes, he 
would rest his backpack, forget his fishing rod and find a soft patch of grass on which to 
stretch out. Slowly and invariably, perhaps following a short nap, something would sneak up 
on him. And when it grabbed him this something would erase him from this world. This is no 
fancy description. My father speaks quite seriously when he says that in these moments it is 
as if he ceased to exist. And with his absence for the first-time reality would bloom into life: 
the clouds slowly and patiently striding across the clear blue sky, the gentle murmur of the 
river, the whispering conversation between the trees, all would become magical, wondrous. 
And as this state deepened, he recalls, that which usually appears as distinct and separate, 
including himself, would merge into a kind of harmonious unity. He once illustrated this by 
asking me to imagine a wheel with the different colours painted on it. And then to imagine the 
wheel as spinning really fast, and it keeps spinning until the different colours merged into a 
homogeneous and undifferentiated quality. The different colours stand for the distinct 
phenomena of which our everyday world is made, the homogeneous quality represents the 
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reality that revealed itself to my father in these moments. These experiences, he says, would 
refresh him completely, and memories of them served him as an unfaltering source of strength 
upon which he drew when faced with the endless, trivial difficulties and agitations that he 
encountered when he followed the river in the other direction. Because of my Buddhist 
background, I had not the slightest doubt that what my father was describing was an encounter 
with mindfulness, something that I was trying to harness through my meditation practice. 
 Experiences like my father’s have been expressed in some of the classic works of 
Western literature. The first instance that I will consider comes from Fyodor Dostoevsky’s 
(1983) Memoirs from the House of the Dead, a work inspired by the author’s experience while 
a prisoner in Siberia. Mindfulness is often preceded by some kind of anguish or anxiety, which 
arises as one begins to disconnect from ordinary existence. This is certainly so in the case of 
Dostoevsky, whose anguish finds its source in the fact that he is imprisoned. In prison, the 
conditions are arranged in such a way as to prevent the prisoner from pursuing the projects 
that defined their pre-prisoned existence (e.g. socialising, raising a family, the freedom to go 
wherever one wants, etc.) While the surrounding conditions prevent their pursuit that does not 
mean that these projects are annihilated from the prisoner’s consciousness; they now float 
painfully in front of the prisoner’s awareness in the form of realisable but currently non-
pursuable ends—“if not for these conditions, I could do all that”. It is this tension—between 
what the prisoner is capable of in the conditions that he finds himself in and the kind of life 
he could live in different circumstances—that make prison life so tormenting. 
 This tension, as Dostoevsky is about to tells us, is especially amplified in spring, the 
season that in ordinary circumstances opens up a whole range of possibilities, including such 
simple pleasures as strolling through the fresh green grass underneath the clear blue sky. While 
the prisoner senses these gifts of spring, and senses them very keenly, they nevertheless remain 
out of reach. “Even a man in fetters…” writes Dostoevsky (1983, p. 267), “…was moved by 
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the advent of the fine weather, which awakened even in him vague aspirations, striving and 
longings. I think that men pine more bitterly for freedom in the bright sunshine than in the 
grey days of winter or autumn, and this was noticeable amongst all the prisoners”. The 
freedom that Dostoevsky is longing for here is the freedom to pursue his desires or projects. 
Soon, he will find a very different, much more fulfilling kind of freedom. But for now let us 
get a little more acquainted with his anguish. A little after the above passage, Dostoevsky 
(1983, p. 272) retells his own impressions of the torment that spring brings into the life of the 
prisoner: 
 
The spring had its effects on me also. I remembered how sometimes I gazed hungrily through 
the gaps in the stockade, and how I used to stand for long periods leaning my head against the 
fence and looking obstinately and insatiably at the green grass on the fortress rampart and the 
sky whose blue grew deeper and deeper. My restlessness and longing increased every day and 
the prison became more and more hateful to me. 
 
Because his mind is still holding onto the dreams and desires of his pre-prison life, and because 
the current conditions are such that he is unable to move towards their realisation, because of 
all that anguish and melancholy arise in Dostoevsky’s mind with an incredible force, and he 
is brought down by a sense of hopelessness. This anguish also hides from Dostoevsky the 
intrinsic beauty of the surrounding reality—the greening grass, the distant sky etc.—which, at 
this point in the narrative, are only apprehended as unusable means towards non-pursuable 
ends, as a kind of painful reminder of his confined freedom. He appears to only see the 
surrounding reality vaguely, as if through a fog or a veil. 
 But this very hopelessness, in certain circumstances, forces Dostoesvky to find a whole 
new way of relating to reality, and to the discovery of a very different and much deeper kind 




I speak of that river-bank so often because that was the only place from which God’s earth 
could be seen, the pure bright distance and the free, lonely steppes, whose wild emptiness had 
a strange effect on me…on the river bank you might forget yourself; you would look at the 
vast, solitary expanse as a captive gazes at freedom from the window of his prison. To me, 
everything there was dear and lovely: the bright hot sun in the unfathomable blue sky, the 
songs of the Kirghiz tribesmen carried from the farther bank (Dostoyevsky, 1983, p. 276). 
 
The contrast is striking. In the light of his anguish, the surroundings are suffocating. With the 
dimming of that light and “the forgetting of self” the surroundings take on a very different 
significance. Freed from the sense of being mere means for his unrealisable ends, they reveal 
themselves as they are: 
 
You would gaze for a long time and finally you would distinguish the beggarly, sooty tent of 
some nomad; you would see the wisp of smoke near the tent and the Kirghiz woman busy 
there with her two sheep. It was all poor and savage, but it was free. You would make out a 
bird in the clear blue translucent air and tenaciously follow its flight for a long time; now it 
skimmed the water, now it disappeared in the blue, now it reappeared, a scarcely discernible 
speck…Even the poor, sickly flower I found in the early spring in the cleft in the stony bank—
even that arrested my attention… (ibid.). 
 
Here is a state of mind where the self is forgotten, where the surroundings are bathed in a 
positive light, where things are freed to exhibit their own intrinsic nature and rhythm and 
where attention becomes fixated in a quite peculiar manner (how many of us would stay so 
long with such a mundane thing as a flower fading by the side of the road?) Keiji Nishitani 
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(1982, p. 8) comments: 
 
The things that Dostoevski draws attention to—the curling smoke, the women tending her 
sheep, the poor hut, the bird in flight—are all things we come in touch with in our everyday 
lives. We speak of them as real in the everyday sense of the word, and from there go on to our 
scientific and philosophical theories. But for such commonplace things to become the focus 
of intense a concentration, to capture one’s attention to that almost abnormal degree, is by no 
means an everyday occurrence.  
 
There is no evidence in these passages that Dostoevsky was intentionally trying to bring about 
some special state—as a meditation master might do. For that reason, we cannot truly say that 
he was engaged in any kind of meditation practice, or that he had any such skill. The 
transformation appears to occur quite spontaneously; all Dostoevsky needed to do was to place 
himself in that special spot by the Irtysh—the shifts in consciousness, including the attentional 
changes, took care of themselves. Here it is worth asking: what is it that brings about this 
perspectival shift? Is it a special way of paying attention? Or, perhaps, are the shifts in 
attention only a consequence of entering a new kind of a relationship with one’s surroundings? 
 The entire segment of Dostoevsky’s consciousness that I have been considering can 
be represented with an image of a line divided into two sections. Their border is the 
spontaneous shift from one state of mind to the other. The section to the left of the border 
represents the conditions of mindfulness, which include the old, anguished state of mind and 
the events that lead to the shift (e.g. the attentional changes, being placed in a particular 
situation.) The segment on the right represents the state of mind that arises after the shift, 
which is characterised by the absence or forgetfulness of self, and the discovery of something 
like a hidden dimension in the most ordinary things. The feeling of melancholy associated 
with the earlier state is replaced by a positive feeling of sorts, which paints everything as “dear 
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and gracious”. Attention, too, functions differently now: before the shift, it was fixated upon 
his personal (non-pursuable) projects, now it effortlessly follows reality; it flows with the 
rhythm of the things themselves. 
 
 A similar transformation takes place in life of Levin Konstantin, a character from Leo 
Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina. Levin is a farm owner who has decided to join the peasants in the 
annual mowing of his fields. Levin came to this decision because, Tolstoy (2003, pp. 175-176) 
writes, “…once last year, coming to the mowing and getting angry with the steward, Levin 
has used this remedy for calming down—he had taken a scythe from a muzhik and begun 
mowing.” It seems that in this kind of labour Levin has found a way of escaping unwholesome 
states of mind, such as anger. Now, on the day when the mowing is to take place, a heated 
debate with his older brother left Levin feeling “…himself roundly beaten, but together with 
that he felt that his brother had not understood what he had wanted to say” (ibid.). Beaten, 
frustrated and misunderstood. And that is not all there is to Levin’s misery: we find him 
dreading the upcoming labour itself. Levin, you see, is quite inexperienced with the scythe, 
and in informing the peasants that he will be joining them he is anxious about being unable to 
keep up and he self-consciously anticipates that he will be the butt of their jokes. While not 
quite to the degree that we saw with Dostoevsky—who is after all imprisoned—the reader 
gets a definite impression that, at this point, Levin’s mind is filled with all sorts of anxieties, 
worries and agitations. 
 Levin begins the work. At first, as anticipated, he struggles to keep up with the peasants 
and grows tired to the point of almost giving up. His misery multiplies. But just as he is about 
to embarrassingly voice his need for rest, the other workers stop of their own accord, as if the 
whole labour was governed by some invisible, finely tuned mechanism. The timely break 
tremendously refreshes Levin. The pattern repeats again, and again: exhaustion, break and 
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rejuvenation. Slowly, Levin stops struggling and completely lets go into the rhythm of the 
work. As he does so, single-mindedness and focus begin to grow in his consciousness, 
cleansing it of superfluous thought: “He thought of nothing, desired nothing, except not to lag 
behind and do the best job he could” (Tolstoy, 2003, p. 178). And so the transformation begins: 
 
The longer Levin mowed, the more often he felt those moments of oblivion during which it 
was no longer his arms that swung the scythe, but the scythe itself that lent motion to his whole 
body, full of life and conscious of itself, as if by magic, without a thought of it, the work got 
rightly and neatly done on its own. These were the most blissful moments (Tolstoy, 2003, p. 
179). 
 
As ‘forgetting his self’ leads Dostoevsky into a new relation with his surrounding, so as Levin 
loses the sense of being a doer (an intentional agent who must plan and think everything out) 
he engages the work in an entirely new, and quite unexpected way: 
 
They finished another swath and another. They went through long swaths, short swaths, with 
bad grass, with good grass. Levin lost all awareness of time and had no idea whether it was 
late or early. A change now began to take place in his work which gave him enormous pleasure. 
In the midst of his work moments came to him when he forgot what he was doing and begun 
to feel light, and in those moments his swath came out as even and as good as Titus’s (Tolstoy, 
2003, p. 178). 
 
Tolstoy uses such expressions as ‘moments of oblivion’ and ‘state of unconsciousness’ to 
describe Levin’s state of mind. And these are good descriptions. Compared to our normal state 
of mind (which is constantly flooded by thoughts, memories, expectations and other such 
things) the state that Levin finds himself in is quite different.  It is a silent and open way of 
relating to the world. But, in an important sense, this state is the very opposite of oblivion, of 
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unconsciousness. It is rather that only now, with the extinguishing of explicit mental chatter, 
everything blooms into life and becomes fully aware. 
 Just contrast the way Levin’s body becomes “full of life and conscious of itself” with 
the way the body appears, or rather fails to appear, in the normal, agent-driven kind of activity 
that underlies and powers the more ordinary and familiar modes of being. In instrumental 
practice, the body is experienced as a peculiar instrument; it is not apprehended for itself but 
withdraws into a kind of a background from where it is utilized for the purpose of 
manipulating the surrounding environment, as Jean Paul Sartre (2003a, p. 347) describes in 
the following passage, which begins with the example of how the hand is experienced in the 
act of writing: 
 
…the hand is at once the unknowable and non-utilizable term which the last instrument of the 
series indicated (“book to be read—characters to be formed on the paper—pen”) and at the 
same time the orientation of the entire series. But I can apprehend it—at least in so far as it is 
acting—only as the perpetual, evanescent reference of the whole series. Thus in a duel with 
swords or with quarter-staffs, it is the quarter-staff which I watch with my eyes and which I 
handle. In the act of writing it is the point of the pen which I look at in synthetic combination 
with the line of the square marked on the sheet of paper. But my hand has vanished; it is lost 
in the complex system of instrumentality in order that this system may exist.  
 
As Levin is released from instrumental practice, his up to then ‘evanescent’, ‘lost’ or 
‘withdrawn’ (whatever adjective you want to use) body emerges into the foreground of 
awareness. And when Levin described himself as “feeling light” he is pointing to the fact that 
this foregrounding of the body is associated with a positive feeling tone of some kind. Tolstoy 
(ibid.) describes the feeling that overtakes Levin in this moment as a kind of “blissfulness” 
and as an “enormous pleasure”. For Dostoevsky, recall, everything became “dear and 
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gracious”. I will call this activity, which involves the forgetting of the doer and self, 
foregrounding of the body and the arising of blissful feelings, ‘non-instrumental practice’.6 
 Levin is not only the subject to this transformation; he is also a witness of it in those 
around him (take special note of how the old man’s awareness of his body is described here): 
 
The old man, holding himself erect, went ahead, moving his turned-out feet steadily and 
widely, and in a precise and steady movement that apparently cost him no more effort than 
swinging his arms while walking, as if in play, laid down a tall, uniform swath. Just as though 
it were not him but the sharp scythe alone that swished through the succulent grass (Tolstoy, 
2003, p. 178). 
 
 To the forgetfulness of the self, foregrounding of the body and arising of a deep 
equanimity it is now possible to add a kind of effortlessness to the characteristics of the state 
of mind that arises after the shift. This last quality is nicely captured in Muriel Berbery’s 
(2008, p. 275) commentary on these Tolstoyan passages: 
 
Gradually, [Levin’s] movements are freed from the shackles of his will, and he goes into a 
light trance which gives his gestures the perfection of conscious, automatic motion, without 
thought or calculation, and the scythe seems to move of its own accord. Levin delights in the 
forgetfulness that movement brings, where the pleasure of doing is marvelously foreign to the 
striving of the will… 
 
Berbery (2008, pp. 275-276) gives a wonderful example of non-instrumental practice of her 
own, which illustrates that such a state can be realised even in intellectual work and which I 
 
6 I have borrowed the expressions ‘instrumental’ and ‘non-instrumental’ practice from Maraldo (2012). 
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therefore quote with no small degree of pleasure: 
 
Freed from the demands of decision and intention, adrift on some inner sea, we observe our 
various movements as if they belonged to someone else, and yet we admire their involuntary 
excellence. What other reason might I have for writing this—ridiculous journal of an ageing 
concierge—if the writing did not have something of the art of scything about it? The lines 
gradually become their own demiurges and, like some witless yet miraculous participant, I 
witness the birth on paper of sentences that have eluded my will and appear in spite of me on 
the sheet, teaching me something that I neither knew nor thought I might want to know. This 
painless birth, like an unsolicited proof, gives me untold pleasure, and with neither toil nor 
certainty but the joy of frank astonishment I follow the pen that is guiding and supporting me. 
In this way, in the full proof and texture of my self, I accede to a self-forgetfulness that borders 
on ecstasy, to savor the blissful calm of my watching consciousness.  
 
In Dostoevsky’s case, this effortlessness is implicitly present in the way that his attention 
follows the natural rhythm of the surroundings: the rising of the smoke, the flight of the bird 
through the air and so on. These descriptions produce the impression of a kind of rhythm that 
sharply contrasts with the ordinary one that we are all so used to, the rhythm of chasing some 
desire or other.  
 This contrast is vividly depicted in another one of Tolstoy’s passages, this time from 
War and Peace. We join Andrei Bolkonski on the battlefront of the French-Russian war. In 
the passages leading up to the one that describes ‘the event’—the moment, I contend, when 
Andrei becomes mindful—and which I will quote shortly, Andrei is wholly occupied with 
such human concerns as gaining promotion and recognition for some act of heroism that he is 
constantly and obsessively looking to perform in battle and, in the moment just prior to the 
event, with the outcome of a struggle taking place near him between a French and a Russian 
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soldier. While strenuously trying to determine the outcome of the struggle, a bullet strikes 
Andrei and he begins to fall towards the ground. As he does so, a remarkable transformation 
takes place in him: 
 
‘What is this? Am I falling? My legs are giving away,’ thought he, and fell on his back. He 
opened his eyes, hoping to see how the struggle of the Frenchman with the gunners ended, 
whether the red-haired gunner had been killed or not, and whether the cannon had been 
captured or saved. But he saw nothing. Above him there was nothing but the sky—the lofty 
sky, not clear yet still immeasurably lofty, with grey clouds gliding slowly across it. ‘How 
quiet, peaceful, and solemn, not at all as I ran, thought Prince Andrei ‘—not as we ran, shouting 
and fighting, not at all as the gunner and the Frenchman with frightened and angry faces 
struggled for the mop: how differently do those clouds glide across that lofty infinite sky! How 
was it I did not see that lofty sky before? And how happy I am to have found it at last! Yes! 
All is vanity, all falsehood, except that infinite sky. There is nothing, nothing, but that. But 
even it does not exist, there is nothing but quiet and peace. Thank God! (Tolstoy, 1941, p. 299). 
 
How wonderfully Tolstoy contrasts the rhythm of the human pursuits with that of the reality 
of the sky and the clouds as they are in themselves! The ‘effortlessness’ I have been speaking 
about is reflected in such terms ‘peace’ and ‘solemnity’ that Andrei feels as he simply lets 
himself drift with the clouds above him. Note also Andrei’s surprise—‘How was it I did not 
see that lofty sky before?’—that he could have been so oblivious to something, so peaceful 
and pure and, yet, not entirely foreign. 
 Back to Levin, we learn that the new state that he finds himself in is easily shattered by 
the re-appearance of conscious effort: “…as soon as [Levin] remembered what he was doing 
and started trying to do better, he at once felt how hard the work was and the swath came out 
badly” (Tolstoy, 2003, p. 178). Lastly, I wish to consider the alteration that takes place in 
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Levin’s experience of time. This was already touched upon in a previous passage, where it 
was said that “Levin lost all awareness of time, and had no idea whether it was late or early”. 
A little later in the narrative, Levin is surprised that “…the muzhiks had been mowing without 
a break for no less than four hours” and that he “…did not notice how the time passed. If he 
had been asked how long he had been mowing, he would have said half an hour—yet it was 
nearly dinner time” (ibid). 
 Dostoevsky and Levin’s experience share many common elements: the forgetfulness of 
the self, tuning into the intrinsic rhythm in the surrounding world, which comes with a certain 
effortlessness and a positive feeling tone, and in both cases the most ordinary things reveal a 
quite extraordinary side. But there are also some points of difference. Dostoevsky’s state, and 
Andrei’s too, is associated with a kind of detached observation of the surrounding 
environment. Levin, by contrast, finds mindfulness in a special kind of activity, in non-
instrumental practice.  Does this imply that what we have in our hands are really different 
phenomena? Not necessarily. But it does point at something very interesting: that neither pure 
detached observation, a kind of looking without doing, nor non-instrumental practice are 
essential to mindfulness, if indeed all of these cases are taken as instances of mindfulness, as 
I am encouraging the reader to take them. That leaves the possibility open that detached 
observation and non-instrumental practice belong to a class of phenomena some members of 
which are essential to mindfulness, just as a flower is neither blue nor red necessarily but is 
necessarily some colour. This can be illustrated through another example. Arguably, one can 
be anxious without experiencing either resentful memories, negative thoughts and projections 
or images. But it is plausible that anxiety is necessarily associated with some such 
phenomenon. In the same way, we can think of mindfulness as being necessarily associated 
with neither detached observation nor non-instrumental practice but as nevertheless being 
necessarily associated with and serving as the ground for some experience from that class. 
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More on this later.  
 With the above, we have put down the first lines of our pre-phenomenological sketch of 
mindfulness. It is now time to add further detail to it by considering how the phenomenon is 




An Interpretation of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta 
 
 To become mindful is to undergo a certain shift in perspective. After the shift, the person 
in whom it occurs is taken away from the normal, everyday way of relating to the world to a 
way of being where the most ordinary things (the surrounding environment, the body, one’s 
activities) reveal a quite extraordinary dimension. While this dimension was never entirely 
absent, it laid dormant beneath the surface of ordinary existence as a seed always ready to 
sprout into life in the right conditions. It is with the idea that to become mindful is to undergo 
a shift in perspective, that I now approach the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (henceforth, ‘the Sutta’), the 
authoritative text on mindfulness in the Pali Canon.7 Does the text provide any support for the 
idea that becoming mindful involves a perspectival shift? 
 While the Sutta does not explicitly mention a perspectival shift, I do believe that it is 
there implicitly. Before I give some reasons in support of this claim, let me begin by quoting 
the passage (henceforth, ‘the definition’) where mindfulness is defined. According to Bhikkhu 
Anālayo (Anālayo, 2003, p. 45) the definition functions as “…the standard way of defining 
right mindfulness (sammã sati)” in the Pali Canon and it will be the primary point of focus of 
this chapter. Anālayo (ibid.) offers the following translation of the definition: 
 
Here, monks, in regard to the body a monk abides contemplating the body, diligent, clearly 
knowing, and mindful, free from desires and discontent in regard to the world.  
In regard to feelings he abides contemplating feelings, diligent, clearly knowing, and mindful, 
free from desires and discontent in regard to the world. In regard to the mind, he abides 
contemplating the mind, diligent, clearly knowing, and mindful, free from desires and 
discontent in regard to the world. In regard to dhammas, he abides contemplating dhammas, 
 
7 The Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta is found in the Majjhima Nikāya as sutta 10. 
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diligent, clearly knowing, and mindful, free from desires and discontent in regard to the world.  
 
The first thing to note is that defining mindfulness (the usual translation of ‘sati’) here means 
listing the phenomena (diligence, clear knowing, freedom from desires and discontent) 
without which mindfulness, or to be more specific ‘right’ mindfulness (sammã sati), could not 
exist. This chapter will begin making phenomenological sense of these co-existing 
phenomena, of how they fit together with mindfulness, and what ‘co-existence’ means in this 
context. At this point, however, we are still with the question: does anything in the definition 
speak in favour of the idea that becoming mindful involves a perspectival shift of some kind?  
 To show that something does indeed point towards such a shift consider the following. 
Even before taking up the practice of meditation, all of us have some kind of an understanding 
of the objects that the Sutta instructs us to contemplate: the body, feelings, mind and 
dhammas.8 Call this the ordinary or everyday understanding. This everyday understanding is 
not only responsible for our ability to use the body (to focus on that particular example), but 
also for the know-how of how to move it about and do things with it. It is also that which 
differentiates the body from other phenomenon in our everyday experience. To put it 
differently, everyday understanding has already cut up the world into distinct regions of facts 
and it is only because of the existence of this everyday understanding that the Sutta’s 
instruction to turn towards these familiar objects and to contemplate and understand them in 
some new manner even makes sense. From this we can take the lesson that, implicitly, the text 
is instructing the practitioner to undertake a shift in perspective from the everyday 
understanding to a ‘contemplative understanding’ that allows the phenomenon to be 
 
8 It is a little more difficult to show that this is true of dhammas, which I would translate as ‘transcendental 
phenomena’. While this is not the occasion to go into this, I think that the point I wish to make still holds true 
even if one puts aside the issue of ‘dhammas’ for now and focuses exclusively on the first three objects. 
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understood as it is—more on this below. 
 Further support for the notion that becoming mindful involves a perspectival shift can 
be found in the Sutta’s bivalent title. ‘Satipaṭṭhāna’ is a compound term that can be understood 
in two ways: either as a combination of ‘sati’ and ‘paṭṭhāna’ or of ‘sati’ and ‘upaṭṭhāna’ (Bodhi, 
2011).9 ‘Paṭṭhāna’ means foundation, base or cause. ‘Upaṭṭhāna’ has two meanings: on the 
one hand, it means setting up or establishing something. On the other hand, it carries the sense 
of presence, in the sense of being present to something (ibid.). Not only in the contrast between 
‘upaṭṭhāna’ and ‘paṭṭhāna’ but within the latter itself there exists an ambiguity between the 
process of setting something up, on the one hand, and the foundation or base upon which that 
something is established, on the other. Now there is a tendency in the secondary literature to 
choose one meaning over the other. As Bodhi (2005, p. 1189, fn.136) writes: 
 
Thus the four satipaṭṭhānas may be understood as either the four ways of setting up 
mindfulness or as the four objective domains of mindfulness…The former seems to be the 
etymologically correct derivation…but the Pali commentators, while admitting both 
explanations, have a predilection for the latter. 
 
But the ambiguity can be taken as an informative one and as pointing at the difference between 
the process of setting up or establishing sati, on the one hand, and to the state of affairs where 
sati has actually been established and where one is now actually present to the object, on the 
other. To put it differently, the process of establishing sati leads, or potentially leads, to a shift 
in perspective after which sati is actually established. 
 At this point I would like to explicitly distinguish the phase of experience that takes 
place before the shift from the phase that comes after it. What takes place before the shift can 
 
9 In Pali, the ‘u’ of ‘upaṭṭhāna’ is dropped through vowel elision (Anālayo, 2003, p. 29) 
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be described as the process or practice of cultivating mindfulness. After the shift, one is 
actually being mindful. This difference can be compared to the difference between falling and 
being asleep; while the one can lead to the other, and while they are obviously connected in 
important ways, they are nevertheless different phenomena. But, as I will now try to show, 
instead of speaking of cultivating ‘mindfulness’ and of being ‘mindful’ it may be more 
accurate to speak of the difference between cultivating the ‘contemplative state’ and actually 
being in the contemplative state.  
 
i. CONTEMPLATION 
 ‘Contemplation’ translates into Pali as ‘anupassanā’. This term is derived from the verb 
‘anupassati’, a compound made up of the verb ‘passati’, meaning to see and the emphatic ‘anu’ 
(Anālayo, 2003, p. 32). ‘Anu’ can also carry the meaning of along or together with. The kind 
of contemplation here in question, then, can be understood as a close-seeing-of-how-the-
phenomena-fit-together (the dashes between the words in order to emphasise that these 
distinct qualities constitute a single, unified process). To put it differently, the kind of 
contemplating now in question is a seeing with a definite and inextricable cognitive 
dimension; seeing and cognizing being to anupassati what heads and tails are to a coin.  
 What is the relation between anupassanā and the other phenomena listed in the 
definition (i.e. diligence (ātāpi), clear knowing (sampajāna), mindfulness (sati) and freedom 
from desires and discontent in regards to the world (vineyya abhijjhãdomanassa)? I think that 
Bodhi (2011) should be interpreted literally when he speaks of these phenomena as being 
“parts of” and as “entering into” anupassanā. According to this way of looking at things, 
anupassanā does not belong on the same logical level as the other factors that feature in the 
definition and to think of it as just another item on the same list is to commit a category 
mistake, akin to the error that one makes when one conceives of the university as being just 
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another item on the list that includes the cafeteria, the library, the auditorium and so on.10 
Rather, I propose, anupassanā is the whole of which the other factors are constitutive parts. 
But I do not think that the whole can be reduced to its parts; what is in question here is not a 
mere sum but an organic whole. This, I hope, will become clearer as the discussion unfolds. 
For now the ontological status of sati or mindfulness can be compared to that of colour, the 
existence of which depends on some instance of visual spread and shape with which it co-
exists in the context that is the concrete visual thing. Analogously, sati depends on the other 
factors listed in the definition with which it co-exists within anupassanā. 
 This raises the question: if this is so why, then, is the Sutta called the Satipaṭṭhāna?  Why 
the emphasis on that which is in truth only an aspect of a larger whole? Would it not have been 
more accurate to title the text the Anupassanāpaṭṭhāna Sutta? I believe that the commentary 
raises a similar question in the following way: “Why is the Arousing of Mindfulness intended 
by the word “way”? Are there not many other factors of the way…?” (Soma, 1949, p. 20) And 
the answer is given: “To be sure there are. But these are all implied when the Arousing of 
Mindfulness is mentioned, because these factors exist in union with mindfulness” (ibid). This 
point, which I take to be a good one, can also be put in the following way. Whenever the 
phenomenon that ‘sati’ designates is brought before mind, certain other phenomena are 
necessarily co-apprehended as a kind of accompanying background. This is true even if this 
accompanying background is not explicitly grasped and articulated. Again, it is instructive to 
compare this to colour: to imagine a colour is necessarily to also imagine a definite instance 
of visual spread and shape (even if one does not usually focus upon this accompanying 
background in an explicit way) all of which together make up the imagined visual thing. The 
idea here is that sati is comparable to colour, (at least some) of the other elements mentioned 
in the definition to visual spread and shape and anupassanā to the visual thing.  
 
10 For a discussion of the idea of ‘category mistake’. See Ryle (1984) 
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 It should now be clear why instead of cultivating ‘mindfulness’ and being ‘mindful’ it 
may be more accurate to speak of cultivating the ‘contemplative state’ and actually being in 
that state. And in this chapter, I will generally prefer the latter terminology. But when, either 
in this chapter or in the forthcoming ones, the occasion calls for emphasising the aspect of the 
contemplative state that is mindfulness, I will resort to speaking of cultivating mindfulness 
and being mindful. In general, the hope is that the context will make the meaning clear.  
 It is now possible to define the aims of this chapter more precisely. Given that 
anupassanā is a special kind of a whole or totality, the main task of this chapter is to grasp 
and define the whole as such by, so to speak, allowing it to shine through its parts. While 
different parts of the whole will be distinguished, this activity does not imply the 
fragmentation and destruction of the whole. Differently put, the process of bringing the parts 
into view and understanding their structure and interrelations will proceed by always keeping 
the whole in mind as the background context within which its parts make sense. Now, when I 
speak of ‘the whole’ here I really have in mind two different wholes, which correspond to the 
two phases before and after the shift in perspective. The establishing phase is arguably much 
more dynamic (the conditions for the sprouting of the seeds must be brought into play 
sequentially) than the phase after the shift (where the parts can be taken as co-existing 
simultaneously). So, and this will become much clearer as the discussion progresses, the 
establishing phase is perhaps best described as a temporal whole and, in this sense, it can be 
compared to a melody whose parts, the tones, are spread out in time. Like the blotches of paint 
that constitute a painting, the parts that make up the contemplative state itself can be taken as 
existing simultaneously. The difference between cultivating the contemplative state and being 
in it opens up the possibility that some of the factors mentioned in the definition are aspects 
of the establishing phase, that others make up the contemplative state itself while multivalent 
terms can be taken as designating aspects on either side of the process. This question—of what 
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belongs where—will guide the following analysis of the phenomena that feature in the 
definition, beginning with the object to be contemplated. 
 
ii. THE OBJECT 
 The factors mentioned in the definition can be grouped into two basic categories: the 
subjective and the objective. ‘Objective’ here refers to the object that is to be contemplated. 
In the last chapter, it was almost always some ‘external’ event that stirred mindfulness into 
life; in the case of Dostoevsky, it was a bird flying through the air, for Levin the scythe 
swooshing through the grass, for Andrei the clouds drifting across the sky… Clearly in the 
context of the Sutta ‘object’ does not mean ‘external object’. For, in an important sense, the 
‘objects’ that the text instructs the practitioner to contemplate, such as feelings, are ‘internal’ 
and are aspects of the ‘mind-body’ complex (In Pali: ‘nāma-rūpa’).11 At this point, I suggest, 
‘object’ can be interpreted as intentional object: the object towards which the contemplation 
is to be directed. But here the possibility must be left open that the kind of contemplative 
practice now in question transcends the subject/object dichotomy and that it cannot be 
ultimately understood in those terms. While the intentional object can either be internal or 
external, in the context of the Buddhist path as it is set out in the Sutta the contemplation 
should be directed ‘inwards’ (i.e. towards the mind-body complex). To put it differently, the 
contemplative state contains the possibility of being directed towards internal objects. But this 
is not a necessary possibility; it must be intentionally cultivated from a whole range of 
possibilities that the contemplative state offers. The cultivation of this possibility is therefore 
an important aspect of the Buddhist path and it could be argued, although I will not do so here, 
 
11 This is certainly true for the first three domains: the body, feelings and mental objects. But I am a little less 
certain about categorising dhammas as an aspect of the mind-body complex. But, for the present purposes, the 
dhammas can be left aside. 
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that mindfulness would not be right mindfulness (sammasati) if it were not directed inwards. 
 The Sutta lists four objective domains suitable for contemplation: the body, feeling, 
mind and dhammas. An important question, which I will not address at this point, is: is this 
sequence necessary? In other words, must the aspirant begin by contemplating the body, then 
feelings, the mind and finally dhammas? Or is the order arbitrary; can the contemplation be 
undertaken on any object, do particular ones perhaps suit different personality types? I will 
leave this issue aside for now in order to focus on a more basic question: how is the object—
of whatever kind it is—to be taken in the context of contemplation?  
 This question can be interpreted in at least two ways. (1) How does the object appear 
within the practice of cultivating the contemplative state? (2) How does it appear within the 
contemplative state itself? To illustrate what this difference is getting at, it may help to contrast 
the way that an object (say the body) appears in the process of falling asleep, on the one hand, 
and how the body (fails to) appears in the state of sleep itself, on the other. The following 
discussion will begin by focusing on the role of the object in the establishing phase, while the 
question of how it appears within the contemplative state will be taken up later on. Regarding 
the body in particular, the instructions say: “…in regards to the body a monk abides 
contemplating the body…” Ñānamoli (2005) translates this as: “…abides contemplating the 
body as body” and Bodhi (2011) as “…dwells contemplating the body in the body…”. This is 
an answer to the question: to contemplate the body is to allow it to appear as body or, more 
generally, it is to allow the object to manifest as the object that it is. But what does that mean? 
 On the way to addressing this very question, Anālayo (2003, p. 32) notes that in the 
Buddha’s other discourses contemplating designates “…an examination of the observed object 
from a particular point of view” where “…particular features of the object are to be given 
prominence, such as its impermanence, or its selfless nature”. Here contemplation appears as 
a kind of discriminative judgment, or at least as the support for such a judgment, where some 
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quality of the phenomenon, such as its impermanent nature, is emphasised. But, as Anālayo 
(ibid.) goes on to note, this is not the meaning that the phrase carries in the Sutta, where “…the 
feature to be contemplated appears to be the same as the object of contemplation”. Differently 
put, what the aspirant is being asked to focus upon and isolate here is not some quality of the 
body but the body as such. Anālayo admits to being puzzled by this. In an attempt to clarify 
the issue, he proposes that the two occurrences of ‘body’ in ‘the body as body’ do not carry 
the same meaning. The first occurrence, according to his interpretation, stands for the body as 
a whole. The second “…stands for a particular aspect from the general area of 
contemplation…” (Anālayo, 2003, p. 33).  Here ‘particular aspect’ designates one of the six 
bodily regions that the later parts of the sutta instruct the aspirant to contemplate, namely: 
breathing, postures, activities, anatomical constitution, the four primary elements and the 
decomposition of the body after death. It appears, then, that in Anālayo’s final understanding 
of the expression ‘contemplate the body as body’, ‘contemplating’ retains the sense it has 
elsewhere in the discourses, the sense of being a kind of discriminative judgment, a judgment 
that emphasises a part of a whole, with the difference that ‘part’ no longer means, as it does 
elsewhere in the discourses, the three natures (i.e. impermanence, no-self, suffering) but rather 
stands for the different parts, regions or life phases of the body. I do not find this interpretation 
very convincing.  
 I do not deny that there is a point in the practice where it is necessary to divide the body 
into distinct regions, to isolate and focus on the different postures that the body can assume 
and to become conscious of the different phases of its life cycle. But that point belongs to the 
vipassanā or insight stage of practice, a stage that presupposes the establishment of 
mindfulness or contemplation. But what is in question at this point is how the body appears 
on the way to the establishment of that state, within the establishing phase of the process. 
 Towards the end of his discussion of this issue, Anālayo (2003, p. 34) mentions the 
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commentarial interpretation of the expression, which seems to me to be at odds with his own 
and which I believe to be more satisfactory: 
 
According to the commentaries, the repetition of the object of contemplation also indicated 
emphasis, implying that the object of contemplation should be considered simply as perceived 
by the senses, and in particular without taking it to be “I” or “mine”. In this way the 
repetition—body in body—underlies the importance of direct experience, as opposed to mere 
intellectual reflection. One should let the body speak for itself, so to say, disclosing its true 
nature to the scrutiny of the meditator. 
 
In a footnote to the Sutta, Bodhi (2005, p. 1189 fn.138) also mentions this commentarial 
interpretation:  
 
 The repetition in the phrase “contemplating the body as body”…has the purpose of precisely 
 determining the object of contemplation and of isolating that object from others with which 
 it may be confused. 
The key terms here are ‘direct experience’, ‘emphasis’, ‘letting the body speak for itself’, 
‘precisely determining it’ and ‘isolating the object’, which contrast with ‘mere intellectual 
reflection’ and taking the body to be “I” or “mine”. This will now serve as a clue for 
developing an alternative and what I believe to be a more satisfying interpretation of what it 
means to contemplate the body as body or, more generally, object as object.  
What does it mean to let the body speak for itself and to experience it directly, outside of 
all additions made by intellectual speculation and judgment? It cannot mean to isolate a part 
of the body. For that presupposes that the body as a whole has already been brought into view, 
and brought into view as it is. But the question is concerned with the issue of how the body 
as a whole is to be isolated, and isolated just as it is. To begin making sense of this, recall the 
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earlier observation that in everyday understanding (the kind of understanding at work before 
the perspectival shift) the body already appears in a specific way. What way is this? The 
phenomenologists, such as Jean Paul Sartre (2003a) and Merleau-Ponty (2002), present a 
strong case for the idea that the body originally appears in our experience as a kind of an 
instrument that withdraws and which is therefore hidden or forgotten. This withdrawal of the 
‘instrumental body’ is simultaneously an externalisation. Here the body appears as the 
‘invisible’ or ‘hidden’ medium through which the world announces its instrumental 
dimension, as Sartre (2003a, p. 325) illustrates:  
 
…my body always extends across the tool which it utilizes: it is at the end of the cane on which 
I lean against the earth, it is at the end of the telescope which shows me the stars, it is on the 
chair, in the whole house, for it is my adaption to these tools.  
 
 “Contemplate the body as body” can be interpreted as instructing the practitioner to bring 
the body forth from its withdrawn, instrumental state. This can be described as the practice of 
foregrounding the body. We already touched upon this phenomenon in the last chapter to some 
degree. Recall how Levin’s body appeared as “full of life and conscious of itself”. But in 
Levin’s case foregrounding was a spontaneous, passive happening. However, in the 
Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta foregrounding of the body is to be taken up as a practice, as something to 
be cultivated. But in addition to breaking through this instrumental hiddenness of the body, 
which I believe is the primary meaning of the practice of seeing the body as it is, I think this 
phase can have yet other meanings, which I will now briefly touch upon. 
In the context of ordinary life the body primarily appears as an instrumental body but most 
people are oblivious to this fact. This is because the body’s instrumental dimension tends to 
be overlooked, misunderstood and misconceptualised due to the tendency to treat the body as 
though it was a mere object, as a thing amongst other things and not as the medium through 
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which things appear and disclose their instrumental dimension. Alongside and prior to 
foregrounding, the instruction to “contemplate the body as body” can also be taken to 
designate the need to put aside our interpretative tendencies (everything we believe about the 
body that stems from our past learning and what our society tells us about it) in order to let 
the body speak for itself, to let it emerge as it is. There is yet another, closely related sense in 
which the body can be hidden in the context of everyday understanding, which is prominent 
in the Husserlian phenomenological method. It may be hidden because the body is 
apprehended, not in that original and sui generis experience in which it appears as itself, but 
emptily: through empty, symbolic thinking burdened with preconceived notions about what 
the body is. 
These interpretations of what it means to “contemplate the body as body” are not 
incompatible and it could be argued that the practice involves all three. Moreover, there 
appears to be an order in which the practice should proceed: (1) break through the empty 
apprehension of the body; stop looking at the body through your speculative thoughts and 
images and turn directly to the experience in which it appears originally (2) break through the 
tendency to look at the body simply as an object; in other words, resist the tendency to attribute 
to the body the mode of being of a mere object and (3) foreground the body: suspend the 
instrumental dimension of the body in order to reveal it as really is. The first move is 
Husserlian, the second Heideggerian while the third can be interpreted as Buddhist. While 
arguably all three meanings have an important role to play in the practice, in the following I 
will focus almost exclusively on foregrounding. 
This interpretation is promising. But for it to be truly satisfying it needs to be further 
developed. An important task here is to work out the sense in which the other objects—
feelings, the mind and dhammas—are instrumental and withdrawn in the context of everyday 
understanding and prior to the shift. This is not as straightforward as extending what was said 
49 
about the body to the other objective domains. Feelings, for example, are not instrumental in 
quite the same sense as the body. Nevertheless a strong phenomenological case could be made 
for the idea that feelings, too, externalise themselves; that to experience a feeling in everyday 
life does not first and foremost mean to be thematically aware of the feeling itself but to be 
aware of some aspect of the reality as repugnant, as enticing, as valuable etc.12 To contemplate 
the feeling as feeling, then, would be to break the kind of externalising tendency that is proper 
to it and the kind of hiddenness that correspond to this externalisation. But clearly more work 
is needed in order to spell out the details. The same applies to the mind. How do thoughts, 
memories, expectation etc., externalise themselves? And what would it mean to foreground 
them? The point can be put in the following way also.  
Phenomenologists conceive of pre-reflective consciousness as being directed towards the 
world, towards that which it is not or at least towards that which it does not apprehend itself 
as being. It does this in many different ways, depending on the kind of intentional act in 
question. The Buddhist contemplative practice can be understood as the practice of breaking 
through this externalising tendency of pre-reflective life, a breaking through that reveals pre-
reflective life as it is. 
 According to the Sutta, to contemplate X as X is to reveal its true nature (or at least it 
is to take the first step in that direction). But it could be argued along broadly Heideggarian 
lines that, far from being a revelation of some fundamental truth, foregrounding is in fact an 
objectifying distortion of the phenomenon.13 Perhaps the being of the body is most originally 
revealed in its instrumental/externalising nature. Perhaps the instrumental body is what the 
body really is, primordially and originally. What reason is there to think that when we 
 
12 Scheler (1973) develops the idea that feelings disclose or reveal values in a phenomenological fashion. 
13 This view, that to objectify an aspect of ourselves, to see it as ‘present-at-hand’, is to distort its true nature is 
articulated in Heidegger (1967). 
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apprehend the body as body, when we foreground it, that we are not distorting it? Would this 
not be like dissecting the butterfly in order to find out what its life consists in? Here one could 
also raise the concern that this kind of contemplation is a way of escaping from the world, a 
world with which we are in touch through pre-reflective life and wherein we love and suffer. 
What else, one may wonder, could it be, given that it involves a turning away from 
instrumental solicitations and a turning towards some kind of a de-contextualised and 
detached surveying of phenomena? Is this not an (artificial) creation of some isolated abstract 
inner realm that is far removed from the concreteness of life? 
But the opposite view could also be argued for. Contemplation, the rejoinder could be, is 
a kind of modification of being-in-the-world that is not a distortion but a way of revealing 
phenomena as they really are. Far from turning to some abstract inner subjective realm, 
contemplating is the practice of allowing things to speak their true nature, of seeing the 
phenomenon from which our subjectivity is constituted precisely in their constituting function. 
The turn ‘inwards’ should not be taken too literally; the real force of the kind of contemplation 
now in question is that it allows the real structure of phenomenon to be explicated. If this is 
right then Buddhist contemplation escapes the kind of criticism that Heidegger directed at the 
Husserlian epoché.14 But how does it escape it? What is the relation between and the difference 
of Buddhist contemplative practice and the phenomenological epoché? Some of these issues 
will be dealt with in Part II. 
 According to the above, establishing the contemplative state involves the practice of 
 
14 Heidegger’s (1985)  critique of the epoché, in my opinion, is misguided. As far as I can see, he takes the epoché 
to be a kind of abstractive procedure wherein the phenomenologist ignores the being of the world of 
consciousness in order to bring its intentional experiences into view. This is a serious misunderstanding. But this 
is not the place to expand upon this. I hope to deal with the issue in a forthcoming publication. In so far as this 
work is concerned, the epoché is dealt with in some length in Part II, Chapter I, Section v. 
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breaking through the object’s hiddenness. Success in the practice leads into the contemplative 
state, wherein the object appears as it is. Just as spectacles transform a blurry vision into a 
sharp one, so the practice of contemplating transforms the withdrawn object into a 
foregrounded one. It is now time to turn way from contemplation’s objective dimension, from 
its intentional object, to the ‘subjective’ factors that make up this state itself. To continue with 
the metaphor, what remarkable properties bestow on the spectacles the power of so radically 
transforming vision, of bringing the object out from its instrumental hiddenness and into view 
just as it is?  
 
iii. FREEDOM FROM DESIRES AND DISCONTENT   
 The discussion of the ‘subjective’ factors commences with ‘vineyya 
abhijjhãdomanassa’ translated here as ‘being free of desires and discontent’. What is it that 
one is being, or trying to be, freed from? What, in other words, is the meaning of ‘desires and 
discontent’ (abhijjha domanassa)? I think that the term ‘desire’ can be roughly interpreted as 
being synonymous with ‘our possibilities’, a category that includes different kinds of 
possibilities. Here the focus will be primarily on ‘projects’, examples of which include such 
possibilities as writing this text, going to the cafe, chatting with friends, becoming a 
philosopher and so on. While there may not be an exact correspondence between ‘desires’ and 
‘projects’, the connection is sufficiently close to justify using these terms as synonyms for the 
current purposes. As to ‘discontent’, I will for now interpret this term as designating the 
dissatisfaction that arises on the basis of the realisation that there is always a gap between us 
and our projects; not only in the obvious cases where we fail to realise some project but also 
in the cases where we do bring some project to completion. The discontent exists because a 
human being never stands still but is always striving for some future project that is not-yet. 
While I will no longer explicitly discuss discontent here, its existence will be implied 
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whenever I speak of striving for the realisation of projects, desires or our possibilities. Leaving 
aside for the moment the question of why one should want to become free of one’s projects in 
the first place, the remainder of this section will focus on the meaning of ‘vineyya’. 
 According to Anālayo (2003, pp. 69-71), this expression can be interpreted in two ways: 
as meaning either (1) complete and permanent freedom or (2) the process of becoming free. 
While admitting that (1) is probably the ‘best’ translation of vineyya in general, he opts for (2) 
as being the one that makes most sense in the context of the definition. This is because, 
Anālayo (ibid) argues, this early stage of the Satipaṭṭhāna practice cannot demand of the 
aspirant complete and permanent removal of desires. For the later sections of the Sutta instruct 
the practitioner to contemplate the hindrances that are tied up with desires in their very nature. 
And this would make no sense if one were already permanently freed from them.  
 I agree that (1) is not a satisfactory interpretation of vineyya. But it does not follow that 
(2) is correct. For there is a third way to interpret vineyya: as complete but temporary freedom 
from projects. While Anālayo does not explicitly consider this possibility, it appears fleetingly 
in his claim that “[d]uring these initial stages the task is to build up a degree of inner equipoise 
within which desires and discontent are held at bay” (Anālayo, 2003, p. 77 my emphasis), and 
Thanissaro Bhikkhu (1996, p. 16 my emphasis)  also seems to point at it when he speaks of 
“putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world”. According to this interpretation 
of vineyya, while the establishment of the contemplative state implies the complete removal 
of the bond that ties us to our various projects, what persists is (something like) the disposition 
for these projects, and the associated discontent, to return when the contemplative state lapses, 
as it is bound to do, at least in these early stages of practice. This can be comparable to the 
temporary relief from an illness that some drugs bring about, where all symptoms of the 
ailment are temporarily absent but not therefore the underlying disposition for the illness to 
return. 
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 While this is, I contend, how the expression ‘vineyya’ should be interpreted when used 
to describe the contemplative state itself, the sense of permanent freedom from desires and 
discontent also has a place in the practice. This can be described as the ultimate goal of the 
Buddhist path but I will have not too much more to say about it here. As for ‘vineyya’ in the 
sense of the process of becoming free of desires and discontent, I suggest that this is a 
description of what takes place in the context of cultivating the contemplative state. I would 
now like to discuss this in a little more detail. 
 To begin with, it is important to note that there is a deep connection between projects, 
the instrumental body and the instrumental meaning of objects (‘the content’ of an action). 
Let’s take an example. I am drinking coffee. This act includes as an aspect of itself the project 
of, say, being caffeinated. It is in virtue of this project that the coffee mug appears with the 
instrumental meaning to-be-sipped-from. But the instrumental body, the sense that I have of 
the possibility of picking the cup up, of placing it against my lips and so on, plays a key role 
in the constitution of this instrumental meaning. This instrumental meaning is the content of 
the action. In the above example, the content of the action can be described as the cup to-be-
drank-from. Next, I would like to distinguish internal and external actions. The content of 
external action is determined, in part at least, by the materiality of the immediate environment, 
which we know through the five external senses. In contrast, this content of the internal actions 
is not determined in that way.  
 While the project plays an important role in the formation of the content, it is not itself 
the content of the action but its basis or foundation. The relation that obtains between the 
content of the external actions and the project that underlies it is such that, in ordinary 
circumstances, the project appears through and as a structure of the content; we discover what 
the project is, not by some detached act of contemplation, but precisely by realising the 
content or, better, by responding to the instrumental meaning of the object, as Sartre (2003a, 
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p. 36) illustrates in the following passage: 
 
In lighting this cigarette I learn my concrete possibility, or if you prefer, my desire of smoking. 
It is by the very act of drawing towards me this paper and this pen that I give to myself as my 
most immediate possibility the act of working at this book; there I am engaged, and I discover 
it at the very moment when I am already thrown into it…Thus in the quasi-generality of 
everyday acts, I am engaged, I have ventured, and I discover my possibilities by realizing them 
and in the very act of realizing them as exigencies, urgencies, instrumentalities.  
 
This disclosure of projects by the means of responding to instrumental solicitations can be 
described as a kind of mindlessness and it is how most of us live our lives most of the time.  
 But here I wish to focus on the following. It can happen that the link between the external 
action and the underlying project becomes severed. And when that happens, it can also happen 
that while the content of the action stays the same, the way of relating to it alters; whereas 
before we were related to it through external action, the instrumental meaning now becomes 
the content of some internal act. An innocuous example of this is found in the case where I 
simply close my eyes, thereby preventing myself from drinking coffee. What can happen at 
this point is that I start imagining the cup as-to-be-drank-from; I start anticipating how I will 
be realising this instrumental meaning in the future when I open my eyes. Here I continue to 
relate to the instrumental meaning, i.e. cup to-be-drank-from, except that in the mental act this 
content is posited as absent. The underlying project has remained the same as it was in the 
external action; it is just that now, because I have been prevented from realising it in the ‘real 
world’, I relate to it mentally. To put it differently, the old projects continue to structure my 
‘world’ but when the situation prevents that project from being realised through external 
actions, the project can ‘pop up’ in the mental realm, in thoughts, images and so on. And for 
it to pop up in the mental realm means: the project appears through instrumental meanings or 
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contents of internal actions. When we can no longer pursue our projects through the external 
action and instead become aware of them through the content of internal actions, I will call 
this event thematisation. The crucial point in here is that in order to practice becoming free 
from our projects, they must first be thematised. 
 In the description of Dostoevsky’s experience in the first chapter, we said that in prison 
“…the conditions are arranged in such a way as to prevent the prisoner from pursuing the 
project by which their pre-prison life was defined…” In prison the surroundings are arranged 
in such a way the prisoner can no longer pursue the basic projects that make up normal human 
existence through external actions. Hence the projects that were previously (in pre-prison life) 
pursued mindlessly, without much reflection, and which were responsible for that sense that 
life is worth living, that it has a meaning “…now float before the prisoner’s awareness in the 
form of realisable but currently non-pursuable ends”. The lesson here is that thematisation can 
be triggered by a felt lack of something in the surrounding environment. 
 But thematization can also be brought about through the foregrounding of the 
instrumental body. If, for some reason, we find ourselves in a position where our instrumental 
body is no longer available and functioning, then we will be in a position of not being able to 
realise any projects in our immediate environment.  Both—the removal of the external 
conditions through which projects appear and the foregrounding of the body—play a role in 
the practice of establishing the contemplative state.  It is for this reason, I believe, that shortly 
after the definition the Sutta gives the following instructions:  
 
And how, bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu abide contemplating the body as body? Here a bhikkhu, 
gone to the forest or to the root of a tree or to an empty hut, sits down; having folded his legs 
crosswise, set his body erect, and having established mindfulness in front of him, ever mindful 
he breaths in, ever mindful he breaths out. 
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The effect on the practitioner of feeling the absence of the usual means or instruments in the 
environment is comparable to the effect that prison has on the prisoner: in both cases, the 
person is left confronting the absence of familiar equipment. The consequence is 
thematisation, the appearance of ‘our world’—the total set of projects that make us who we 
are— through internal actions, perhaps as thoughts of the following kind —“I cannot wait to 
get out of here. Oh, how I look forward to a long conversation over coffee with Brett”—or 
memories—“ah, how nice it was just to be able to stroll through the town on a Friday night, 
and look at me now, stuck here, watching my breath like some idiot, with nowhere to go”. 
Commitment to the practice forces the aspirant to sit down, and keep the body still and erect. 
This foregrounding of the body ensures that even the most innocuous and taken-for-granted 
projects, such as moving around, stretching and scratching, can no longer be felt and pursued 
through external actions. At this point even these proximate projects will, so to speak, bubble 
up as contents of images and thoughts. This is thematisation par excellence. As I see it, 
thematisation precedes and conditions the possibility of the practice of becoming free from 
desires and discontent. This involves tuning-out of our projects and tuning-in to something 
else—the precise nature of which will be discussed below. For now, however, I would like to 
distinguish this practice of tuning-out from what may be called the practice of becoming 
disenchanted from our (thematised) projects.  
  Disenchantment is not discussed in the Sutta. It is, however, treated in other Buddhist 
texts, including the Stages of Meditation (Bhāvanākrama), a work by the eighth century Indian 
scholar Kamalaśīla. What follows is a brief summary of some of the main points from this 
text which will strengthen the above line of thought. After withdrawing to a “place conductive 
for reflection”, Kamalaśīla (2004, pp. 639-340) writes, and having set “the body erect in a 
comfortable posture, with legs crossed”—in short, after bringing about the suspension of 
external action—, the mind Kamalaśīla warns us, will be “…pulled away to externals by other 
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objects like those that induce passion, disgust and the like…” (ibid). Here ‘distraction’ and 
‘being pulled away to externals’ correspond to ‘thematisation’; the appearance of projects 
through internal acts. “Once the distraction is noted…” the Kamalaśīla (ibid.) continues 
“…one should counteract it. For instance, if the distraction is pleasurable, one should bring to 
mind a mental image of the impure and the unpleasant, or a similar meditation object.” In 
other words, depending on the nature of the thematised project, and in particular its feeling 
tone, the aspirant is to counterbalance it by bringing to mind an object that neutralises its 
affective pull. When undertaken earnestly with persistence and patience, such practice can 
lead to disenchantment with the project. At that point the project, temporarily at least and so 
to speak, ceases knocking on the door of the mind. One has become completely but only 
temporarily free of it. But, while it can be extremely helpful, I believe that disenchantment is 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the practice of meditation (indeed, disenchantment on its 
own can lead to serious depression for one may get the sense that life is meaningless). Instead, 
it is possible to become temporarily free from the project by taking the awareness away from 
the thematised content directly to one’s meditation objects; through the practice of tuning-in, 
which I will discuss shortly. To succeed in this practice is to realise the state of being tuned-
out, the complete but temporary freedom from projects.  
 ‘Complete but temporary detachment from desire’ is a negative description of the 
contemplative state, pointing towards that which it lacks. Anālayo (2003, p. 67) notes that in 
the Buddha’s other discourses ‘being free of desires and discontent’ is replaced by 
“…reference to concentrated mind and experiencing happiness”. These expressions are not, I 
believe, meant to be synonymous. Rather, they point at different aspects of the same facet of 
the contemplative state: one negative, the other positive. What was above negatively described 
as complete but temporary detachment from our projects can be positively characterised as a 
state of equanimity and concentration. This is important as it implies that concentration is a 
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characteristic of mindfulness or contemplation itself. In other words, establishing mindfulness 
implies establishing some degree of concentration, where this kind of concentration must be 
distinguished from high concentrative states into which mindfulness can but need not be 
developed. The kind of concentration now in question could very well be what some Buddhist 
texts call ‘khanika samādhi’ or ‘momentary concentration’. 
 How does momentary concentration relate to freedom from our projects? Why does the 
one imply the other? At this point, I can do no more than sketch the answer to these questions 
and bring into light certain distinctions that will be treated in detail later on (see: Part II, 
Chapter II, Section v.). To begin with, we can say that the opposite of one-pointedness or 
concentration is scattered attention, which is constantly darting from one thing to another. And 
why does attention scatter? Scattering of attention implies at least the presence of the project 
to be aware of what is happening in the surrounding environment. It is based in the project to 
see this, to investigate that. To completely let go of one’s projects means to let go of this one 
too. The consequence of this letting go is the cessation of scattered attention and the 
establishment of one-pointedness or concentration. This is a state that the mind finds itself in 
when it is no longer striving to realise its own ends but is there with the phenomena 
themselves. Here the multiplicity of objects that make up our normal scenery gives way to a 
kind of oneness or togetherness (recall our earlier definition of anupassanā as close-seeing-
of-how-the-phenomena-fit-together). Was this, I wonder, what my father was trying to convey 
with the metaphor of the multiple colours merging into a homogeneous quality?  
 
iv. MINDFULNESS 
 ‘Sati’ carries two meanings in the context of the Pali Canon. On the one hand, the term 
points back towards the Sanskrit ‘smrti’ from which it originated and which is usually 
translated as ‘memory’ or ‘recollection’. On the other hand, ‘sati’ carries a sense that has been 
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rendered in English in several ways including ‘lucid awareness’, ‘undisturbed watchfulness’ 
and ‘attentiveness’. On this multivalence, Rhys Davids (1910) wrote long ago: 
 
Etymologically Sati is Memory. But as happened at the rise of Buddhism to so many other 
expressions in common use, a new connotation was then attached to the word, a connotation 
that gave a new meaning to it, and renders ‘memory’ a most inadequate and misleading 
translation. It became the memory, recollecting, calling-to-mind, being-aware-of, certain 
specified facts. Of these the most important was impermanence (the coming to be as the result 
of a cause, and the passing away again) of all phenomena, bodily and mental. And it included 
the repeated application of this awareness, to each experience of life, from the ethical point of 
view. 
 
The question of how to harmonise this apparent semantic dissonance has received quite a bit 
of attention in the secondary Buddhist literature. There one can detect a trace of the tendency 
to do away with the meaning of recollection or memory altogether. However, this is never 
pursued to the very end and the author in question ends up having to, in one way or another, 
retain the meaning of memory in the final explication of the term. A good illustration of this 
is the above quotation itself, which accuses ‘memory’ of being “a most inadequate translation” 
while at the same time asserting sati to be a (special) kind of memory, the recollection “…of 
certain specified facts”. Similarly, Bodhi (2011) writes that in the Buddhist context “…sati no 
longer means memory” and that “…it would be a fundamental mistake to read the old meaning 
of memory into the new context” while also holding that “…it is not a mistake to determine 
how sati acquires its new application on the basis of the old meaning”. The general lesson 
here is that there must be something left in the meaning of ‘sati’ that points back to its origin 
in ‘smrti’. After all, the Buddha chose ‘sati’ and not some other Sanskrit term for his purposes, 
and this suggests a special connection between the phenomenon he was trying to demarcate 
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and memory or recollection. What is the nature of this connection? In what sense is sati 
recollection? 
 I will try to show that ‘sati’ can be interpreted as memory or recollection in two distinct 
senses. Both play an important role in the context of the Buddhist path as it is set out in the 
Suta (and the Pali Canon more generally) and must be distinguished from the third sense of 
‘sati’ as lucid awareness.  
 The first meaning of ‘recollecting’ is closely related to the previously discussed 
foregrounding of the object, bringing it forth from its instrumental hiddenness, from its 
withdrawn state. This withdrawal of the object can also be described as a kind of forgetfulness. 
While the above discussion of foregrounding focused on the way that the object appears when 
its instrumental meaning is broken through, ‘sati’ in the sense of recollecting can be 
understood as designating the ‘subjective’ dimension of the contemplative state that 
corresponds to foregrounding. While, as far as I am aware, it is nowhere articulated explicitly, 
traces of this interpretation can be found in the existing literature.  
 It fits Davids’s somewhat vague claim quoted above that sati is the recollecting of 
certain specified facts, if ‘specified facts’ is taken to mean the object as it is underneath its 
instrumental covering. The interpretation is more clearly anticipated in the following set of 
statements made by Bodhi. Sati, Bodhi (2011) writes, “…brackets the ‘objectification’ of the 
object that occurs in our everyday interaction with the world, whereby we treat the objects as 
things ‘out there’ subservient to our pragmatic concerns”, it is the activity of bringing the 
object out “…from the twilight of unawareness into the clear light of cognition”, it 
“…illuminates the object without the usual overlay of distorted conceptual elaborations that 
obscure their real nature”. And if ‘makes’ is in the following quote replaced with ‘making’, 
thereby emphasising the active nature of the process, then it too can be interpreted as being in 
harmony with the interpretation on offer: “[sati] makes the objective field ‘present’ to 
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awareness as an expanse of phenomena exhibiting their own distinctive phenomenal 
characteristics, as well as patterns and structures common to all conditioned phenomena” 
(ibid.). In summary, sati in this sense of recollecting or remembering can be understood as the 
activity of bringing to awareness the object’s inner intelligibility and structure, which is 
usually hidden underneath its instrumental meaning. Leaving the details aside until later, at 
this point I would only like to make the observation that the object’s inner intelligibility, 
(which I will argue is the best way to interpret ‘sampajāna’, one of the two factors mentioned 
in the definition yet to be discussed) is not something that the practice introduces into the 
object. The inner intelligibility is discovered when the object’s instrumental cover is broken 
through with the power of recollection. To avoid unnecessary confusion, and to distinguish 
this meaning of ‘sati’ from those to be discussed shortly, I will reserve the term tuning-in for 
this activity of remembering the object’s intrinsic intelligibility. Bodhi (2011 my emphasis.) 
touches upon this meaning in the following passage: 
 
…the suttas do not give us a formal definition of sati that enables us to clearly differentiate it 
from sati as memory, but rather an operational demonstration that indicates, in practical terms, 
how its role in Buddhist meditative practice differs from that of memory. Certain 
definitions…show that the two are not entirely distinct, and thus it would be an interesting 
theme for inquiry how a word originally meaning “memory” came to mean “attention to the 
present.” Perhaps the root idea is that to be mindful means “to remember” to pay attention to 
what is occurring in one’s immediate experience rather than to allow the mind to drift away 
under the dominion of stray thoughts and tumultuous emotions. 
 
Tuning-in is the other side of tuning-out: the practice of becoming free from one’s projects 
(vineyya abhijjhādomanassa). Tuning-out and tuning-in are two sides of the same coin. From 
here on, I will refer to whole structure of which these two are but moments as tuning-out-
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tuning-in. In the following passage, which I already quoted but which is worth repeating, 
Bodhi (2011) can be taken as pointing to both of these moments of tuning-out-tuning-in: 
 
…on the one hand, we might say that [sati] brackets the ‘objectification’ of the object that 
occurs in our everyday interaction with the world, whereby we treat objects as thing ‘out there’ 
subservient to our pragmatic purposes. On the other hand, sati makes the objective field 
‘present’ to awareness as an expanse of phenomena exhibiting their own distinctive 
phenomenal characteristics, as well as pattern and structures common to all conditioned 
phenomena.  
  
 Tuning-in is the first sense in which ‘sati’ means memory. In order to bring the second 
into view, it is necessary first to understand the sense in which ‘sati’ means lucid awareness. 
While tuning-in is a moment of the practice of cultivating mindfulness or contemplation, lucid 
awareness is an aspect of the contemplative state itself, which can now be described as the 
state of being tuned-in. Insightfully and helpfully, Bodhi (ibid.) draws a distinction between 
lucid awareness, the ‘subjective side’ of the contemplative state, and vivid presentation, which 
describes the way that the object appears within that state. On lucid awareness, Bodhi (ibid.) 
writes that… 
  
I characterise this as a stance of observation or watchfulness towards one’s experience. One 
might even call the stance of sati a ‘bending back’ of the light of consciousness upon the 
experiencing subject in its physical, sensory and psychological dimensions. This act of 
‘bending back’ serves to illuminate the events occurring in these domains, lifting them out 
from the twilight of unawareness into the light of clear cognition. 
 
To put the two meanings together we can say the following. There comes a point when the 
practice of waking the object up from its instrumental slumber (i.e. tuning-in to its intrinsic 
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intelligibility) yields a result: the object actually wakes up. At that point, tuning-in gives way 
to the state of lucid awareness, the state of being tuned-in. Here the practitioner is no longer 
trying to awaken the inner intelligibility of the object and is no longer struggling with the pull 
of one’s projects and the instrumental meanings that that pull gives rise to. The practitioner is 
now lucidly aware and dwelling in the phenomenon’s inner intelligibility. A shift in 
perspective has taken place. It is as if after all the flickering, the lights have finally come on. 
Shedding its instrumental skin, the up-to-then dimly lit inner intelligibility of the object now 
shines brightly, illuminating awareness and exposing itself to further explication. I must, 
however, at this point leave the question open of whether the bending back metaphor—which 
seems to point towards something like what the phenomenologists have called reflective 
awareness—adequately captures sati’s illuminating quality. I have my doubts about lucid 
awareness being some kind of a reflective act that bends back and takes as its object some pre-
reflective experience. More will be said about this in the forthcoming chapters. 
 It is now possible to discuss the other sense in which ‘sati’ can be interpreted as memory. 
When sati is defined as ‘memory’ in some of the other discourses of the Pali Canon, it seems 
to refer to that which we usually have in mind when we use the term: the recollection or 
memory of something that occurred in the past. Thus, in sutta 48.9 of the Samyutta Nikāya 
sati is defined in this way: 
 
And what, monks, is the faculty of mindfulness? Here, the noble disciple is mindful, 
possessing supreme mindfulness and alertness, one who remembers and recollects what was 
said long ago. This is called the faculty of mindfulness.  
 
According to Bodhi (2011), sati in this sense is grounded on lucid awareness in the following 
way. In the terms developed above, with the state of being tuned-in established it is possible 
that some past event ‘enters’ the lucidly aware mind. And when it does so, lucid awareness 
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assumes the form of memory. But this is no ordinary memory; rather it is an amplified memory 
of sorts. I will call it mindful memory. Bodhi (2011) writes: 
 
Sati makes the apprehended object stand forth vividly and distinctly before the mind. When 
the object being cognized pertains to the past—when it is apprehended as something that was 
formerly done, perceived, or spoken—its vivid presentation takes the form of memory. 
 
Similarly, Anālayo (2003, p. 48) argues that the lucid awareness makes the remembrance of a 
present moment easier later on, amplifying the normal, recollective function. To put this in 
different terms, mindful memory can be said to make up the pattern of the contemplative state, 
the unique form that the stream of consciousness takes when one becomes tuned-in. Mindful 
memory is an essential factor in the Buddhist path. To fully understand its role, however, we 
must first understand the meaning of sampajāna, which we will study below. For now, we can 
say that ‘sampajāna’ stands for the intrinsic intelligibility of the object, which comes into 
view when we tune-in to it. But without a map on what to do with this intrinsic intelligibility, 
there is a good chance that the practitioner would become lost from the Buddhist path. The 
function of mindful memory, I propose, is to recollect the Buddhist teachings; not in order to 
impose a meaning onto an otherwise meaningless field of phenomena but to serve as a guide 
on how to proceed once the intrinsic intelligibility of the phenomenon has come into view. 
 
v. EFFORT 
 The first chapter characterised mindfulness as involving a kind of effortlessness. More 
over, this state of mind was described as being incompatible with that which is usually called 
‘effort’. Recall how “…as soon as [Levin] remembered what he was doing and started trying 
to do better, he at once felt how hard the work was and the swath came out badly.” And if in 
the following passage ‘serenity’ is taken as referring to the contemplative state or mindfulness 
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then this is also Kamalaśīla’s (2004, pp. 641-342) view: “…when the mind moves effortlessly 
as it wishes on the object, then one should know that serenity has been perfected” but, 
Kamalaśīla warns, “…if one applies effort as the mind is moving in equilibrium, then the mind 
will be distracted”. The Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta does not directly discuss this quality of 
effortlessness. But it does point out a kind of effort as an essential factor in the practice of 
tuning-out-tuning-in. 
 This is ‘ātāpi’. Besides effort, this term has also been translated as diligence or ardency. 
According to Anālayo (2003, p. 35), ātāpi designates the “…firm opposition to unwholesome 
thoughts and tendencies”, which calls for “…a strong and uncompromising commitment” and 
involves “…keeping up one’s contemplation with balanced but dedicated continuity, returning 
to the object of meditation as soon as it is lost”. The tendency of the object to become lost is 
the same as, I suggest, the tendency of the object to withdraw, to be forgotten underneath its 
instrumental meaning. ‘Thoughts and tendencies’ can be interpreted as designating thematised 
projects. Returning to the lost object is tuning-in. If this reinterpretation is accepted, so far 
Anālayo’s statements contain nothing new. The novelty comes in with the idea that this 
returning to the lost object calls for a strong and uncompromising commitment and a dedicated 
continuity. These are different ways to describe ātāpi. What kind of effort is in question here? 
How does it fit into the definition of mindfulness or contemplation as developed so far? 
 An illustration may help at this point. Suppose that I am engaging in breath meditation. 
According to the interpretation so far, this means that I am tuning-out of my projects—to write 
philosophy, to go out for a walk, to sit around and do nothing—and tuning-in to the way that 
the breath is unfolding in and of itself. As I listen in to the breath, however, I find myself being 
constantly pulled away towards the thematised projects (which manifest as the content of 
thoughts, expectations, and the like or simply through the way I am tempted to move around, 
to open my eyes etc.) In fact, usually I do not even experience being pulled towards a project. 
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Rather, without knowing how exactly I got there, I usually find myself as already being drawn-
in to some project or other. When—usually after quite some time has gone by—I realise that 
I have become lost a peculiar kind of mental energy is called for in order to attempt to tune-
in to the breath again, to find its natural rhythm. This is ātāpi. While ātāpi cannot be isolated 
from tuning-in-tuning-out as a self-sufficient phenomenon, it can be discerned as a distinct 
moment of the process (one that can be represented by the middle ‘-’). But, to return to the 
question, what kind of an effort is ātāpi? 
 As the term is usually understood, ‘effort’ gets its sense from the endeavour to bridge 
the gap between how things are and how we desire them to be. It is the expenditure of energy 
required to overcome “the resistance and adversity” of things and thereby to realise a project 
in virtue of which things get these qualities of resistance in the first place. To illustrate and to 
help contrast this phenomenon with ātāpi, consider the following situation. While in 
meditation: I ‘unconsciously’ latch on to the project of solving some philosophical problem 
with which I was preoccupied earlier in the day. Here certain concepts appear before my mind 
as unclear, as needed-to-be-sorted-out and the project in question manifests through this 
instrumental meaning. It is as if in order to get to the meaning I must push aside the veil of 
unclarity, which manifests as a kind of resistance to the access of the meaning that I seek. Still 
drifting off, I respond to this solicitation: I start drawing distinctions, perhaps doing 
phenomenological analyses, recalling what philosopher X said about topic Y and so on. Here 
a kind of effort is at work. But is it the same kind of effort that appears when I become aware 
that I am drifting, and again attempt to tune-in to the breath?  
 Someone could argue for an affirmative answer by stating that here, too, there is a 
project at work: the project of being tuned-in to the breath. In light of this project, the breath 
appears with the instrumental meaning to-be-tuned-in-to. The effort that goes into the practice 
is then nothing other than a response to this solicitation. According to this view, ātāpi is 
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nothing but a special case of the standard kind of effort. To this, a skeptic could respond by 
pointing out the apparently self-defeating nature of such an enterprise (where one is resorting 
to desire in order to overcome desire). Is that not a little like drinking oneself to sobriety? This 
same skeptic could argue that being tuned-in to the breath is not an nonactualised possibility 
(which it would have to be according to the above account) but an implicit actuality: on some 
level one is already tuned-in to the breath; the practice of tuning-in-tuning-out is nothing more 
than the removing of the covering of projects in order to allow what is already there to shine 
forth. But the following counter-response suggests itself. Just as a lesser fire can be used in 
order to control a greater one—as when farmers burn dry grasslands in order to prevent the 
spread of a raging bushfire—so it could be argued that projecting the possibility of being 
tuned-in to the breath is a preventative measure against being imprisoned by the project that 
shape’s one’s everyday existence. Being unable to decide what is actually the case, I will let 
the matter rest here for now and leave a more definite statement on the phenomenological 
nature of ātāpi for later parts of this work. 
 Before leaving the question of effort, I wish to suggest the following. Just as the effort 
that goes into falling asleep is no longer present in the state of sleep itself so ātāpi is left 
behind with the establishment of the contemplative state. But while the contemplative state is 
effortless in one way, it does not follow that it excludes every kind of effort. In fact, I believe 
that the contemplative state can, and in the context of the Buddhist path must involve a kind 
of effort. To begin elucidating this phenomenon recall how, in Levin’s case, mindfulness found 
its expression in what I called non-instrumental practice. While this is not an intentional 
doing, and therefore does not call for the kind of effort that goes into the realisation of our 
projects, it nevertheless can be described as involving a kind of effort. But more importantly, 
in the context of the Sutta the establishment of the contemplative state is followed by the 
practice of vipassanā. This is a kind of explicit reflection or cognition that should not be 
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conflated with the form that these phenomena take in the normal, project-driven ways of 
being. Above I mentioned the idea that when one becomes tuned-in the stream of 
consciousness takes on a specific form. This is the pattern of the contemplative state. Memory, 
for example and as I discussed above, now takes the specific form of mindful memory. 
Analogously, the process of thinking or judging now becomes mindful reflection; the bringing 
of the object’s intrinsic intelligibility into explicit awareness. This is vipassanā. At this point, 
I do not wish to go into the details of how this mindful reflection arises from within the 
contemplative state—I will have more to say about this later (see: Part II, Chapter III). The 
only thing that I wish to emphasise here is that mindful reflection calls for a kind of effort that, 
unlike ātāpi, is compatible with the state of being tuned-in. 
 
vi. CLEAR COMPREHENSION 
 There is one more factor in the definition left to consider. This is ‘sampajāna’. This is 
the cognitive dimension of contemplation. Its other translations include: ‘clear knowing’, 
‘clear comprehension’ and ‘thorough understanding.’ Here it is important to keep in mind that 
while sampajāna is a condition for and can be developed into insight (vipassanā) and wisdom 
(panna), the more explicit cognitive functions, which take the form of what I earlier called 
‘mindful reflection, it cannot be identified with them. Sampajāna is a more primordial, basic 
and implicit kind of discrimination or understanding and it is the seed from which more 
explicit forms of understanding arise. What role does sampajāna play in the context of 
anupassanā and how does it relate to the other factors that we have discussed? I will begin 
addressing these questions by considering the nature of the relation between sampajāna and 
sati. 
 It is generally agreed upon that sati and sampajāna occur in close proximity to each 
other. But the expression ‘in-close-proximity’ appears to be understood in at least two distinct 
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ways in the secondary literature. On the one hand, the expression is sometimes interpreted as 
implying an interdependence: a necessary and simultaneous co-existence of sati and 
sampajāna. According to this understanding, the two factors stand in the same relation as 
colour and visual spread do in the context of a visual object: whenever the one is there so is 
the other and it is impossible to tear them apart. Thus in the discourses “…the explanation of 
sati invariably includes the term sampajāna” and that “…whenever there is samma-sati 
(wholesome mindfulness) there is also sampajāna” (Importance of Vedana and Sampajañña, 
1990). Bodhi (2011) notes that the presence of sati and sampajāna in the definition  “…shows 
that [sampajāna] has been present to some degree all along”, by which he means that 
sampajāna is not something that enters the picture once the contemplation is already under 
way but that it has been there from the very start and that it is therefore ‘co-joined’ with sati:  
 
Mindfulness, though operating in a simple mode as “bare attention,” doesn’t occur alone, in 
isolation from other mental functions. One such mental function with which it is conjoined is 
sampajañña, and here we might say that sampajañña operates as the simple knowing of the 
quality of the breath. In commentarial terms, this would be gocara-sampajañña, clear 
comprehension of the meditation object. 
 
That is one way to interpret ‘in-close-proximity’. But, on the other hand, this expression is 
sometimes taken to mean that sampajāna occurs subsequently to and on the ground of sati. 
The idea here is that sati, in the sense of lucid awareness, is established first, that its 
establishment illuminates the field of awareness, a field that is, at this point, dumb and 
unstructured. Then, in a distinct step, sampajāna enters the picture and performs the function 
of subsuming the illuminated field under Buddhist categories, like dependent origination or 
the four noble truths. In an apparent conflict with the statements quoted above, Bodhi (2011) 
describes sampajāna as being like “…a bridge between the observational function of 
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mindfulness and the development of insight”, implying thereby that mindfulness occurs first, 
and that it is followed by discrimination that is sampajāna, in a second, distinct step. In a 
complementary description, Bodhi (ibid) says that in the initial stages of the practice, lucid 
awareness ‘opens up the phenomenal field’ while “clear comprehension supervenes adding 
the cognitive element” and places “…the arisen phenomena in a meaningful context”. In the 
same spirit, Anālayo (2003, p. 42 my emphasis) writes that sampajāna “…has the task of 
processing the input gathered by mindful observation, and thereby leads to the arising of 
wisdom” and that “…the presence of the two factors in the definition point to the need to 
combine the mindful observation of the phenomenon with an intelligent processing of the 
observation data.” This talk of processing input, and needing to combine sati and sampajāna, 
shows that Anālayo opts for the subsequent interpretation of the claim that sampajāna exists 
in-close-proximity to sati. 
 The two interpretations are not necessarily in conflict. For it is possible that one of the 
two factors belongs in the establishing phase of the process (as an element of tuning-out-
tuning-in) while the other could be a moment of the contemplative state itself. In a sense, I 
believe that this is so. This simultaneous interpretation seems to fit the way that lucid 
awareness and clear comprehension fit together in the context of the contemplative state itself. 
Recall how at the very beginning the contemplative state was described as a unified whole, of 
which the other factors mentioned in the definition (and sati and sampajāna in particular), are 
constitutive parts. The existence of one part, qua part, therefore implies the simultaneous co-
existence of all the others. I will return to this shortly. If the simultaneous interpretation is 
correct in so far as the contemplative state is concerned, the subsequent interpretation could 
still hold true in the context of the practice of cultivating this state. And the descriptions 
developed thus far suggest that some of the factors that constitute the establishing phase enter 
the picture subsequently, which compliments the idea that the establishing phase is a kind of 
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a temporal whole, like a melody. In particular, there appears to be a temporal disjunction 
between the thematization of projects, on the one hand, and the practice of tuning-in—tuning-
out, on the other. Could the same be true of sati in the sense of tuning-in and sampajāna? 
Could they, in the establishing phase, enter the picture in distinct steps? As I said, in a sense I 
think that this is so. But, I will now try to show, the secondary literature has got the true 
situation upside down: it is in fact sati that arises subsequently to and on the basis of 
sampajāna. 
 Following Bodhi (2011), above I distinguished the ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ 
dimensions of sati, and ‘lucid awareness’ was reserved for the former, ‘vivid presentation’ for 
the latter. An analogous distinction, I believe, should be made in the case of sampajāna. 
Expressions that are usually used to translate this term, such as ‘thorough understanding’ and 
‘clear comprehension’, suggest that sampajāna primarily designates the subjective activity of 
discriminating or knowing something. But it is essential to keep apart the activity of knowing 
or understanding from that which is understood; clear comprehension from that which is 
clearly comprehended. (To repeat an earlier warning: I am not suggesting that the subject-
object dichotomy is at work here. It is important not to jump to conclusions and interpret this 
as some kind of intentional act—where the knowing subject confronts an object that is known. 
Nevertheless, despite the caution, the distinction has its purposes).  
 What is it that is understood by the means of sampajāna? According to the Satipaṭṭhāna 
Sutta, and the Buddha’s teachings in general, the ultimate end is the understanding of the three 
characteristics (the impermanent, selfless and unsatisfactory nature of all conditioned 
phenomena) and the four noble truths. But these do not exhaust the subject matter to be known. 
The other facts recognised by Buddhists, such as the structures that make up the links of 
dependent origination (paticca-samuppada), as well as the numberless phenomena spelled out 
in the Abhidhamma texts, I believe, is first of all made available by sampajāna. But it would 
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be a mistake to assume that the knowledge opened up by sampajāna is restricted to only what 
is to be found in the Pali texts, or even to the Buddhist texts more generally. These texts are 
only concerned with the knowledge that leads to the final goal of Buddhism: the end of 
suffering and the realisation of Nibbana.15 But this should not lead one to infer that there is 
nothing more to be known through the method than what we find in the Buddhist texts. Indeed, 
it is precisely because there is potentially much more to know that sati in the sense of mindful 
memory plays such a crucial role in the Buddhist path. Differently put, because sampajāna 
opens up the field of potentially infinite knowledge, it is necessary, in the context of the 
Buddhist path, to remember the Buddha’s teachings in order to be able to focus on and isolate 
those bits of knowledge that are relevant for the goal. All this, I believe, points to the necessity 
of the aforementioned distinction between the subjective activity of understanding, on the one 
hand, and the ‘intrinsic intelligibility of the things themselves’ (that which is understood 
through such activity), on the other. It is merely a terminological issue of whether sampajāna 
was traditionally intended to encompass both meanings. Be that as it may, what is certain is 
that this distinction is not recognised, or is not recognised clearly enough, in the secondary 
literature.  
 Quite frequently in contemporary Buddhist literature, and we will have a chance to see 
this more clearly in the following chapter, one encounters such notions as ‘raw data’, ‘raw 
sensations’, ‘bare input’ etc., which are introduced in order to capture the original ‘stuff’ 
supposed to be made available to the practitioner through the illuminating power of sati. As 
 
15 In sutta 56.31 of Saṃyutta Nikāya, the Buddha compares everything that he knows to the leaves in the forest 
and everything that he teaches to the handful of leaves in his hand. And he explains to his disciples that the 
reason he does not teach them everything that he knows is because it does not lead to the end of all suffering 
(Nibbana). Here we can assume that he came to this wealth of knowledge through the practice of meditation and 
insight, and by the means of sampajāna in particular. 
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these terms suggest, that at which they point is portrayed as being devoid of all intrinsic 
intelligibility. Under this interpretation, the structures that the Buddha encourages us to 
recognise—including the quality of impermanence, the states of affairs such as that feeling 
arises in dependence on contact etc.— is interpreted, implicitly or explicitly, as being imposed 
on this raw material by our cognitive activity, the most basic kind of which is sampajāna itself 
(for an example of this, the reader can recall Bodhi’s claim that sampajāna imposes a 
meaningful context on the field that sati first opens up). But, in so far as I am aware, the very 
idea of raw material is alien to the Buddha’s understanding of reality. According to that 
understanding, all phenomena are interdependent and refer to each other in their very 
essence—this is one lesson of the law of dependent origination. In other words, according to 
Buddhism, there is a kind of inner articulation in the very essence of things themselves and 
the purpose of contemplation is precisely to uncover and not impose that structure on a 
phenomenal field that would be in itself dumb and unstructured. The recollection of the 
Buddha’s teaching is important, not because the phenomenal field would be unstructured 
without it, but precisely because it would be, so to say, too structured, causing one to become 
lost from the ultimate aims of the teachings. If this is accepted then the role of sampajāna in 
the context of contemplation becomes clear. 
 In the context of everyday understanding, the instrumental dimension (and the projects 
that underlie and make it possible) conceals the intrinsic intelligibility of the phenomena. If 
sampajāna is used to designate this intrinsic intelligibility itself, as I suggest, then it follows 
that sampajāna is always already there, albeit implicitly and inconspicuously, underneath the 
instrumental meaning of things.  This means that sampajāna is present before, and as a 
condition for, the practice of tuning-out-tuning-in. Tuning-in, we can now say, is the tuning-
in to this intrinsic intelligibility of the phenomenon itself, and tuning-out is the movement of 
distancing oneself from one’s possibilities and the instrumental meaning that they give rise to. 
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So, according to this interpretation, it is not that (as the secondary literature that I am familiar 
with tends to believe), lucid awareness first opens up a field that sampajāna subsequently 
interprets. Rather, tuning-in arises on the basis of sampajāna and as the means of, so to speak, 
waking it up. And for it to be awake is for the phenomenon to be vividly present or, from the 
side of the subject, there is now lucid awareness of its intrinsic intelligibility. 
  
vii. SUMMARY 
 This engagement with the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta has brought us to a place where it is 
possible to formulate an initial definition of the phenomena that we have been studying. The 
practice of cultivating mindfulness or contemplation is the practice of tuning-out of our 
possibilities (‘becoming free’ from desires and discontent). While the concept of ‘our 
possibilities’ is wider than that of ‘projects’, in the above discussion the focus was solely on 
the latter. Complimenting the negative movement of tuning-out is the positive movement of 
tuning-in (sati in the first sense of ‘recollecting’) to the intrinsic intelligibility of the 
phenomenon (the objective sense of sampajāna). A specific kind of effort (ātāpi) is 
constitutive of this practice of tuning-out-tuning-in. With the dropping off of ātāpi, a shift in 
perspective takes place into the contemplative state itself, the state of being tuned-in. This 
state is characterised by lucid awareness (sati in the second sense) and clear comprehension 
(sampajāna). From the side of the object, being tuned-in is the vivid presentation of the 
phenomenon’s intrinsic intelligibility. But this is not all that we learnt from our engagement 
with the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta. We also now know that becoming tuned-in alters the stream of 
consciousness in a specific way. This altered stream of consciousness is the pattern of the state 
of being tuned-in. Two experiences that help constitute this pattern carried a special 
importance in the above discussion: mindful memory (sati in the sense of ‘recollection’) and 
mindful reflection (vipassanā). In the next chapter, we will encounter another aspect of this 
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pattern that tends to be confused with the state of being tuned-in itself: this is mindful attention. 
CHAPTER III: 
Mindfulness in the contemporary literature, a critical analysis 
 
 The first chapter offered a glimpse into the possibility of a particular kind of 
transformation or perspectival shift where the ordinary way of relating to the world gives way 
to a much more intimate and profound kind of relation with it. This is mindfulness. The 
engagement with the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta in the second chapter brought this transformation, 
and what takes place on either side of it, into sharper focus. While the literary passages depict 
the transformation as a spontaneous, serendipitous happening—something that one falls into 
in the right circumstances—the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta outlines a way of intentionally cultivating 
these conditions. On this, in his notes to the Saṃyutta Nikāya (2000, p. 1940), Bodhi writes: 
 
[The factors of] energy, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom...are not different from 
mental qualities that arise periodically in the ordinary, undeveloped mind. In the untrained 
mind, however, their occurrence is sporadic and random. The intention behind the Buddha’s 
presentation of the practice is to train the disciple to arouse these factors deliberately, through 
the exercise of the will… 
 
According to the findings of the last chapter, the practice of cultivating mindfulness is the 
practice of tuning-out of our possibilities or projects and tuning-in to the intrinsic 
intelligibility of the phenomenon itself, or simply tuning-out-tuning-in. But just as we do not 
confuse falling asleep with being asleep, so we should keep the cultivation of mindfulness 
from mindfulness itself—the potential fruit of that practice. Mindfulness was defined 
(subjectively) as the state of lucid awareness and clear comprehension and (objectively) as 
the vivid presentation of the phenomenon’s intrinsic intelligibility. 
 Aside from a few remarks from Bodhi about lucid awareness being some kind of a 
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reflective act that bends back and illuminates the contents of consciousness—remarks that we 
will have a chance to reconsider again in the current chapter—we still remain in the dark as 
to the character of this lucid awareness.  Descriptively speaking, what kind of awareness is in 
question here? Are we talking about a special way of paying attention? Or is it a question, as 
Bodhi seems to suppose, of a reflective intentionality of some sort? Another possibility is that 
lucid awareness is something sui generis in which we do it an injustice when we try to reduce 
it to more familiar phenomena such as attention and reflection. Moreover, while the 
Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta has taught us that the establishment of lucid awareness is simultaneously 
an opening of a kind of cognition (‘clear comprehension’ or ‘sampajāna’) the text remains 
silent on the precise nature of the relation between the two factors. More generally, it is not 
yet at all clear how mindfulness in the sense of lucid awareness (these terms will be used 
synonymously here unless stated otherwise) relates to any kind of cognising. To shed light on 
these issues, this chapter will focus on the question of how ‘the contemporary literature’ (an 
expression that I will use to refer to the group of contemporary philosophers, scientists and 
contemplatives that have taken an interest in the issue) addresses the question: what is lucid 
awareness and what is its relation to cognition? 
 On this question, the contemporary literature can be divided into two opposing camps, 
which I will call the ‘Quietists’ and the ‘Cognitivists’.16 For the Quietists, lucid awareness is 
 
16 I would like to make two comments here. The first is a warning not to read any meanings that the terms 
‘Cognitivists’ and ‘Quietists’ may carry in other philosophical contexts into the current discussion. When I 
coined these terms, I was not aware that they were used in other areas of philosophy at all. The second point is 
that I am well aware that drawing a boundary like this is simplifying things somewhat and that not everyone who 
speaks on the issue of mindfulness will neatly fit into one of the two categories. While the distinction does bring 
its own difficulties with it (not all of which I can deal with here) I am also confident that it carries more 
advantages than disadvantages and I will stick with it until the content of the discussion itself forces us to revise 
it, if indeed it does. 
77 
a kind of attention, ‘bare attention’, characterised by the absence of all explicit cognitive 
activity, such as conceptualising, thinking and remembering. For the Cognitivist, by contrast, 
not only is it true that mindfulness does not exclude every kind of cognitive activity; 
mindfulness (or at least the most important kinds of mindfulness) demands that a special kind 
of cognition be brought into play. The first two sections will take a closer look at these two 
standpoints, beginning with the Quetists. The next step will be to uncover some of the common 
presuppositions held by both camps and to subject those presuppositions to a critical analysis. 
In the final part, I will put down the first marks of what I consider to be a more satisfactory 
account of mindfulness (and of its relation to different kinds of cognitive processes) than the 
contemporary literature has to offer. According to this proposal, mindfulness is the feeling of 
being tuned-in. 
 
i. THE QUETISTS 
 Venerable Nyanaponika (1968, p. 30) was the first to define mindfulness as ‘bare 
attention’, 
 
…the clear and single-minded awareness of what actually happens to us and in us, at the successive 
moment of perception. It is called ‘bare’ because it attends just to the bare facts of a perception as 
presented either through the five physical senses or through the mind…When attending to that sixfold 
sense impression, attention or mindfulness is kept to a bare registering of the facts observed, without 
reacting to them by deed, speech or by mental comment, which may be one of self-reference (like, 
dislike, etc.) judgment or reflection.  
 
In the same Quietist spirit, Kabat Zinn (2005, p. 4) defines mindfulness as “…paying attention 
in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment and non-judgmentally”. For Bishop et 
al. (2004) mindfulness is “…a kind of nonelaborative, nonjudgmental, present-centred 
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awareness in which each thought, feeling, or sensation that arises in the attentional field is 
acknowledged as it is”. Mindfulness, Joseph Goldstein (1976) writes, means “…observing 
things as they are, without choosing, without comparing, without evaluating, without laying 
our projections and expectations on to what is happening, cultivating instead a choiceless and 
non-interfering awareness”. 
 At first glance, then, for the Quietists, ‘mindfulness’ designates the presence of ‘bare’ 
attention and the absence of all cognitive activity. Does this not, however, conflict with the 
idea derived in the previous chapter, namely that mindfulness is inextricably bound up with a 
kind of cognition: clear comprehension (sampajāna)? If so, can we rule out the Quetist’s view 
immediately, without bothering to look deeper? If the Quietists believe that mindfulness 
excludes all kind of cognitive activity, then whatever it is that the Quietists are talking about 
is not the phenomenon that the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta is attempting to demarcate and with which 
we are concerned here.  It is not that simple. When we look at the writings of the Quietists 
more closely, hidden complexities come into view, complexities that take us beyond their 
explicit ‘explanation’ of mindfulness as bare attention.  
 Generally speaking, I can sense two tendencies at work in the writings of the Quietists: 
the ‘explanatory’ and the ‘descriptive’ or ‘intuitive’. The descriptive tendency is the urge to 
voice the immediate, inarticulate feeling or intuition of what becoming mindful or lucidly 
aware means to the person in whom it manifests. Often the words used to communicate this 
feeling have a poetic and mystical undertone (this is not intended as a criticism). The intuitive 
tendency finds its counterforce in the need to explain, in more straightforward terms, what 
this intuitive feeling ‘really is’. It is when it comes to explaining (away) their intuitions that 
the Quietists grasp at something much more familiar and tangible: the presence of bare 
attention and the absence of thoughts, memories, evaluations and the like. I believe that the 
descriptive or intuitive aspect of the Quietist account contains an important, (albeit unrefined) 
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element of truth. But I also believe that this truth gets lost in their rush to explain mindfulness 
as bare attention. And in this work I will tap into these intuitive descriptions and use them as 
a guide for a more rigorous phenomenological description of mindfulness and of its relation 
to cognition. But that is for later. In order to get more familiar with the set of aforementioned 
tendencies, I will now take a closer look at the writings of Venerable Anālayo and Bhante 
Gunaratana. 
 In Anālayo’s wonderful commentary on the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, the tension between the 
explanatory and intuitive tendencies manifests, I believe, between his exposition of the way 
that mindful awareness is depicted in the Buddha’s discourses, on the one hand, and his own 
explanation or interpretation of the meaning of these descriptions and similes, on the other.17 
The discourses describe mindfulness as a ‘choice-less’, ‘uninvolved’, ‘detached’, ‘…alert but 
receptive and equanimous’ awareness. (Anālayo, 2003, p. 60) Compared to our ordinary, 
intoxicated mind, mindful awareness has a sobering quality; it remains disenchanted from the 
phenomenon of which it is aware. As one simile portrays it: just as someone standing on an 
elevated platform or a tower is able to observe what is going on on the ground below from a 
place of safe detachment, likewise by establishing mindfulness one erects a platform for 
oneself from where one can relate to phenomena (in which one is usually so deeply entangled) 
through a “relaxed and distant manner of observation”. (Anālayo, 2003, p. 53)   While “sati 
can interact with other, much more active factors of the mind…” it is itself “…an aloof quality 
of uninvolved, detached observation… [that] does not interfere”. (Anālayo, 2003, p. 58) 
Another simile compares mindfulness to the surgeon’s probe; just as the latter gathers 
 
17 I am not fully confident in labeling Anālayo as a ‘Quietist’.  While I think there is some justification for this, 
I can also see how someone could argue to the contrary and, in fact, many Cognitivists resort to Anālayo’s views 
in support of their own position. In any case, the crucial issue here is not to decide which particular person 
belongs in which camp but to understand the general views in virtue of which the two camps differ. 
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information for the ensuing operation, so mindfulness gives the practitioner “…a clear 
overview of the situation”  and “…keeps the streams of the world in check, so that the faculty 
of wisdom can cut them off”. (Anālayo, 2003, p. 55) This detached receptivity of sati, Anālayo 
(2003, p. 58) writes, “…enables one to step back from the situation at hand and thereby to 
become an unbiased observer of one’s subjective involvement and of the entire situation. This 
detached distance allows for a more objective perspective, a characteristic exhibited in the 
above-mentioned simile of climbing a tower”.  
 Of themselves these descriptions and similes, I believe, do not force the move of 
identifying mindfulness with attention. Nevertheless, in his attempt to ‘explain’ in more 
familiar terms what the discourses are really getting at, Anālayo (2003, p. 59) makes precisely 
that move: “[s]ati can be understood as a further development of attention, thereby adding 
clarity and depth to the usually much too short fraction of time occupied by bare attention in 
the perceptual process”. For Anālayo, the detached and uninvolved awareness that is not 
entangled in things but stands back in order to let them be what they are is in the end nothing 
but a kind of attention. Is this move justified? And if mindfulness is identified with attention, 
will we be able to make sense of its cognitive dimension? Can a form of attention, no matter 
how we conceive it, perform the function of providing an ‘objective overview’ of the entire 
situation, a situation of which attention itself is a part? Before and in order to tackle these 
important questions, I first wish to consider how the intuitive and the explanatory tendencies 
play out in the writings of Bhante Gunaratana. 
 According to Gunaratana (2002, p. 82), mindfulness is a “…flowing, soft-focused 
moment of pure awareness…that is interlocked with the rest of reality, not separated from it”, 
it is “…that flashing split second just as you focus your eyes on the thing…before you 
objectify it, clamp down on it mentally and segregate it from the rest of existence”. “[W]hen 
this Mindfulness is prolonged by using proper techniques”, Gunaratana (ibid., p. 83) continues 
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“…you find that this experience is profound and it changes your entire view of the universe”. 
Mindfulness is “an impartial watchfulness”, “present time awareness…[that] stays forever in 
the present, surging perpetually on the crest of the ongoing wave of passing time” (ibid.), “a 
non-egoistic alertness [that] takes place without reference to self” (ibid. 84), it is a “goal-less 
awareness”, “an awareness of change…[that] is watching things as they are changing. It is 
seeing the birth, growth, maturity of all phenomena”, a “…wakeful experience of life, an alert 
participation in the ongoing process of living” that has a distinct “… flavour—a light, clear, 
energetic flavour. Conscious thought is heavy by comparison, ponderous and picky” (ibid). 
 Having given these wonderful descriptions (which I think are in harmony with the way 
that mindfulness is characterised in the Pali discourses) and having awakened in us the sense 
of wonder, Gunaratana goes on to identify this mindful awareness with ‘bare attention’: 
“Mindfulness is bare attention; and bare attention is noticing things exactly as they are without 
distortion” (ibid. p. 86). Once again, the question pushes itself to the surface: is this 
identification justified? Is mindfulness really nothing but a kind of attention?  
 For now, I wish to put these questions aside in order to take a closer look at the other 
aspect of the Quietist’s view: that mindfulness means the absence of all cognitive activity. At 
first sight, it seems difficult to deny that this is exactly what Gunaratana and, judging from the 
passages quoted above, Quietists in general believe. Consider this passage: 
 
Mindfulness registers experiences, but it does not compare them. It does not label them or categorize 
them. It just observes everything as if it was occurring for the first time. It is not analysis which is based 
on reflection or memory. It is, rather, the direct and immediate experiencing of whatever is happening, 
without the medium of thought. It comes before thought in the perceptual process (ibid. p. 83). 
 
Cognitivists tend to interpret this and similar passages as saying something like this: that 
mindfulness is incompatible with any kind of cognition; that the one rules out the other. In the 
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case of Gunaratana at least, this is certainly not the intention. Consider his description of 
mindfulness as involving “…a very deep sort of knowing”, which is “…lost as soon as you 
focus your mind and objectify the object into a thing” (ibid. p. 82). Far from excluding the 
very idea of cognition from mindfulness, Gunaratana (ibid. p.83) characterises mindfulness 
as a “mirror-thought” (ibid.). And in giving his view on the recollective meaning of ‘sati’, he 
seems to echo the finding of the previous chapter according to which here ‘recollection’ 
primarily means a tuning-in to the inner intelligibility of the phenomenon. This, according to 
Gunaratana, “…it is not memory in the sense of ideas and pictures from the past, but rather 
clear, direct, wordless knowing of what is and what is not, of what is correct and what is 
not…” (ibid. p. 87). To nurture this kind of knowing, which “does not think [about phenomena 
but] sees them directly, without the intervening medium of conscious thought” (ibid. p. 86) it 
is necessary to let go of our ordinary explicit comparing, labeling, categorising and so on. To 
lucidly-know is to “see things as they are” and this faculty “… alone has the power to reveal 
the deepest level of reality available to human observation” and it “…operates on so fine a 
level that one actually sees directly those realities which are at best theoretical constructs to 
the conscious thought process” (ibid.). 
 Gunaratana’s objective here is clearly not to say that mindfulness excludes all cognising 
but to rule out a certain way of conceiving what ‘cognising’ may mean in this context. I believe 
more generally that in denying that mindfulness involves judgments and thinking the Quietists 
are only trying to stress the point that mindfulness excludes what may be called ‘instrumental’ 
cognising, a kind of cognising that is inextricably bound up with our projects and which is in 
their service. And this is correct. For tuning-out of all projects implies a distancing from 
instrumental thinking too. But as one is released from the shackles of instrumental thinking, 
one is also tuning-out to an implicit knowing or understanding of things as they are. But one 
must not infer from this that mindfulness excludes all explicit cognition.  
83 
 What must be kept in mind here (and I will return to this point again) is that establishing 
mindfulness transforms the form of explicit cognitive activity itself. What was previously 
instrumental thinking now takes the form of mindful reflection. Mindful reflection (or 
vipassanā) is what allows clear comprehension (the implicit understanding that tuning-in has 
disclosed) to enter explicit awareness. But the reader must wait until Part II (Chapter II, 
Section iv.) for a phenomenological description of the process where clear comprehension 
becomes mindful reflection. The important point to keep in mind here is that when the 
Quietists deny that mindfulness is explicitly and thematically cognitive, they need not be 
interpreted as denying that mindfulness excludes every kind of cognition. If it sometimes 
sounds as though they are trying to say this, this can be interpreted as stemming from their 
urgency to communicate the idea that mindfulness excludes instrumental thinking; in order to 
become mindful it is necessary to let go of the kind of thinking that is bound up to our projects 
and desires. But, as the saying goes, it is important to not throw out the baby with the 
bathwater.  
 For the purposes of the following discussion, when I label someone as a ‘Quietist’, I do 
so solely on the basis of the way that they explicitly explain mindfulness: as bare attention 
that excludes all cognising. It is this way of explaining mindfulness that the Cognitivists have 
a problem with, as we are about to see.  
 
ii. THE COGNITIVISTS 
 The Cognitivists reject the idea that mindfulness is identical with bare attention while 
affirming that it includes (or that it does not exclude) a certain kind of cognitive activity. While 
the Cognitivists universally reject the move of wedging the is of identity between mindfulness 
and bare attention, all agree that there is some kind of a relation between the two (although 
different authors understand the nature of this relation in different ways). Bodhi (2011), for 
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example, believes that bare attention is a kind of mindfulness. According to Bodhi (ibid.), bare 
attention is the kind of mindfulness involved in ānāpānasati or mindfulness of breathing. But, 
according to Bodhi (ibid.), the more complex and powerful forms of mindfulness (such as the 
forms that are brought into play in the later stages of the Satipaṭṭhāna practice) demand that 
the practitioner go beyond the practice of bare attention by bringing into play certain kinds of 
cognitive processes. By contrast, Georges B. Dreyfus (2011) holds the view that a certain kind 
of cognitive activity is necessary for mindfulness. For Dreyfus, not only is mindfulness not 
identical with bare attention, the latter is not even a kind of mindfulness. Nevertheless even 
for Dreyfus, bare attention (which he describes as “…a therapeutically helpful quietness” 
(ibid.)) has a role to play in the ‘practical instructions’ on how to establish mindfulness. I will 
return to this point a little later. For Dreyfus, too, there is as an essential relation between 
mindfulness and attention (although not bare attention); mindfulness is dependent on and 
arises as a kind of a modification of the attentive process. In other words, in his understanding, 
mindfulness is nothing but a higher-order cognitive modification of attention. I will now 
consider Dreyfus’s views in more detail. 
 The focus here will be on an article titled ‘Is mindfulness present-centred and non-
judgmental? A discussion of the cognitive dimensions of mindfulness’ (2001). In this piece 
Dreyfus seeks, in his own words, “…a better conceptualisation of mindfulness so as to retrieve 
its cognitive implications, which are in danger of being lost in the rush to equate mindfulness 
with bare attention”. Towards this end, Dreyfus points out that in the Questions of Kind 
Milinda (an important Buddhist text) mindfulness is described as that which makes possible 
the distinguishing and discriminating of phenomena, and in particular of wholesome from 
unwholesome mental qualities. From this Dreyfus argues that “[t]his understanding of 
mindfulness is quite far from the idea of bare attention, for if mindfulness is to distinguish 
wholesome from unwholesome states, it must be explicitly cognitive and evaluative, in 
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contrast with the idea of mindfulness as nonjudgmental acceptance of whatever arises within 
the stream of consciousness”. The argument here seems to go something like this: 
 
(1) Mindfulness has a necessary cognitive dimension. 
(2—Implicit Assumption) If X has a cognitive dimension then X must be “explicitly 
cognitive and evaluative”, in the sense of involving such processes as judgments, 
evaluations, working memory and so on.  
(3) Bare attention is characterised as the absence of all explicit cognition. This is the 
Quietist view.  
Therefore, 
(C) Bare attention is not mindfulness (or at least it is not the kind of mindfulness that is 
portrayed in certain key Buddhist texts). 
 
 Note that the earlier distinction between implicit and explicit cognising gives us some 
reasons to doubt the truth of (2). Could not mindfulness be cognitive, not in the sense of 
involving explicit cognitive activity but rather in the sense that it involves an implicit, pre-
thematic kind of understanding or cognition? Is this not precisely what the study of 
Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta (and sampajāna in particular) in the previous chapter leads us to believe? 
At this point, I do not wish to pursue these critical suggestions any further. I will rest content 
with having raised these questions. Let us now return to the exposition of Dreyfus’s views. 
 How, according to Dreyfus, does mindfulness accomplish this feat of differentiating 
phenomena? What, in other words, does the cognitive dimension of mindfulness amount to? 
The answer is found in the mind’s retentive function, which enables it to “…hold its object 
and thus allows for sustained attention regardless of whether the object of attention is present 
or not”. According to this view, mindfulness is the process of retaining or holding the object 
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in the grasp of attention for longer than it would usually be held there, thereby modifying the 
ordinary way that attention works (constantly dropping its object and quickly picking up 
another). It is relatively straightforward to get a feeling of what sustained attention means 
here. But it is less clear what Dreyfus is getting at when he describes this retentive function 
as not depending on “whether the object of attention is present or not”. For, one wonders, does 
not the object need to be present in order for it to be retained in attention in the way being 
suggested?  
 Dreyfus is here resorting to the idea that mindfulness can be of both the past and the 
present as an argument against the Quietist contention that mindfulness is necessarily present-
centered. For Dreyfus the recollective dimension of mindfulness is incompatible with the 
claim that mindfulness is necessarily present-centered. At first, it is not difficult to see why he 
would think this. But this is only self-evident if ‘recollection’ is here given the meaning of 
bringing to mind some past event. And, indeed, this is one sense in which ‘sati’ means memory 
or recollection (but, as discussed in the previous chapter, this is no ordinary memory. It is 
mindful memory: the form that memory takes within the state of being mindful). But it is 
neither the only nor the most important sense. Mindful memory itself presupposes that one 
has tuned-in to the phenomenon; that one has remembered its intrinsic intelligibility which is 
always present but which is also usually hidden or forgotten underneath its instrumental 
meaning. If ‘sati’ is given the sense of tuning-in then, contrary to Dreyfus, not only is there no 
conflict between the recollective dimension of sati and the Quietist’s conception of 
mindfulness as being present-centered, but also the two descriptions are in fact 
complementary. 
 In his critique of the Quietists, Dreyfus works with yet another sense in which ‘sati’ may 
mean memory, a sense that differs from both mindful memory and tuning-in. According to 
Dreyfus, sati is closely related to “…the retentive ability that allows the mind to hold the 
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object in the ken of the attention as well as remember it later”. The retentive ability is a “…way 
of holding information…” that ordinary attention, rather carelessly, allows to slip out of its 
grip. This retention of information “…is crucially connected to working memory, the ability 
of the mind to retain and make sense of received information”. And, for Dreyfus, it is this 
retentive function that makes possible both the mindfulness of a present and of a past content. 
How does Dreyfus propose to explain mindfulness in terms of the retentive function? He says 
that his intention is not to equate “the retentive ability of consciousness, working memory and 
mindfulness” but to show that there is a close connection between these phenomena. Granting 
for the time being that such a connection exists, the question remains: what then is mindfulness 
itself? How precisely does it connect up with and differ from working memory? To answer 
these questions, we must take a closer look at Dreyfus’s understanding of what attention is. 
 Dreyfus derives his views of attention from the Abhidhamma school of Buddhism, 
according to which attention (manasikāra) designates the “…automatic ability of the mind to 
turn towards the object and select it”. In the ordinary, non-mindful ways of being, attention 
turns the mind (and body) towards something, say a person walking past, holds onto this object 
for a few moments, quickly release it, reorients the mind and grabs onto something else. 
Ordinary attention is constantly “losing its object”, is unable to remain faithful to anything 
for too long: a promiscuous thing! Mindfulness, according to Dreyfus, is a kind of 
modification that “…strengthens and enhances…the mind’s ability to keep the object in the 
ken of attention without losing it”. To put it otherwise: mindfulness helps ordinary, adolescent 
attention (which cannot keep still but is always throwing itself into something new) mature 
by teaching it the art of patience; to give each thing the time it deserves without being swept 
away by every temptation that comes its way. And how does mindfulness do this? By drawing 
on “…the top-down ability of the mind to retain and bind information so that the present 
moment of experience can be integrated within the temporal flow of experience”. In 
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conclusion, for Dreyfus, mindfulness “… is then not the present-centered nonjudgmental 
awareness of an object” as the Quietists are interpreted as affirming, “…but the paying close 
attention to an object leading to the retention of the data so as to make sense of the information 
delivered by our cognitive apparatus.” 
 The reader may suppose that this extension of attention (through the retention of 
information delivered from the cognitive apparatus) is Dreyfus’s way of accounting for clear 
comprehension (sampajāna). But that is not his view. Dreyfus calls this retentively modified 
attention ‘mindfulness proper’. But he distinguishes mindfulness proper from that which he 
calls ‘wise mindfulness’: an even higher-order mental process that adds to mindfulness proper 
further discursive elements. And, according to Dreyfus, this wise mindfulness is clear 
comprehension. This shows that Dreyfus subscribes to what I in the last chapter called the 
‘subsequent interpretation’ of the claim that sati and sampajāna occur in-close-proximity. For, 
in Dreyfus’s view, sati first opens up the field of experience by extending the normal attentive 
process (which already calls for a kind of cognising that is not clear comprehension), while 
sampajāna enters the picture later, explicitly subsuming this information under categories. I 
have already criticised this way of understanding the relation between sati and sampajāna in 
the previous chapter and I do not wish to repeat those criticisms here. But let me say that that 
which Dreyfus describes as ‘sampajāna’ seems to me much closer to what I called mindful 
reflection (which is a description, not of sampajāna, but of vipassanā or the practice of 
insight). But, again, I want to resist getting too critical at this point, where the primary 
objective is to understand Dreyfus’s own views. 
 In denying that mindfulness is bare attention, Dreyfus is not trying to deny the existence 
of bare attention altogether. In fact, he thinks that bare attention, understood as the practice of 
“…disengaging from the usual patterns of discursivity and reactivity through which we 
usually function” plays an important role in the development or cultivation of mindfulness; 
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bare attention is useful as a ‘practical instruction’ on how to cultivate mindfulness. According 
to this view, bare attention, while real enough, is “… not an end in itself but a skillful means 
that allows the weakening of pre-potent responses so as to allow of more adequate attitudes”. 
Bodhi (2011), too, understands bare attention as “…a type of awareness intrinsically devoid 
of discrimination, evaluation, and judgment”, and while useful as a “…procedural directive 
for cultivating mindfulness…” fails as a “…valid theoretical description of mindfulness 
applicable to all its modalities”.18 What are we to make of this idea that bare attention, while 
not valid as a ‘theoretical description’, is useful in terms of the ‘practical instructions’ on how 
to cultivate mindfulness? 
 I think that there is an important element of truth in this idea. But to see it clearly, it is 
necessary to draw a distinction between the practical instructions on how to cultivate 
mindfulness, on the one hand, and the experience of cultivating mindfulness itself, on the 
other. To give an analogy, if you have trouble sleeping, your doctor may give you practical 
instructions on how to fall asleep, but those instructions are not the experience of falling asleep 
that you may or may not go through after receiving the instructions. When in the last chapter 
I defined the practice of cultivating mindfulness as the practice of tuning-out-tuning-in I was 
not giving practical instructions (I am not very good at that at all), but rather a theoretical 
description of the process of cultivating mindfulness. To apply this to the case at hand, I think 
that the Quietists’ description of mindfulness as bare attention contains an important insight 
into what the experience of cultivating mindfulness is like. In fact, I believe that the Quietists 
description of bare attention overlaps in certain respects with the idea of tuning-out, as I will 
now briefly try to show.  
 Tuning-out is preceded by thematisation, the process where the instrumental meaning 
that one is usually pursuing through ‘external’ actions manifests as the content of mental 
 
18 Note that this conflicts with Bodhi’s other claim, discussed above, that bare attention is a kind of mindfulness. 
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actions (such as thoughts, judgments, memories and so on). Thematisation is commonly 
accompanied by instrumental thinking, where one sorts out (through distinguishing, 
contrasting, comparing etc.,) means in light of our ends or projects. Instrumental thinking 
usually continues when one sits down to meditate: one continues to reflect on how to achieve 
this, and how to prevent that. In other words, despite stilling the body (in the case of sitting 
meditation) one continues to be absorbed in one’s project, albeit ‘mentally’. When the 
Quietists describe mindfulness as an absence of thinking, I suggest that they are best 
interpreted as saying that cultivating mindfulness involves preventing oneself from 
responding to the solicitation of instrumental meaning and the engagement in the associated 
instrumental thinking. While I do not believe that the two phenomena are identical, there is 
obviously a close connection between distancing oneself from instrumental thinking and the 
practice of tuning-out of one’s projects. This will become clearer later. 
 I will conclude this exposition of Dreyfus’s views with the question: if bare attention is 
a good description of the practice of cultivating mindfulness, and not of the state of 
mindfulness itself, why then does he describe it as a “non-evaluative form of mindfulness”? 
A similar question can be directed at Bodhi (2011) who described bare attention as a “useful 
procedural directive for cultivating mindfulness” while he also describes it as a form of 
mindfulness (a form that is at play in the simple observance of breathing). To call bare 
attention a kind of mindfulness, in this context, is a little like calling falling asleep a kind of 
sleep. But I will let the matter rest there. 
  For the purpose of becoming more familiar with the Cognitivist standpoint, I would now 
like to go through an article co-authored by Jake H. Davis and Evan Thompson, titled 
Developing Attention and Decreasing Affective Bias: Towards a Cross-Cultural Cognitive 
Science of Mindfulness (2015). This article has two major aims: (1) to develop a precise 
definition of mindfulness, and to work out how mindfulness relates to such phenomena as 
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attention, working memory and consciousness, and (2) to make sense of the Buddhist claim 
that mindfulness and wisdom are co-joined. 
 The attempt to deal with the above issues is undertaken on the background of a particular 
model that divides the mind into two kinds of awareness or consciousness. (1) Creature 
consciousness: the overall awareness that there is something it is like to be a particular 
creature. (2) State consciousness: the awareness of particular contents, such as that there is a 
computer in front of me, or that the neighbours are talking loudly. State consciousness is 
further divided into phenomenal and access consciousness. For a state to be phenomenally 
conscious is for there to be something that it is like for the subject to experience that state 
‘from the inside’. Access consciousness designates the mental contents that may not be 
available to the subject (in that sense, there is nothing it is like to have them) but which 
nevertheless influence the subject’s speech and behaviour.19 
 The difference between creature and state consciousness overlaps with the difference 
between two kinds of attention: top-down and bottom-up. Top-down attention is voluntary 
and it involves something called a ‘control set’, a kind of plan that specifies where, to what 
aspect of experience, attention is to be directed. This function of directing attention to a 
particular area of experience calls into action both a conceptual representation of the area in 
question, and working memory—which retains the conceptual representation in awareness, 
thereby guiding attention to its target. Top-down attention can therefore be described as being 
biased towards a certain region of experience and as biased against the other regions. By 
contrast, bottom-up attention designates the “basic alerting function of the mind” and it is 
‘stimulus driven’; here, it is not a conceptual plan that guides attention to its target but rather 
some environmental stimulus which enters into the mind from the ‘outside’, such as the loud 
banging that has just snatched my attention away from the writing and redirected it at my 
 
19 For further discussion refer to Bayne (2007) 
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neighbour’s house.  
 In order to make a bridge from this Western model of the mind to the one we find in the 
classical, Pali Buddhism, the authors propose that phenomenal consciousness can be identified 
with viññāṇa, a notion that encompasses the five external senses and the mental sense (which 
included such phenomena as thoughts, memories and so on). Access consciousness, the 
authors propose, corresponds to sañña, a term that is commonly translated as ‘perception’ but 
which is here, rightly I think, taken as referring “…to some kind of knowledge or knowing 
which is done in an associative, connective, linking way”. Bottom-up attention (which the 
authors interpret as corresponding to the Abhidhamma notion of manasikāra) is described as 
modulating the content of viññāṇa, which in turn makes this content available for sañña. In 
this way, viññāṇa has predictable effects on sañña (and on working memory in particular). 
Let us leave aside the issue of whether this way of understanding these Buddhist notions is 
satisfactory and focus on how the authors use this model in order to develop a description of 
mindfulness, and of how mindfulness makes wisdom possible. 
 Something that is not stated clearly enough in the article is that the authors are working 
with two kinds of meditation practices, termed “open awareness” and “focused attention”. 
Elsewhere one of the authors, Evan Thompson (2014, p. 51), described the difference in the 
following way:  
 
…[t]hese terms, although derived from traditional Buddhist meditative vocabulary, were 
recently coined by scientists and contemplative scholars in order to delineate the specific kinds 
of mental processes involved in various Buddhist and non-Buddhist meditation practices, 
ranging from Vipassanā, to Yoga to Zen.  
 
 According to the authors, ‘focused attention’ practices can be made sense of in terms of 
a dynamic interaction between top-down attention, working memory, and conceptual 
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representations. In this kind of meditation, “…working memory plays a role in specifying how 
attention is to be directed” and it does that by retaining a conceptual representation of the 
target area. The authors interpret the practice of ‘mental labeling’ (a crucial feature of certain 
meditative techniques, as in the Mahasi Sayadaw Vipassanā tradition, and which involves the 
practitioner repeatedly noting the name of the target area, e.g. “breathing”, “breathing”), 
“…not as a phenomenological analysis of experience, or as a metaphysical analysis of the 
nature of reality, but rather as holding in working memory a mental representation that 
functions to direct top-down attention in ways that can have transformative effects”. ‘Focused 
attention’ meditation therefore appears to be the same kind of practice that Dreyfus was trying 
to describe in his paper, and the two accounts are in fact complementary. In contrast to focused 
attention, open awareness practices aim to “…counteract biases of attention by broadening 
the awareness of incoming stimuli to include aspects that attention would otherwise have been 
biased away from and…by making our habitual reactions themselves more conscious”. In 
short, open awareness meditation works by (1) suspending our innate biases (stemming from 
emotion, expectation and so on.) to prefer certain stimuli over others, frees bottom-up 
attention and leads to the increase in the capacity to (2) “…consciously experience more of 
the internal and external stimuli reaching the sense organs”. 
 To summarise the difference between the two kind of practices, as they are understood 
in the article being discussed: while focused attention narrows the area within which attention 
operates to a small region of experience, open awareness expands the range of attention to 
encompass the entire region of experience. To describe the difference in yet another way, we 
could say that while focused attention practices strengthen the grip of top-down attention, 
enabling it to hold onto its object for longer, open awareness practice “…makes you better at 
quickly picking up a sensory object and then quickly letting go of it, so that you’re ready for 
the next one”.  
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 On first glance, it seems that the practices are mutually exclusive; broadening seems to 
exclude narrowing, and conversely.  It could be that I misunderstood what they were trying to 
say, but it seems to me that the authors are unclear and undecided on this point. Evidence for 
both (that narrowing compliments broadening and that it excludes it) can be found in the 
article. On the one hand, the authors write that “…developing focused attention, for instance, 
on the breath or mental states, may help to cultivate a more general alertness to a range of 
stimuli across perceptual modalities, thereby increasing the scope of the basal phenomenal 
consciousness” But, on the other hand, they write that top-down orienting “…may actually 
get in the way of being conscious of stimuli that are outside the narrow area of selected focus”. 
 This difference between open awareness and focused attention meditation is closely 
related to, if not identical with, the difference between what the Buddhist texts call sati and 
samādhi, ‘mindfulness’ and ‘concentration’. In broad agreement with Davis and Thompson 
(2015), Anālayo (2003, p. 63) describes the difference in the following way: “[w]hile 
concentration corresponds to an enhancement of the selective function of the mind, by way of 
restricting the breadth of attention, sati on its own represents an enhancement of the 
recollective function, by the way of expanding the breadth of attention”. Anālayo (ibid.) goes 
on to note that “[t]his difference, however, does not imply that the two are incompatible, since 
during absorption attainment both are present. “But…” he adds “…during absorption sati 
becomes mainly presence of the mind, when it to some extent loses its natural breadth owing 
to the strong focusing power of concentration”.  
 I agree with the general tendency here to think of mindfulness as expanding the scope 
of awareness and of concentration as narrowing or restricting it. But I am not convinced that 
expanding and narrowing are primarily attentive functions. That is one issue. Moreover, to 
state that expansion is compatible with narrowing (for that is what happens in certain 
meditative states) is neither to give a description of this ‘hybrid’ state nor is it to explain (in 
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experiential terms) how it is possible. And how can mindfulness both ‘lose its natural breath’ 
and nevertheless remain in what it is? Does that mean that expanding the breath of attention 
does not belong to the essence of mindfulness? And how do mindfulness and concentration 
co-operate in the context of the Buddhist path and in particular in the context of developing 
insight and wisdom? To answer these questions calls for a careful phenomenological study of 
these phenomena and their interrelations, and that is the major aim of this work. But that is 
for later. It is now time to steer the discussion back towards the article that we have been 
discussing.  
 We have now seen how the authors deal with the first aim of the paper: to give a 
definition of mindfulness and its relation to such phenomena as attention, working memory 
and so on. It is now time to consider how they employ this definition of mindfulness in order 
to address the second major aim: to make sense of the claim that ‘mindfulness and wisdom 
are conjoined’. 
 The first thing to note here is that when the authors discuss mindfulness in relation to 
wisdom, by ‘mindfulness’ they seem to mean ‘open awareness’ (the decrease in affective bias 
and the expansion of attention that allows more stimuli to be experienced). According to the 
article, mindfulness can lead to: an increase in emotional understanding of oneself and others, 
an improvement in the ability to correct certain cognitive distortions (such as the belief that 
pursuing sense pleasures will lead to lasting happiness), a decrease in the tendency to prefer 
certain aspects of a situation at the expense of others and to a decrease in ‘belief biases’ that 
may arise from such a tendency. All these benefits result from the fact that, according to the 
authors, mindfulness increases attentive alertness, which increases the amount of information 
available for encoding in working memory, which in turn passes this information on to higher 
cognitive functions where “…identification, recall, deliberation and reporting take place”, 
which is presumably where insight and wisdom arise. 
96 
 There are at least two major issues here. The first has to do with the precise meaning of 
the term ‘stimuli’ and its cognates. The authors repeatedly describe mindfulness as increasing 
the amount of incoming ‘stimuli’ by decreasing affective biases. But nowhere is the meaning 
of this crucial term defined. ‘Stimuli’ sometimes seems to be used synonymously with 
‘interoceptive and somatosensory stimuli from the body’, at other times it means ‘internal and 
external stimuli’. Here the term ‘stimuli’ seems to be used in the empirical, scientific sense to 
designate the electromagnetic radiation that falls on our sense organs. But the term is also 
taken as referring to ‘one’s own and another’s emotional information’, such as macro facial 
expressions, and in the authors’ discussion of the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, it seems to stand for four 
foundations of mindfulness: the body, feelings, mind and dhammas. But it is not at all clear 
that these different ways of understanding the meaning of ‘stimuli’ are compatible. But if 
mindfulness opens the mind up to more ‘stimuli’, as the authors claim, this issue is crucial for 
making sense of mindfulness itself. The second and closely related issue is that it is not at all 
clear how exposure to more ‘stimuli’ is meant to lead to the kind of knowledge that, according 
to the teachings of the Pali Canon, mindfulness is meant to open up. 
 Without an increase in the ability to process the incoming information (to categorise and 
associate it with other information and to draw the appropriate implications) is there not a 
danger that the increase of the ‘incoming stimuli’ would lead to more and not less confusion? 
An increase in the quantity of facts that one is acquainted with does not lead, by itself at least, 
to knowledge and wisdom. What is crucial is the ability to see the meaning in virtue of which 
these facts group into distinct categories and to be able to ‘pluck out’ these meanings. 
Consider, for example, an instance of the kind of knowledge that the practice of mindfulness 
and wisdom is meant to yield: the knowledge that feeling (vedāna) originates or arises in 
dependence on contact (phassa) (Anālayo, 2003, p. 204 fn 13.). To have this kind of insight 
one must, amongst other things, be able to distinguish the phenomenon of feeling from other 
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phenomena with which it may be confused (such as the bodily materiality (rūpa) to which 
feeling is so tightly bound up in ordinary experience). Moreover I believe that, at least in so 
far as the teachings of the Pali Canon are concerned, here it is a matter of having an insight 
into general relations: that Feeling as such is different from Materiality as such. Even if it is 
allowed that mindfulness increases our sensibility to the quantity and intensity of our 
experiences (say of feelings) it is not clear how this leads to the right kind of insight (e.g. into 
the general and necessary law that feeling necessarily arises in dependence on contact). What 
is required is an account of how mindfulness and clear comprehension (sati-sampajāna) 
disclose the general structures and laws that bind phenomena together, structures and laws 
that mindful reflection (vipassanā) can then bring into explicit awareness. Perhaps cultivating 
mindfulness has other effects on the mind, such as decreasing ‘attentional blink’ and 
increasing our general sensitivity, as the authors argue on the basis of empirical evidence. But 
that does not appear to be the primary function of mindfulness in the context of the Buddha’s 
teachings (at least as those teachings are presented in the Pali Canon and the Satipaṭṭhāna 
Sutta in particular). Its primary role therein is to disclose reality in such a way as to make a 
particular kind of insight possible. To develop an account of mindfulness along these lines, 
and to show how it leads to this kind of insight, is a major task of this work. 
 In order to push forwards, it is now time to draw some general lessons from our 
engagement with the contemporary literature. Despite all their differences, the Quietists and 
the Cognitivists can be said to share the presupposition that mindfulness can be accounted for 
as the presence or absence of such familiar experiences as attention, working memory, 
judgment, including their various combinations and higher-order modifications. What the 
contemporary literature fails to do, across the board, is to distinguish mindfulness itself from 
(a) the practice of cultivating mindfulness and (b) the effects that establishing mindfulness has 
on the ‘stream of consciousness’ (on such transient conscious episodes as memory, thinking 
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and attention). The tendency is especially strong to identify mindfulness with the attentional 
changes that it brings about (whether this means that attention is ‘bare’ or that it is cognitively 
loaded in a certain manner). But I believe that, in an important sense, mindfulness is more like 
the state of being awake or being in a mood than any kind of a modification of short lived 
conscious experiences (such as attention and judgment).20 To begin building a case for this, I 
will now present some reasons that speak in favour of not identifying mindfulness and 
attention. 
 
iii. MINDFULNESS IS NOT ATTENTION 
 The question of the relationship between mindful or lucid awareness and attention is an 
extremely difficult one to get a handle on, yet alone to answer. I recall that when I first started 
reflecting on these matters, I took it for granted that whatever else we may end up saying about 
mindfulness, surely what is in question here is a special way of paying attention. Therefore I 
understand the natural temptation to conceive of the phenomenon in this way. But as my 
 
20 In describing mindfulness as being like a mood, my intention is not to say that mindfulness is entirely passive. 
It is true that one characteristic of moods is that they can ‘overcome’ us and that when they do that we stand 
passively before them in the sense of being able to do nothing but fall into the mood. And if the first chapter 
showed anything it is that mindfulness can manifest in this way too; that it can overcome us passively and 
spontaneously. But moods can be described as being ‘active’ in the sense that they can open up a realm of 
possibilities that one can respond to and engage. Consider, for example, an intellectually productive mood and 
the kind of activity that it makes possible. When I describe mindfulness as being like a mood, I am primarily 
drawing the reader’s attention to (a) the fact that mindfulness is a kind of state into which one can ‘enter’ and in 
which one can remain for an extended period of time and (b) that this state opens up certain possibilities that one 
does not ‘see’ at all from the more ordinary states of mind. Also, to ‘respond’ to the possibilities that mindfulness 
has opened up is to be active in a certain (and very special) sense. Hopefully all this will become clearer as the 
discussion progresses. I would like to thank Brett Allen for encouraging me to be clearer on this point. 
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reflection deepened over the years, it gradually became clear that, while there is an important 
connection between mindfulness and attention, the two are not identical. Nor is mindfulness 
a special mode, a higher-order modification of attention. This, I think, is a special case of a 
more general truth: that mindfulness or lucid awareness cannot be identified with and thereby 
reduced to any aspect of the psycho-physical complex. What makes it so tempting to identify 
mindful awareness with some aspect of the psycho-physical complex is (in part at least) the 
fact that establishing mindfulness has the effect of transforming the psycho-physical complex 
in a specific way, with the transformation of attention being a particularly obvious instance. 
Put otherwise, establishing mindfulness transforms ordinary attention into mindful attention 
which (together with other phenomena such as mindful memory and mindful reflection) makes 
up the ‘pattern’ of mindfulness: the particular form that the stream of consciousness takes in 
a mind where mindfulness is established—I will have more to say about this below. But this 
tendency to overlook the difference between mindfulness and its effects on the stream of 
consciousness is not the only factor at work behind the natural urge to identify mindfulness 
with attention. Another reason stems from a reasoning process that unfolds in something like 
the following way: 
 “Mindfulness is nothing entirely foreign; the seeds of mindfulness are always already 
here in ordinary life, albeit in a dormant form. To cultivate mindfulness is to nurture and 
develop these seeds.” “But...” the stream of thought continues, “…what are these seeds of 
mindfulness if not attention: that basic alerting function that allows the mind to turn towards 
and thereby to simply note the presence of something, a function that precedes and makes 
possible all higher order cognitive activity (such as evaluation, judgment, categorisation and 
so on)?” 
 In this way mindfulness comes to be thought of as some kind of a development or 
modification of attention, whether this modification involves keeping all higher-order 
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cognition at bay (as per the Quietists) or bringing a certain kind of cognitive process into play 
(as per the Cognitivists). I agree that mindfulness is nothing entirely alien to our experience; 
it is a dimension of our being that is always there, albeit usually in a forgotten, implicit way. 
A part of the reason for writing the first chapter was to show precisely this. And, moreover, I 
am inclined to agree, or at least I can see no good reasons to reject the idea, that attention is 
an omnipresent feature of human experience. But it does not follow from this that mindfulness 
is nothing but attention or a modality of it. For it could be that attention is not the only 
omnipresent but implicit dimension of our experience that can, broadly speaking, be described 
as a stance of bare, undistorted receptivity to the wider reality. If something else can also be 
characterised in this way then perhaps this ‘something else’, and not attention, is what, in the 
right conditions, develops into mindfulness. But what might this something else be? 
 To begin answering this question, I would like the reader to consider what takes place 
when one becomes mindful of breathing. Amongst other things, what happens can be 
described as the discovery of the breath’s ‘natural rhythm’; the way it has of moving and 
transforming in and of itself. And the breath is not the only phenomenon that exhibits this 
rhythm. For another example, this time from the ‘outside world’, recall the passage from War 
and Peace, where Andrei is struck in the midst of battle, begins falling to the ground and as 
he does so he is struck again, this time by the natural, serene movement of the clouds gliding 
across the lofty sky above. In both cases, that which is disclosed in these moments does not 
strike one as something entirely foreign; the discovery of the natural rhythm comes with the 
sense that it was always there underneath the instrumental meaning that things acquire in the 
light of our projects. Recall Andrei’s astonishment that he was ignorant of something so close 
and familiar: “how was it I did not see that lofty sky before?” And his gratitude for uncovering 
(tuning-in) to this usually forgotten dimension: “And how happy I am to have found it at last!” 
Can this natural rhythm be identified with attention (any kind of attention)? 
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 As to how we answer this question, a lot will depend on what we mean by ‘attention’. 
If we take the term as it is usually taken in the contemporary literature (and especially in the 
Buddhist literature) as designating the process of orienting consciousness towards an object, 
then there are good reasons to think that the two cannot be identified. For one, to find the 
natural rhythm is to (temporarily at least) stop orienting ourselves towards this or that object. 
It is a mode of being where we allow ourselves to flow along with phenomena or, better, we 
actually become the effortless flow of phenomena. This transformation away from being 
preoccupied with objects (which presupposes that we are absorbed in our projects) and 
towards a letting go into the way that the phenomena are unfolding in and of themselves, calls 
for a shift in awareness. This is a shift away from the grasping and clinging that characterises 
the normal way of life (which underlies our awareness of objects) to an open or lucid 
awareness, which simply steps back, allowing phenomena to unfold in accordance with their 
nature. The attribute ‘open’ is especially appropriate here, for the awareness in question is 
open to what the phenomenon ‘wants’ to do, it is open to the possibilities of the phenomenon 
itself, and this openness is what makes the phenomenon vividly present. As all phenomena are 
‘trying’ to unfold in their own way, this open awareness is an omnipresent feature of 
experience. But usually it tends to not be explicitly experienced because it is covered up by 
our tendency to push the phenomena towards a particular direction, towards our possibilities. 
Could it not be that it is this open or lucid awareness, and the natural rhythm that it brings into 
view, and not attention to objects, that we are trying to tune-in to when we practice cultivating 
mindfulness? Could mindfulness not be the state wherein we step into this natural rhythm and 
allow it, for once, to take center stage? I do not wish to pretend that these few remarks have 
settled the issue. But they do open up the possibility of seeing things in this way.  
 Something else that speaks in favour of not identifying mindfulness and attention, has 
to do with the fact that the former takes us to a perspective where we can have an ‘objective 
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overview’ of the situation. Now, a part of that situation is our own psycho-physical self which 
corresponds to what the Pali texts refer to as the five aggregates affected by clinging 
(upādānakkhanda).21 In order to bring the five aggregates into view it is necessary to take a 
 
21 The five aggregates are: materiality (rūpa), feeling (vedāna), fabrications (saṅkhāra), consciousness (viññāṇa) 
and perception (sañña). What reason is there for the idea that this group of aggregates corresponds to the psycho-
physical self? It is clear, I think, that the last four aggregates designate experiential or psychical factors, while 
the physical or bodily dimension of our being would fall under rūpa. But that the body is rūpa does not imply 
that rūpa is body. And in fact, in the Pali texts, rūpa stands for the four primary elements (earth, water, fire and 
wind) and the secondary materiality that is built upon these. And this seems to suggest that there is more to rūpa 
than the human body; the category also includes the ‘external’ material world. Does this not mean that the five 
aggregates cannot be identified with the psycho-physical self? I believe, although I cannot justify this here, that 
when the Pali text speaks of rūpa as ‘external materiality’ what is meant is the experience of the external material 
world; the ‘external’ world as it appears to the subject (in Husserlian terminology, ‘rūpa’ in this sense is a 
noematic notion). I believe that Gethin (1986) is making this point in the following passages: 
 
 Rūpa is typically defined as the four elements earth, water, fire and wind, and rūpa dependent upon 
 (upādāya) them. What is clear, both from the nikāyas’ elaboration of this by reference to parts of the 
 human body, and from the list of twenty seven items of rūpa distinguished in the Dhammasaṅgani, is 
the extent to which the early Buddhist account of rūpa focuses on the physical world as experienced by 
a sentient being—the terms of reference are decidedly body-endowed-with-consciousness… 
 
…the lack of attention to inanimate rūpa [in the Pali texts] further illustrates the way in which the 
analysis of rūpa centres around the sentient being. This orientation is, of course, relevant to the khandha 
analysis as a whole.  
 
That the ‘five aggregates (affected by clinging)’ corresponds to the psycho-physical self finds support in sutta 
21 of the Saṃyutta Nikāya, where Venerable Sāriputa explains that the ordinary (unenlightened) person believes 
the five aggregates to be self (and, therefore, in the experience of an ordinary person the self is the five 
aggregates).  
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standpoint that is ‘outside’ them. This is a specific application of the general principle: that in 
order to bring any perspective into view one must step outside of it into a wider perspective. 
Just as a child does not know itself as a child until it reach adulthood, and a dreamer is not 
aware of dreaming until she becomes lucid or wakes up, so it could be argued that we do not 
know and cannot know the five aggregates as they are until we step outside of them. Attention 
itself belongs to the five aggregates.22 It follows that if mindfulness is attention then we could 
not bring the five aggregates into view and open up the possibility of knowing them as they 
are. Since we can, mindfulness cannot be attention (for essentially the same reasons, 
mindfulness cannot be identified with anything else within the five aggregates). Mindfulness 
is ‘outside’ the five aggregates.23 Do we find any support for this idea in the Buddhist texts? I 
think that we do. 
 I will begin with the question: in the Buddha’s teaching, is anything outside the five 
aggregates? Yes: clinging or grasping (upādāna). I say this because the arahant, a person who 
has eradicated all clinging and realised Nibbana still ‘has’ the five aggregates (while still 
 
22 As far as I know, attention (manasikāra) is not explicitly discussed in the Pali discourses. For it is certainly 
not recognized explicitly as one of the five aggregates. But (as with all the other mental qualities not explicitly 
listed under the five aggregates) attention is believed to fall under the formation (saṅkhāra) aggregate, as Gethin 
(1986) writes “…all those mental factors that are considered to be specifically skillful (kusala) or unskillful 
(akusala) fall within the domain of the samkhārakkhanda”. In any case, I take it as intuitively obvious that 
attention, in the sense of the function that directs consciousness towards an object, must be an aspect of the 
psycho-physical being. 
23 Of course, mindful awareness is not ‘outside’ of the five aggregates in the sense that, say, the sun is. Here one 
has to go beyond the usual (and naïve) way of thinking of the ‘inside/outside’ opposition. But this is not 
something I can go into at this point. The key point here is because mindfulness cannot be identified with any of 
the five aggregates it is outside of them. 
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alive).24 This seems to imply that clinging is ‘outside’ the five aggregates.25 Someone may 
respond to this by saying that, while it is true that clinging is absent in the arahant, it does not 
follow that it is outside the five aggregates. For clinging could still be a particular aspect of 
the five aggregates, an aspect that is eliminated in the arahant. But if that was true, would not 
the suttas describe the arahant as a person who is missing some of the five aggregates, as one 
with an incomplete set of the five aggregates? But that is not the description that we find. 
Rather in the arahant the five aggregates, which remain intact, have been freed of something 
that is outside of them. But all this does is give us some reason to think that there are certain 
phenomena in the Buddha’s teachings (other than Nibbana of course) that are outside the five 
aggregates. But this does not show that mindfulness is itself outside the five aggregates. To 
make a convincing case for that, further evidence is called for. 
 In certain Pali discourses, mindfulness is associated with “…a broad and even a 
“boundless” state of mind” (Anālayo, 2003, p. 49). Moreover Anālayo (ibid) notes that sutta 
150 of the Sutta Nipāta “…refers to the practice of radiating metta [loving kindness] in all 
directions as a form of sati, so here too sati represents an “immeasurable” state of mind”. Sutta 
83 of the Majjhima Nikāya describes the kind of awareness that is to be nurtured in the practice 
of loving kindness (and which is here being associated with mindfulness) as “abundant, 
exalted, immeasurable” and as being able to encompass the “whole world”. These descriptions 
 
24 That an arahant is a person without clinging is stated in sutta 22.110 of the Saṃyutta Nikāya: “when…a 
bhikkhu is liberated by non-clinging, then he is called a bhikkhu who is an arahant…”. That the arahant 
nevertheless continues to ‘have’ the five aggregates is implied in the following passage of sutta 22.122 of the 
Saṃyutta Nikāya, where Venerable Sāriputa says: “a bhikkhu who is an arahant should carefully attend to these 
five aggregates subject to clinging…” 
25 But it could still be true that clinging is dependent on and that it could not exist without the five aggregates. 
According to Gethin (1986), this is the view of the Nikāyas: “…although upādāna is not the same as the five 
upādānakkhandas [five aggregates affected by clinging] there is no upādāna apart from them…” 
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suggest that mindful awareness allows one to transcend the subjective standpoint and know 
the whole situation (indeed the whole world) objectively. But it is difficult to see how 
mindfulness could open up this standpoint if it was an aspect of (and therefore constrained to) 
one’s psycho-physical self (such as attention)—which is itself but an aspect of the wider 
situation that mindfulness enables one to know. This is the ‘epistemological problem’. But the 
identification of mindfulness and attention also gives rise to the following descriptive or 
phenomenological issue. 
 Even if we supposed that mindful awareness belongs to the five aggregates, 
descriptively speaking what would it be? Presumably either one of the six kind of 
consciousness (viññāṇa) or attention (manasikarā). But nowhere in the Buddhist texts, as far 
as I know at least, are these phenomena described with such adjectives as ‘immeasurable’ and 
‘boundless’, as mindful awareness is. Giving further support to this line of thought, Bodhi 
(2006) writes that lucid awareness cannot be identified with either manasikarā or viññāṇa:   
 
…[w]hen I use the word “awareness” or “attention” to render upaṭṭhāna, as representing sati in this 
role… this awareness is quite different from ordinary consciousness (viññāṇa), and this attention is 
different from manasikāra, the mental factor that performs the function of adverting to an object or 
selecting features of the objective field for closer focus. 
 
But while Bodhi claims that lucid awareness is neither consciousness nor (ordinary) attention, 
his view also seems to be that this kind of awareness arises, somehow, through a modification 
of these phenomena. Recall his earlier description of lucid awareness as being a kind of 
reflective act, which would make it a kind of mental consciousness. And in the above passage 
he describes it as ‘a kind of awareness’ and ‘a kind of attention’. But how could a modification 
of attention or consciousness, even in conjunction with corresponding modifications of 
working memory, yield a sui generis kind of awareness, a ‘boundless’ lucid awareness? This 
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is the phenomenological problem that arises when mindfulness is identified with something 
within the five aggregates. 
 The strongest evidence that I have been able to find so far in the discourses for the idea 
that mindful awareness is outside the five aggregates is found in sutta 22.89 of the Saṃyutta 
Nikāya. The sutta portrays a situation where Venerable Khemaka is “…sick, afflicted, gravely 
ill”. Hearing of his predicament some elder monks (through an intermediary who keeps on 
going back and forth between the two parties in a rather comical manner) question Khemaka 
about which of his five aggregates he regards as “I am”. Khemaka responds in this way: 
“…[a]mongst these five aggregates affected by clinging, I do not regard anything as self or as 
belonging to self”. “If the Venerable Khemaka does not regard anything amongst these five 
aggregates subject to clinging as self” the elders respond, “…then he is an arahant, one whose 
taints are destroyed.” Khemaka replies: 
 
‘I am’ has not yet vanished in me in relation to these five aggregates subject to clinging, but I 
do not regard [anything amongst them] as “This I am”.  
 
The implication here is that while nothing in Khemaka’s five aggregates is currently serving 
as the basis for the notion “I am”, something is. What is this base that is outside the five 
aggregates and to which the sense of “I am” continues to cling? While Khemaka does not 
explicitly address the question, his answer can be inferred from the simile that he does give: 
 
Suppose, friends, a cloth has become soiled and stained, and its owners give it to a laundryman. 
The laundryman would scour it evenly with cleaning salt, lye, or cowdung, and rinse it in clean 
water. Even though the cloth would become pure and clean, it would still retain the residual 
smell of cleaning salt, lye or cowdung that has not yet vanished. The laundryman would then 
give it back to the owners. The owners would put it in a sweet-scented casket, and the residual 
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smell of cleaning salt, lye and cowdung that had not yet vanished would vanish. 
 
I interpret this simile in the following way. The soiled and stained cloth stands for the five 
aggregates afflicted with the notion “I am”. Through Buddhist practice it is possible to 
“cleanse” the five aggregates of this notion. And what is used for such cleansing if not 
mindfulness (in conjunction with the other factors of the path)? And it is to this mindful 
awareness (which is outside the five aggregates), the residual smell, that the notion “I am” 
continues to cling. It therefore follows that mindful awareness is outside the five aggregates.  
It follows that mindfulness is not attention. 
 
iv. MINDFULNESS AND SITUATEDNESS 
 I think that we now have good, albeit not conclusive reasons to think that mindfulness 
cannot be identified with attention (nor, for that matter, with any aspect of the psycho-physical 
complex). While a complete description of mindfulness will need to take into account ‘what 
goes on in the subject’, that will be neither the whole nor the most important part of the story. 
This, I hope, will become clearer as this work proceeds. 
 Up to this point the division of the contemporary literature into two opposing camps (the 
Quietists and the Cognitivists) has served us well. But it is now time to face the fact that this 
way of splitting the field is a (useful) simplification and that there are thinkers who hold views 
that do not fit neatly into either of the two categories. For example, Evan Thompson (2017), 
the co-author of an article discussed above, while remaining faithful to the core of the 
Cognitivist standpoint, points out a different, and what I believe is ultimately a much more 
satisfactory way of thinking about mindfulness. Thompson continues to consider mindfulness 
as “a kind of attentional (cognitive unison) practice”. But in order to understand this special 
kind of cognitive practice, he now claims, it is necessary to interpret it on the model of the so-
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called ‘4-E cognitive science’. According to the 4-E approach, cognition is necessarily 
embodied, embedded, extended and enactive. I understand the 4Es to stand for four 
complementary ways of dividing up the wider situation within which (according to 4-E 
theorists) all cognitive activities take place and from where they acquire their content. This 
background context or situation is an outcome of a complex interaction involving the lived or 
instrumental body, the physical and cultural worlds, including symbolic devices and 
technologies, all of which together enact a world of meaning in which we find ourselves and 
within which and from within where all cognising (including the kind that is involved in 
mindfulness) takes place. Abstracting away from the specifics of Thompson’s account, about 
which I will have a bit more to say shortly, his proposal can be summarised as follows: in 
order to understand mindfulness, it is necessary to take into account the whole situation, the 
human being’s relation to the world. The implication is that mindfulness cannot be 
exhaustively accounted for by what goes on in the ‘head’, in the brain or in the individual 
subject. What is necessary, according to Thompson, is to make intelligible how the wider 
situation and the human being’s relation to it determines what goes on in the subject. I agree 
with the spirit of this approach. And in this work I hope to develop a description of 
mindfulness along roughly these lines. 
 I cannot, however, agree with the specifics of Thompsons’s proposal. What I find 
especially troubling is the idea that all cognitive activity, and in particular the kind of 
cognition that constitutes mindfulness, is determined by one’s cultural background and 
embodied skills. I was quite surprised to find that Bodhi (2011) holds a similar view: 
 
As I see it, virtually any intentional act is necessarily subject to a vast set of determinants, 
internal and external, that govern the way it functions. It occurs embodied in a particular person 
with a unique biography and personality, and it occurs embedded in a particular context—
historical, social and cultural—that gives it a specific orientation on which its very identity 
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depends... I do not believe one can ever leave behind all determinants and achieve a state of 
absolute openness, vacuity, and indeterminacy.  
 
This goes directly against the account of mindfulness that I will be developing in this work, 
which will try to show that becoming mindful involves tuning-out of all personal and cultural 
factors (which can be understood in terms of ‘our possibilities’ or ‘projects’) in order to reach 
the state of being tuned-in, a state of ‘absolute openness’ to the way that things are in 
themselves. As we have seen, one of the key functions of mindfulness (within the context of 
the Buddhist path as set out in the Pali discourses) is that it opens up the way to the knowledge 
or understanding of things as they are. But I believe that in order to understand things as they 
are (to see them objectively) calls for a kind of de-contextualisation.26 Here, temporarily at 
least, the practitioner achieves a state of being tuned-out of all human contexts and meaning 
that are imposed on the phenomenon (including one’s cultural background and repertoire of 
embodied skills).27 This is an expanded understanding of what it means to become ‘free of 
 
26 The kind of de-contextualisation that mindfulness brings about should not be mistaken for the kind that 
Heidegger (1967) discusses in the context of his critique of the theoretical, scientific attitude. In the theoretical 
kind of de-contextualisation, one abstracts away from the concrete lived context (which for Heidegger is practical 
in nature and is inextricably bound up with our projects) in order to achieve a kind of context-free knowledge. 
According to Heidegger, this scientific attitude is a distortion of the original way of finding oneself in the world—
a distortion that may have certain benefits, and may even reveal a new dimension of things, but which can never 
capture the original way that reality manifests to us. Indeed, for Heidegger, the theoretical, scientific attitude 
cannot disclose the original and primordial way that reality is in-itself. In contrast, the kind of de-
contextualisation that I am claiming is at work in mindfulness, far from removing us from the concrete situation, 
uncovers a deeper context, a meaningful interaction between things themselves, that underlies and makes 
possible our projects, the cultural world and also the instrumental body. Unfortunately, in the current work, I 
will not be able to give this theme the attention it deserves. 
27 Indeed, I believe (although I will not be able to develop this line of thought in this work) that mindfulness 
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desires and discontent in regards to the world’.  
 But this is not to say that I entirely reject the idea that one’s cultural background has an 
important role to play in the cultivation of mindfulness. I think that it does. But it is essential 
to understand this in the right way. Here I will only make two brief points. Firstly, without 
being integrated into a particular culture, one that carries knowledge about how to cultivate 
mindfulness, it is very unlikely that one would ever uncover this human potential, which is 
there, qua potential, independently of the culture that awakens it into life (although the 
Buddha, as “the path finder”, is himself an example that that is not impossible but only 
improbable). Second, as already discussed, even once mindfulness has been established it is 
necessary to resorts to mindful memory in order to recollect the knowledge recorded in the 
suttas (which is a kind of cultural knowledge) not in order to introduce meaning into 
experience that would otherwise be meaningless, but for the purpose of guiding the 
practitioner along the right path once mindfulness has disclosed the intrinsic meaning of the 
phenomenon. It is not a comfortable feeling to disagree with individuals whom I hold in such 
a high regard, such as Venerable Bhikkhu Bodhi and Evan Thompson. Therefore, I must take 
extra care in developing my position, which I will do in Part II. 
 Putting aside our disagreements, let me repeat that I agree with Thompson on the general 
idea that in order to understand mindfulness it is necessary to take the wider context or 
situation into account. More specifically, I believe, becoming mindful involves an overall shift 
in the way that we relate to the world (but to understand the full significance of this claim, it 
is necessary to understand the meaning that the term ‘world’ carries here, a theme that will be 
taken up again later). And when this shift takes place, regardless of whether it overtakes the 
person passively or whether it is cultivated intentionally, it brings about certain changes in the 
 
reveals a distance from the body and hence there is the recognition that the awareness of the body is not itself 
embodied. 
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psycho-physical structure, and in particular in the workings of attention. But these changes in 
attention are only effects of establishing mindfulness; they cannot be identified with it. In 
order to begin building a convincing case for this, I will now consider a more familiar example 
of a phenomenon that exhibits a similar structure. 
 You are walking along a familiar forest trail, completely relaxed, taking in the natural 
surroundings at your leisure. While in this state of mind, your attention quite naturally floats 
from one thing to another.  All of a sudden, your ears begin to ring. Your companion is 
screaming: “Snake! Snake!” You are teleported into the state of fear. In becoming frightened, 
your attention is no longer capable of gently strolling as it did in the earlier, relaxed state of 
mind. Now it naturally and passively fixates, like metal on a magnet, on certain aspects of the 
situation, perhaps on the path where you expect the snake to show up, or, if you have caught 
a glimpse of it, on the snake itself! It is not attention alone that has altered; working memory, 
thoughts, judgments, recollection of the past and know-how—“do not make any sudden 
movements”, “stay calm” etc.—all now take a specific form, the form of fear. But it would be 
a mistake to identify these changes with fear itself. I would now like to draw three general 
lessons from this example that will greatly help us in our phenomenological study of 
mindfulness.  
 (1) In entering the state of fear, what was previously ‘leisurely attention’ becomes 
fixated. But this transformation of attention is a passive modification; it is not something one 
has to cultivate intentionally. It is sufficient to become afraid (to enter the state of fear) the 
attentional changes (and the other corresponding changes in the stream of consciousness) take 
care of themselves. Is the same true of mindfulness? Is it possible that the changes of attention 
that have so often been observed and described as mindfulness itself are only the effects of 
becoming mindful, of establishing the mindful way of being in the world? 
 (2) We can, if we like, take fixated attention to be an aspect of the fear itself. But fixated 
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attention certainly cannot be identified with fear. Even if we succeeded in giving an exhaustive 
description of fixated attention, that alone would not guarantee that we would also have an 
exhaustive description of fear. This is because other states of mind besides fear are also 
associated with fixated attention, including perhaps mindfulness itself! This raises the 
question: how, then, does one describe fear itself, if not by focusing on the changes it brings 
about in attention and the psycho-physical structure in general? I believe that an important 
part of such a task, and I will return to this again in the next section, involves describing the 
kind of possibilities that fear opens up. To enter the mode of fear is to experience the 
possibility of the threatening, a possibility that only appears in fear and in terms of which fear 
is to be defined.28 Can mindfulness be described in an analogous manner? Does mindfulness 
open up a unique kind of possibility? What kind of a possibility could this be?  
 (3) Some philosophers such as Sartre (2003b), have tried to show that emotions (such 
as fear) are ways of responding to the demands of a situation. (After all, while I may respond 
to the scream of “Snake, Snake!” with fear, Steve Irvin would probably have greeted the same 
sound with a state of excitement and adventure!) Is it possible that becoming mindful, too, is 
a particular way of responding to the situation (a reply that we give to a particular question 
that reality asks of us)? If so, what kind of a response is it? This is an extremely important 
question, one that could have serious implications for our understanding of what it means to 
practice tuning-out-tuning-in and what it means to be mindful. While I cannot at this point 
give the theme the attention and care it deserves, I cannot leave it either without making some 
observations. A common tendency in the contemporary literature (that I am familiar with) is 
to treat the practice of cultivating mindfulness as a kind of attention training. But what if the 
practice of tuning-out-tuning-in is a response to reality that involves not more but less control? 
 
28 For the classical descriptions of fear along these lines see: Heidegger (1967, p. 179) and Sartre (2003a, pp. 
29-30). 
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What if this is the practice of learning to trust reality; of allowing it to unfold in accordance 
with its own ‘will’, instead of always attempting to direct it towards our own ends or projects? 
Moreover, it is only within certain ways of relating to the world that attention will appear as 
able-to-be-controlled or trained. It will not appear in that way, for example, within the state 
of intense fear or terror. Nor, I would argue, anxiety (the state that is associated with tuning-
out of our projects and which often precedes the establishment of mindfulness). One 
characteristic of anxiety is that it removes all practical meanings and projects.29 With the 
removal of this practical significance, the very possibility of controlling phenomenon also 
disappears, for nothing can now appear with the instrumental meaning to-be-controlled. What 
is left for one to do from this state is let go or tune-in to the flow of reality itself; to trust reality 
to unfold in accordance with its own nature. At this point, I must leave these important issues 
alone. But I will return to them in Part II. 
 
v. MINDFULNESS AS THE FEELING OF BEING TUNED-IN 
 In order to push forward, it will be helpful at this point to explicitly distinguish ‘short-
term’ or ‘transient’ episodes of consciousness, on the one hand, and ‘longer-term’, ‘global’ 
attitudes or states of mind, on the other.30 Attention exemplifies the former: at one time, there 
is an attending to the screen, then to something happening in the room, then again to something 
on the screen and so on. In this way, individual instances of attention are constantly coming 
in and going out of being. While these events can, and usually do, form a higher-order 
attentional ‘state’, it is nevertheless experientially obvious that this ‘state’ is founded on a 
 
29 See: Heidegger (1967, p. 228). 
30 Thompson (2014, p. p.63) touches on this distinction when he writes of the need “…to distinguish [the] global 
and more slowly changing background aspects of consciousness from more rapidly changing episodes of sensory 
and cognitive awareness”. 
114 
continuum of transient episodes of attention. Something similar, I believe, is true of thinking, 
imagining, perceiving and so on. I will use the expression ‘the stream of consciousness’ to 
designate the total form constituted through the constant arising and falling away of such 
transient events. States of mind, by contrast, endure in a way that transient episodes do not, 
‘colouring’ the overall sense of how one finds oneself in the world. When one enters the state 
of fear, for example, one remains ‘in’ the fearful attitude or perspective for some time. Fear is 
not experienced as being made up of transient and distinct episodes of fear (at least not in the 
way that the attentional ‘state’ is). But ‘attitude’ or ‘state of mind’ is not a homogenous 
category. Think for example of the difference between the state of fear and that of being 
awake; while both endure in a way that short-term conscious episodes do not, clearly it is a 
question here of what are in other respects very different phenomena. The next thing to note 
is that entering into or establishing an attitude has the effect of transforming the stream of 
consciousness in such a way that the transient conscious experiences take on a particular form, 
which ‘reflect’ the underlying attitude. These forms make up what I will call the ‘pattern’ of 
the attitude in question. Fixated attention, for example, belongs to the pattern of fear, but it 
does not belong to the pattern of the serene and leisurely mood in which I was before the snake 
appeared on the path.  
 With this distinction in hand, I now propose that mindfulness should itself be understood 
as a specific kind of attitude or state of mind: becoming mindful is much more like entering a 
mood or being awake than a modification of attention. Mindful attention, mindful memory and 
mindful reflection help make up the pattern of mindfulness—the unique form that the stream 
of consciousness assumes within the mindful attitude. What kind of an attitude is mindfulness? 
Here I would like to develop the possibility that mindfulness is an example of that which 
Matthew Ratcliffe (2008) has called ‘feeling of being’ or ‘existential feeling’ (terms that will 
be used interchangeably in the following). Mindfulness, I propose, can be understood as the 
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feeling of being tuned-in. The first step to further developing this suggestion involves 
answering the question: what, generally speaking, are feelings of being? 
 In speaking of ‘feeling’ in this context, Ratcliffe (2005) has something different in mind 
than a mere bodily state (a local disturbance that does not refer to anything outside itself and 
the part of the body in which it occurs—a common way of thinking about feelings, both in 
philosophy and ordinary life). While Ratcliffe (ibid.) grants a bodily dimension to existential 
feelings (indeed he believes that bodily localization is essential to the phenomenon) feelings 
of being are simultaneously and necessarily also of or about something outside themselves, 
and the part of the body in which they are localized. In other words, feelings of being are 
intentional, in the sense of being of or about something. What are they of or about? Feelings 
of being, Ratcliffe (ibid) writes, “…are not directed at specific objects or situations but are 
background orientations through which experience as a whole is structured”, encompassing 
“the world as a whole” and are ways of “finding oneself in the world”. Feelings of being must 
be distinguished from emotions that are “…directed towards specific objects, events or 
situations…” and examples of which include “…fear, anger, happiness, disgust, sadness, grief, 
guilt, jealousy, joy and envy” (ibid.). The next question is: how do feelings of being determine 
the way of finding oneself in the world? 
 To answer this question, Ratcliffe (ibid.) resorts to the idea that there is a sense of 
possibility—an experience of what is and what is not possible. In fact, according to Ratcliffe 
(ibid.), the experiential world itself is just this ‘space of possibilities’. This allows him to say 
that existential feelings as “[ways] of finding oneself in a world are presupposed spaces of 
experiential possibility, which shape the various ways that things can be experienced”. The 
‘world’ as the space of possibilities can undergo changes. And these changes involve the 
closing and opening of different kinds of possibilities. A shift in possibility space is at the 
same time a shift in existential feeling (in the way that one finds oneself in the world). This, 
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together with the proposal that mindfulness is the feeling of being tuned-in, therefore forces 
certain questions and tasks onto us, including:  
 (1) How does establishing mindfulness, the feeling of being tuned-in, alter the possibility 
space? What kind of possibility does mindfulness open up or disclose? What kind of possibility 
does it close up? In general, the task of delineating possibility kinds is not a straightforward 
one, as Ratcliffe (2012) acknowledges: “…there is the formidable task of charting the kinds 
of possibility that experience incorporates, exploring variations in the structure of that 
possibility space…” and that “…an analysis of the kinds of possibility that experience 
incorporates … is a very substantial undertaking, which would generate difficult questions 
regarding the criteria and methods we employ to distinguish different kinds of possibility, how 
we might distinguish a good account of the phenomenological possibility space from a bad 
one, and whether there is a uniquely appropriate or correct account.” This sets up a major 
objective of Part II: to isolate and describe the unique kind of possibility that mindfulness 
opens up (and closes) and to work out the place and function of this kind of possibility in the 
overall structure of possibility space (our experience of the world). This brings up the issue 
of: 
 (2) The depth of existential feelings. Ratcliffe (2012) draws an important distinction 
between the founding role and the revelatory capacity of existential feelings. In Martin 
Heidegger’s (1967) account of moods (stimmung) and their ontological basis attunement 
(befindlichtkeit) both characteristics play a role in determining depth. Ratcliffe (2012), 
however, who is developing and reacting to Heidegger’s account, cannot see what bearing the 
revelatory capacity of an existential feeling has on its depth. In fact, Ratcliffe (ibid.) rejects 
the idea that revelatory capacity has anything to do with depth. Instead, he proposes that the 
founding role alone should be used to determine the depth of an existential feeling. Before 
evaluating Ratcliffe’s positions, and his critique of Heidegger on this point, it is necessary to 
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first understand what the terms ‘founding role’ and ‘revelatory capacity’ stand for. 
 If the kind of possibility disclosed by existential feeling A is presupposed by the kind of 
possibility disclosed by existential feeling B then we say that B is founded on A, that A is 
deeper than B. In other words, the very intelligibility of B presupposes A: “…a deeper kind 
of [existential feeling] is presupposed by the intelligibility of a shallower kind or, 
alternatively, renders the shallower kind unintelligible” and “…we need not settle for just two 
levels of depth. Suppose that y constitutes a space of possibilities presupposed by x and that 
y itself presupposes a space of possibilities constituted by z” (Ratcliffe, 2013), a situation 
where we would say that y is deeper than x while z is deeper than y. An example will help 
illustrate these formal definitions.  
 Consider Heidegger’s claim, to which Ratcliffe (ibid.) himself resorts, that fear is 
founded on anxiety. Fear, according to this account, discloses the possibility of the 
threatening, which involves the sense that I am an entity in the midst of the world, one whose 
life is in danger in the face of some other entity (which is also in the midst of the world). It is 
for myself as an entity in the world that I fear for. But, according to Heidegger, I could not 
experience myself as an entity in the world unless I was already related to my own possibilities 
or projects. And anxiety is this awareness of my possibilities. Leaving aside the details of 
Heidegger’s account (and the question of whether he is right about this), the example 
illustrates how the possibility of encountering anything as threatening is founded on the 
awareness of our own possibilities. In that sense, fear is founded on anxiety. If it could be 
shown that our possibilities are also founded, and that there is a feeling of being in which 
these deeper possibilities are disclosed, then while anxiety would be deeper than fear, this 
other state of mind would be even deeper still. Could mindfulness be just such a feeling of 
being? 
 In addition to serving as foundations for other existential feelings, certain existential 
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feelings can be philosophically illuminating. This is their ‘revelatory capacity’. Anxiety can 
again be used as an example: “Heidegger […] suggests that anxiety is philosophically 
illuminating, as it makes conspicuous the ordinarily presupposed structure of Being-in-the-
world” (ibid.) But, as I already said, Ratcliffe (ibid.) cannot see what this revelatory capacity 
has to do with the depth of existential feelings (or the ‘ground’ status of a mood, which amount 
to the same thing): 
 
…it is not clear why the capacity to facilitate any kind of insight should make something a 
ground mood. Enabling Being-in-the-world is not the same as revealing Being-in-the-world. 
Surely there could be equally fundamental moods that are characterised precisely by their 
tendency to obscure rather than enlighten.  
 
Ratcliffe (ibid.) proposes that founding role alone “…rather than its capacity to illuminate 
philosophically… is relevant to [the] ‘ground mood’ status.” I disagree with Ratcliffe on this 
point. 
 What Ratcliffe overlooks, in my view, is the difference between founding relations that 
hold between feelings of being, on the one hand, and those that obtain between different 
regions of possibility space, on the other. What I am here referring to as different regions of 
possibility space, overlaps with that which Heidegger (1967) calls modes or ways of Being. 
For Heidegger, as I understand him, different kinds of possibilities are constitutive of different 
modes of being. For example, practical possibilities (the usability, serviceability, 
conduciveness of equipment and so on.) constitute the mode of being that Heidegger calls 
ready-at-hand, which is the way of being of tools or equipment. Our possibilities or projects 
(such as the possibility of enjoying a cup of coffee, going out for a walk or becoming a 
philosopher) constitute the mode of being of entities that we ourselves are (Dasein): being-in-
the-world. For Heidegger, the ready-at-hand is founded on being-in-the-world. To say that is 
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to say something about the ontological structure of reality itself. This ontological structure 
should be distinguished from the ‘experiences’ or ‘comportments’ through which it is 
disclosed. These comportments are modes of being-in-the-world and exhibit their own 
founding relations, which are distinct from but not unrelated to the founding relations of the 
reality that they disclose. On this background, it should be fairly straightforward to show why 
the revelatory capacity of an existential feeling is an important factor in determining its depth.  
 To understand what makes anxiety a ground mood, it is not sufficient to say, as Ratcliffe 
does, that it discloses being-in-the-world. The crucial point, which Heidegger clearly saw, is 
that being-in-the-world as a mode of being is the foundation for other modes of being, such 
as the ready-at-hand and the present-at-hand. Therefore, to become aware of being-in-the-
world as such, is to become aware of the depth structure of reality itself (which does not imply 
that this structure has been articulated philosophically). This is what makes anxiety into a 
ground mood: it discloses a foundational mode of being; in becoming anxious the very depth 
of reality itself manifests. Speaking more generally, we can say that existential feeling A is 
deeper than existential feeling B if A reveals a more fundamental mode of being than B, if it 
penetrated deeper into reality that B. And to disclose a deeper level of reality means to shed 
light on the ontological structure of the shallower levels. And for a level of reality to be 
obscured is simply for its ontological foundation not to have been disclosed. 
 But was Heidegger right in describing being-in-the-world as the foundational mode of 
being? Correlatively, was he right that anxiety is the deepest mood or attunement? If being-
in-the-world is Heidegger’s description of the transcendental perspective, as I think it is, then 
the same question can also be asked in the following way: is the transcendental perspective 
the most fundamental perspective? What if there is a different perspective that the 
transcendental presupposes as its ontological foundation? And what if mindfulness is the 
feeling of being tuned-in to this more fundamental perspective, and its unique possibility 
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structure? Establishing mindfulness would then open up the possibility of making the 
transcendental perspective intelligible by revealing its ontological source. Part II will attempt 
to show that this is all in fact so. 
 (3) Feelings of being alter and determine the structure of the stream of consciousness. 
According to Ratcliffe (2005), existential feelings “[f]unction as presupposed contexts for all 
intellectual and practical activity and determine how objects themselves appear”. In other 
words, not only do feeling of being determine the form of experience but also of the entities 
or objects that we encounter in the world: “if one’s sense of the world is tainted by a ‘feeling 
of unreality’, this will affect how all objects of perception appear. They are distant, removed, 
not quite ‘there’” (ibid.). This is related to the point made above that becoming mindful alters 
the stream of consciousness in a particular way, endowing the elements of this stream with a 
particular form, the pattern of mindfulness. In other words, establishing the feeling of being 
tuned-in transforms ordinary attention into mindful attention and ordinary reflection or 
thinking into mindful reflection. But this does not answer the question: how does establishing 
mindfulness alter these functions? How does attention take up and express the possibility 
structure that the feeling of being tuned-in discloses? How does mindful reflection bring this 
possibility structure into the light of explicit awareness? Part II will attempt to deal with these 
















Part II aims to refine the pre-phenomenological sketch developed in Part I by bringing 
mindfulness, and related phenomena, into view from the perspective of Husserlian 
phenomenology. 
Chapter I sets the stage through an exposition of three key Husserlian notions: the natural 
and the transcendental perspectives and the phenomenological epoché (the procedure that 
leads the phenomenologist from the former to the latter). This chapter offers an interpretation 
according to which the natural and transcendental perspectives are different modes or 
configurations of the transcendental horizon, which I call the ‘crystallised’ and the ‘de-
crystallised’ modes respectively. ‘De-crystallisation’ refers to the event where the 
transcendental horizon passively reconfigures from the crystallised to the de-crystallised 
mode. On this basis, the epoché is defined as the project of intentionally cultivating the 
possibility of de-crystallisation (or of preventing crystallisation). It is then argued that de-
crystallisation (and consequently the practice of the epoché) presupposes the existence of a 
kind of possibility that Husserl does not explicitly discuss. I call it ‘thingly possibility’. 
Given this background, Chapter II begins by arguing that thingly possibilities come into 
view from a perspective that does not feature explicitly in Husserl’s phenomenology: the open 
perspective. This allows tuning-in-tuning-out to be defined as the practice of tuning-out of the 
transcendental horizon and tuning-in to the open horizon (the horizon filled in by thingly 
possibilities). Mindfulness is then defined as the feeling of being tuned-in to the open horizon. 
This chapter also offers a complementary definition of concentration as a modification of the 
feeling of being tuned-in where the open horizon is narrowed in a certain manner. The chapter 
ends by describing two other kinds of mindfulness and concentration. 
 Chapter III addressed two questions: (1) what is mindful reflection (vipassanā) and how 
does it relate to, and arise from within, mindfulness? (2) What is the phenomenological 
nature of the kind of effort (ātāpi) that is constitutive of tuning-out-tuning-in? In order to 
address these question, close attention is paid to the experience of two individuals who are 
actually (or so I claim) engaging in the practice of tuning-in-tuning-out: Edmund Husserl 
himself and Acariya Maha Boowa (the great meditation master from the Thai Forest tradition 
of Buddhism). Mindful reflection is described as an insight practice that involves contrasting 
and differentiating the different ways that phenomena bring their (thingly) possibilities into 
being. The effort that is constitutive of tuning-in-tuning-out is the effort required in order to 
transform one’s very mode of being (a transformation where the human subject (temporarily 
at least) becomes the phenomenon). 
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CHAPTER I:  
The Husserlian Background 
 
 The overarching ambition of Husserl’s philosophical project, at least from the Ideas I, 
can be understood as an attempt to make sense of two attitudes or perspectives (these terms 
will be used interchangeably here) that we can take on reality, by thinking through their 
interrelation and philosophical significance. Husserl called these the ‘natural’ and the 
‘transcendental’ attitudes, and he invested a significant amount of his energy in trying to 
explicate the method that would lead the phenomenologist from the former to the latter. This 
method is the phenomenological epoché. If the epoché brings about a perspectival shift, from 
the natural to the transcendental perspective, then, in the context of the current project, the 
question naturally arises: what is the relation between this shift and the one that can be brought 
about through the practice of tuning-out-tuning-in? And what, if anything, can the practice of 
the epoché teach us about mindfulness, the feeling of being tuned-in?  In order to address 
these (and other similar) questions, firstly it is necessary to get a firm grip on the 
aforementioned Husserlian themes. This is the task of the current chapter. 
 Section (i) outlines Husserl’s account of intentionality. Section (ii) describes some of 
the main characteristics of the natural perspective. Section (iii) is a similar exploration of the 
transcendental perspective. Section (iv) focuses on the idea of the transcendental horizon, a 
horizon filled in by ‘our’ possibilities. According to the interpretation developed here, the 
natural and transcendental perspectives are different modes or configurations of the 
transcendental horizon, the ‘crystallised’ and ‘de-crystallised’ modes. Section (v) gives an 
account of the phenomenological epoché as the practice of nurturing the possibility of de-
crystallisation (or of preventing the possibility of crystallisation from coming into being). This 
allows the question to be asked: what kind of possibility is at work in de-crystallisation? The 
answer calls for the recognition of a different kind of possibility from ‘our’ possibilities and I 
call this different kind of possibility ‘thingly’ possibility. By articulating the idea of thingly 
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possibility, the discussion takes the first major step towards a phenomenological account of 
mindfulness, and related phenomena. 
 
i. INTENTIONALITY 
 ‘Intentionality’ (a notion that Husserl adopted from his mentor Franz Brentano) 
designates that quality of consciousness in virtue of which it is of or about something.31 For 
Husserl, intentionality is not an extrinsic relation that arises when consciousness and its object 
come into proximity. Rather, intentionality is intrinsic to consciousness; it belongs to its 
essence (it is to consciousness what three angles are to a triangle).32 There are many different 
ways of being conscious of something (Husserl, 2000 Investigation V, §10). When I think 
about the cup of coffee, I am relating to it in one way; and when I perceive it, I am relating to 
it in another way. Another important and related point is that, for Husserl, every phenomenon 
 
31 Brentano’s (1874, p. 92) well known description of intentionality reads: “Every mental phenomenon is 
characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle ages call the intentional (or mental) inexistence of the object, 
and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object 
(which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon 
includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation 
something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire 
desired and so on.” 
32 As Husserl (2000, Investigation V, §21) writes: “This ‘reference to an object’ belongs peculiarly and 
intrinsically to an act-experience and the experiences manifesting it are by definition intentional experiences or 
acts.” To be more precise, Husserl does not believe that every kind of experience is intrinsically intentional. For 
hyletic data or sensations (which we will consider in a bit more detail below) are not (Husserl, 1970b 
Investigation V, §10). Nevertheless, according to Husserl, hyletic data can only exist as moments of intrinsically 
intentional experiences. In this sense all experience is encompassed and characterised by intentionality, as 
Husserl (1982) says: “...intentionality…is also like a universal medium which ultimately bears in itself all mental 
processes, even those which are not themselves characterized as intentive.” 
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has its own way of being original given; there is a sui generis kind of intentional experience 
in which numbers, values, other subjects, the lifeworld etc., appear originally, and, so to speak, 
in person—in contrast to being merely emptily presented, in absence. This is closely related 
to what Husserl (1982) calls the ‘principle of all principles’: 
 
…that every originary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition, that 
everything originarily (so to speak, in its “personal” actuality) offered to us in “intuition” is to 
be accepted simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in which it 
is presented there. 
 
The idea here is that whatever presents itself in this original way (with whatever characteristics 
and structures) is to be affirmed and accepted as such (but only as such). The task of 
phenomenology, as envisioned by Husserl, was to describe this ‘correlation’ between 
consciousness and the experienced world.33 Husserl’s understanding of intentionality evolved 
and changed in many ways throughout his long and productive philosophical life.34 Here, I 
will work with a view of intentionality that Husserl held around the time of Ideas I (which is 
arguably the view that he held on to throughout his life). According to this view, in every kind 
of intentional relation it is necessary to distinguish the noetic and the noematic moments, with 
the noetic moment being further subdivided into two dimensions: the hyletic data and the 
 
33 As Husserl (1970a, p. 166) writes: “The first breakthrough of this universal a priori of correlation between 
experienced object and manners of givenness (which occurred during work on my Logical Investigations around 
1898) affected me so deeply that my whole subsequent life-work has been dominated by the task of 
systematically elaborating on this a priori of correlation”. 
34 I will leave it to more competent scholars to work out the evolution of Husserl’s thought on this topic. For a 
general and in-depth overview of Husserl’s philosophy (which is not restricted to the theme of intentionality) I 
recommend: de Boer (1978). 
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apprehending forms or noesis (Husserl, 1982). 
 In order to bring the noesis into view, consider one of the most celebrated case studies 
in phenomenology: the phenomenon of ‘double sensation’.35 Put your hands together and take 
note of the touch sensation. If you stay with the experience and pay close attention, you should 
notice that this sensation sometimes appears with the meaning “left hand touching the right”, 
which from time to time spontaneously switches to the sense “the left hand being touched by 
the right”. At one time, the right hand is the object, at another the subject, of experience. Since, 
for all intents and purposes, the touch sensation stays constant, we could say that what has 
altered here is the way that this sensation is apprehended (aufgefasst). In the terminology of 
Ideas I, it is the noesis that has changed (Husserl, 1982). The noesis is neither the object that 
appears (say, the right hand touching the left), nor the material that undergoes and supports 
the interpretation (the actual feeling or sensation of touch). It is a distinct moment of 
intentionality that apprehends the sensation in a particular way so as to yield the objective 
sense. Let us take another example. In the duck/rabbit illusion, we see the ‘same’ figure switch 
from a representation of a rabbit to that of a duck and then back again quickly. Here, the same 
material on the paper is at one time interpreted as being a representation of a duck and at 
another time of a rabbit. Again, when the switch takes place, what alters is the noesis (the 
manner in which the material on the page is apprehended). In both examples, the alteration 
was not an alteration in the kind of noesis, but of instances of the same kind (in the first 
example, in both cases we are dealing with a tactile apprehension, and in the second with an 
imaginative one). For an example where a change of kind does takes place, consider the case 
where I go from apprehending what I see on the page of this book as meaning something to 
apprehending it as ink marks on paper. While the material remains constant, the apprehension 
 
35 See: Husserl (1989, p. 155). Moran (2010) offers an insightful overview of how the phenomenon of double 
sensation (and related themes) is treated by some of the key figures in the phenomenological tradition.  
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alters from, what Husserl calls a ‘meaning intention’, to a visual perception (two different 
kinds of noesis). Husserl discovered and described many different kinds of noesis. The 
following discussion will focus on a very special kind: the straightforward synthesis that 
underlies the natural perspective and which constitutes the sense of there being an all-
encompassing ‘world’. 
 In the case of ‘double sensation’ (as stated above) the feeling of touch (the sheer 
materiality) stays the same while the apprehension varies. But in the experience of touch itself 
it is necessary to distinguish the surface of the object being touched (which is something 
persistent and enduring) from the manifold of constantly changing touch sensations through 
which the object’s surface appears and which is given as being located in the touching hand. 
In the Logical Investigations, Husserl called the latter dimension of experience ‘sensations’ 
and in the Ideas he speaks of it as ‘hyletic data’ (Husserl, 1982). With the possible exception 
of the epoché, no other idea of Husserl’s has been attacked as viciously (especially by other 
phenomenologists) as the idea of the hyletic data.36 But it is also true that no other idea of his 
has been as misunderstood. In my opinion, the hyleic data is one of the most important ideas 
of Husserlian phenomenology (one whose true significance even Husserl himself was not able 
to truly appreciate). Unfortunately, in this work I will not be able defend this claim (but I will 
have something to say about it in the conclusion).37 For the present purposes, a brief 
illustration will suffice. 
 Consider the black surface of this coffee cup in my hand. Not only do we speak of this 
colour as persisting over time, as being a uniform property of the object (this is prior to any 
theory that would expel the colour from the world into the mind or the brain), it is also difficult 
to deny that, on a certain level of experience, that is precisely how it appears. When we pay 
 
36 See: Smith (1977) 
37 For a defense of ‘hyletic’ or ‘material’ phenomenology, see: Henry (2008). 
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close attention, however, we see that this uniform and persistent colour appears through a 
multitude of constantly changing colour sensations, which exhibit a richness that is simply 
impossible to capture in words. This hyletic dimension is in a constant state of flux; it is never 
the same from moment to moment, and it is through this constant flux that the uniform colour 
of the object becomes constituted. Something analogous is true of feeling. Consider, for 
example, a pain in the foot. Once again, on one level of description, we experience this as a 
solid, uniform phenomenon, one that is located in the foot, which arose at a certain time, which 
endures and eventually ceases. But, when we pay close attention to the actual experience of 
this pain, what we find is a continuum of pain sensations, which are changing so rapidly that 
it is impossible to keep track, or to describe them in detail.  Colour and pain are only two 
examples of hyletic data, there are many more. 
 As noetic moments, the hyle and noesis are “really inherent” parts of the intentional 
experience.  By apprehending the hyletic data, the noesis constitutes the noema. The noema 
is not actually contained in the experience but is, in some sense, “outside” of it—although this 
‘outside’ is still ‘inside’ in the relevant sense (Husserl, 1982, p. 205). The question regarding 
the true nature of the noema is one of the most discussed in the secondary Husserlian 
literature.38 One key debate has to do with the question of the relation between the noema and 
the intentional object. As I see it, the intentional object is that which appears as identical 
through a continuum of changing noemas, while ‘noema’ designates the way that the object 
appears in a particular intentional experience. In other words, while the object is distinct from 
the noemas that ‘make it up’, it is not independent or self-sufficient in relation to them. Let me 
try and illustrate. I think about the coffee cup, I lift it in my hand, look at it, write about it and 
so on. The cup is the intentional object of all these acts; it persists through all of them as 
 
38 For an overview of the different ways of interpreting the noema, and the wider philosophical implications of 
these interpretations, see: Zahavi (2004) 
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something self-identical. To see what the noema is, consider this particular act of perceiving 
the cup, and abstract from all other ways that the cup may appear, including in a future moment 
of this perception. What remains when you do that is simply the cup as it appears in this act 
of perceiving. Even if it turns out that the cup does not ‘actually’ exist (perhaps I am 
hallucinating), the ‘noematic cup’ (the cup as it appears in this perception) stays what it is. 
 This very brief overview of Husserl’s doctrine of intentionality sets the stage for the 
following section, the task of which is to describe a very special kind of intentionality that 
Husserl calls the natural ‘attitude’ or ‘perspective’. 
  
ii. THE NATURAL PERSPECTIVE   
 For the purpose of illustrating the phenomenological character of the natural perspective 
(and of its relation to and difference from the transcendental) I find it helpful to compare it to 
the dreaming perspective, and the various possibilities that dreaming offers. In this chapter 
and in the remainder of this work, I will use the example of dreaming as a heuristic device in 
order to shed light on these phenomena. In using the analogy, I am not trying to say that there 
is some kind of a deep correspondence between, say, the natural and the dreaming perspectives 
(nor am I saying that there is not). I am only resorting to the example of dreaming for the 
purpose of illustrating certain ideas (the truth of which does not depend on the suitability, or 
otherwise, of the analogy being used to illustrate them). 
 In an ordinary dream the mind identifies itself with something within the dream—the 
self—which it opposes to everything else in the dream—the not-self. And it apprehends both 
the self and the non-self as being situated in dream world—the all-encompassing context in 
which dream events take place. None of this is known explicitly (indeed it cannot be) while 
one is going about one’s dreamy business. The threefold differentiation of self, non-self and 
world, form a kind of background upon which the more familiar kinds of dream experiences 
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take place, experiences related to particular dream objects or events (such as the running away 
from that strange creature, talking with someone and so on). Suppose that you now become 
lucid; you become conscious of the dream while continuing to ‘dream’. The significance of 
the lucid perspective in the current context is that it brings the natural dreaming perspective 
into view, allowing it to be objectified in a certain way. While it may not happen that, in 
becoming lucid, you automatically disassociate from your dream character—you may 
continue to feel that there is a special part of the dream that you can control and that is, in 
some sense, more you than other things—it becomes (or can become) clear that the mind has 
a much more important role to play in the constitution of the dream world (and the objects 
that populate it) than appears from that natural dreaming perspective—where the mind 
apprehends itself as being nothing more than one dream object amongst others. Here ‘mind’ 
does not refer to the mind of the dream character (that part of the dream that is apprehended 
as self) but to the mind that is dreaming the dream. According to Husserl, as I understand him, 
something analogous is going on in ordinary, natural waking life also. In the natural 
perspective, too, the mind identifies itself as being a particular object in the world, the 
‘psycho-physical self’, and it identifies everything else in that world as not self.39 This subject-
object dichotomy is the basic characteristic of the natural perspective. But, as we will see later, 
for Husserl there is something comparable to lucidity here too, which allows us to take a step 
back from the natural perspective in order to objectify it and reflect on its structure.  
 It is necessary to keep apart two possible interpretations of ‘the natural perspective’. On 
the one hand, this term can be taken as designating ordinary life before it has been brought 
into view as such: the situation of being absorbed in and fascinated by the world. On the other 
hand, the expression can be used to designate ordinary life when it has been brought into view. 
When Husserl uses the term he has the second sense in mind. In other words, merely in virtue 
 
39 For the original description of the natural attitude see: (Husserl, 1982). 
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of talking about ordinary life as the ‘natural perspective’, one has taken a step back from it 
and is no longer immersed in it.  To put it in terms that will become clearer later, the ‘natural 
perspective’ is itself a transcendental concept.40 This difference between the absorbed-in 
ordinary life and the natural perspective allows me to briefly touch upon another important 
theme. 
  According to Husserl, unlike other human endeavours (such as the positive sciences, 
and the everyday, practical engagement with the world), philosophy necessitates a (radical) 
break with (absorbed-in) ordinary life. According to this view, philosophy only begins when 
ordinary life is seen as the natural perspective, as Zahavi (2019) writes in a recent article: 
Husserl often contrasts philosophy proper with the work done by the positive sciences. The 
latter are so absorbed in their investigation of the natural (or social/cultural) world that they 
do not pause to reflect upon their own presuppositions and conditions of possibility. They all 
operate on the basis of a natural (and necessary) naivety, namely the tacit belief in the existence 
of a mind-independent reality. This realist assumption is so fundamental and deeply rooted 
that it is not only accepted by the positive sciences, it also permeates our daily pre-theoretical 
life, for which reason Husserl calls it the ‘natural attitude’. Regardless of how natural the 
attitude might be, simply to take it for granted is philosophically unacceptable. If philosophy 
is supposed to amount to a radical form of critical elucidation, it cannot simply presuppose 
our natural realism. Rather than continuing to live in the natural attitude, it must engage in a 
reflective move that will allow it to explore the epistemic and metaphysical presuppositions 
of the latter.  
In response to this line of thought, I would like to raise some questions (which I will not pursue 
at this point). Is this reflective move, which brings ordinary life into view as the natural 
perspective, to be identified with philosophy or is it only one kind of a philosophical 
 
40 Fink (1933) makes this point. 
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endeavour? What are we to say about the possibility of (instead of stepping back from being 
absorbed in the world) becoming even more absorbed in it, albeit in a special way? Perhaps it 
isn’t a problem of too much absorption, but too little of it? Perhaps in order to understand the 
things themselves (which first announce themselves in ordinary life) what is called for is not 
a stepping back from them to their appearances—to what they are for us—but a kind of 
stepping into them? It could be argued that to practice tuning-in-tuning-out is precisely to 
practice becoming absorbed or tuned-in to things in this way. And, having become tuned-in, 
perhaps the possibility of a new kind of reflective practice will become open to us, a kind of 
practice that opens the thing up from the inside, revealing its true nature. Could this, too, not 
serve as a basis for a kind of philosophy? And is it not a different avenue towards questioning 
‘natural realism’ which, according to this position, is naïve because it is not absorbed enough? 
If not, why not? Leaving these questions for later, it is now time to return to the theme of the 
natural perspective.  
 In speaking of the ‘natural perspective’, it is necessary to distinguish the overall, global 
awareness of being in a world (which includes the sense that I am different from the other 
things that are to be found in it) from the short-lived experiences of the various things that are 
encountered within the world (such as coffee cups, other people, tools and indeed our psycho-
physical selves). For the following purposes, ‘the natural perspective’ will be used exclusively 
to refer to the global sense of being in the world with its subject-object structure. ‘Mundane’ 
experiences will refer to the experiences of particular objects encountered in the world (this 
perception of the coffee cup as being an actual thing in the world is an example of a mundane 
experience). What is the relation between the natural perspective and mundane experiences?  
 At first glance, there appears to be a tension in Husserl’s work on this question. On the 
one hand, he wants to say that the natural perspective is not just another experience, it is not 
just another intentional act, but that it is rather the stable ground upon which any such 
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experience appears and which is therefore presupposed by any such experience.41 But, on the 
other hand, he also wants to say that the natural perspective is itself founded on experiences 
and that it is a synthesis that binds experience together in a certain way, thereby implying that 
the natural perspective is itself a higher order, founded intentional experience.42 
 The apparent conflict dissolves, or at least partially dissolves, if we keep in mind the 
following two-fold ambiguity of the term ‘intentional experience’. According to the first 
sense, the term designates mundane experiences: the form that experiences assume within the 
natural perspective. Clearly, since mundane experiences presuppose the natural perspective, 
and could not exist without it as a basis, the latter cannot itself be dependent on, and arise 
from them. According to the second sense, however, ‘intentional experience’ designates the 
form that experiences take within a different perspective, a perspective that is more basic or 
fundamental than the natural perspective. This is the ‘transcendental perspective’ and it will 
be the theme of the following section. Taking the idea for granted for now, allows us to speak 
of intentional experiences in this second sense as transcendental (intentional) experiences. If 
we take the expression in this sense then no conflict arises when we say that the natural 
perspective is founded on experiences. According to this understanding, the natural 
perspective is a particular form that arises on the ground of transcendental experiences, which 
has the effect of transforming transcendental into mundane experiences. For the sake of 
illustration, we can compare this to a melody and the tones that make it up. Just as the 
 
41 “The general positing, by virtue of which there is not just any continual apprehensional consciousness of the 
real surrounding world, but a consciousness of it as a factually existing “actuality”, naturally does not consist of 
a particular act, perchance an articulated judgment of existence. It is, after all, something that lasts continuously 
throughout the whole duration of the attitude, i.e., throughout natural waking life” (Husserl, 1982). 
42 In the Crisis, Husserl (1970, p. 146) describes the natural attitude as a “…constant process, synthetically 
connected as it incessantly flows on, [that] brings about the coherent consciousness of the straightforward 
“being” in the world””. 
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individual tones can exist without giving rise to the melody, so, let us assume, transcendental 
experiences can exist without giving rise to the natural perspective. When the tones are 
synthesised together in a particular way, however, the melody comes to be, and with the 
coming to be of the melody, the underlying tones are themselves modified in a certain manner. 
Analogously, when transcendental experiences are synthesised in such a way that the natural 
perspective comes into being, these experiences are no longer simply what they were before, 
but acquire new layers of meaning and become mundane experiences. Having conceived of 
the natural perspective as a kind of intentional experience, it is now possible to raise the 
question of its noetic and noematic moments. I will begin with the noetic dimension. 43 
 I believe that Husserl’s description of the natural attitude is an extension of his earlier 
study of ‘straightforward synthesis’ in the Logical Investigations, the kind of synthesis at work 
in the perception of individual, actual objects that we encounter within the world (Husserl, 
1970b, Investigation VI, §47). Later on in this work, I will have an opportunity to study this 
synthesis in more detail (see: Part II, Chapter III, Section i.). But for the present purposes a 
brief overview of some of its characteristics will suffice. In the perception of an actual object 
(such as this coffee cup) the straightforward synthesis ensures that a continuum of partial and 
momentary percepts are put together in such a way as to yield a higher-order perceptual 
experience, in which the object appears ‘in one blow’ as something unified, undivided and 
actual. Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of partial percepts. The first kind are constitutive 
of every phase of the straightforward perception: this straightforward perception of the cup is 
made up of many partial intentions that are responsible for the implicit sense that I have of the 
 
43 The reader may wonder about the hyletic dimension of the natural attitude. Didn’t I say above that, for Husserl, 
every act contains a hyletic dimension? The natural attitude satisfies this requirement in virtue of the fact that it 
‘inherits’ its hyletic content from the experiences on which it is founded and which it synthesizes. In the 
remainder of this discussion, however, I will not discuss the hyletic dimension of the natural attitude. 
136 
cup as having a multitude of parts. Some of these partial percepts are filled, such as those that 
present the parts of the object that are now facing me. Others are empty; they refer to the parts 
of the object that I cannot see, such as the side of the object that is facing the wall. Taking into 
account the temporal dimension, the straightforward perception is continually flowing: I 
perceive the cup, I grasp it, tap on it, hearing how it sounds and so on. While constant change 
is going on, nevertheless, through this flux the uniform and stable object somehow manages 
to appear. Here the partial percepts fuse together so as to yield a single, overarching perception 
of something uniform, stable and enduring. The straightforward synthesis or synthesis-by-
fusion (terms that I will use interchangeably from now on) is not an active process in the sense 
of being something that one does intentionally and sporadically. It is rather always going on, 
as long as we are in the natural perspective, and in that sense it is passive (but it is active in 
another, extended sense—for it ‘constructs’ the sense of there being a stable and persistent 
object). 
 Straightforward synthesis is nothing mysterious. It is just that we usually do not nurture 
the right kind of stance from which it can be brought into view. Let us change that. Direct your 
attention to something in your environment, it may be a coffee cup or a book, or a person 
standing on the other side of the room. Pay close attention at the way that the object is 
changing; in one moment, it is showing you one side, then another; now it is close, now it is 
far away. Correlatively, your experience of the object is also always changing. Strictly 
speaking nothing is ever the same. But through this flux and within it, something uniform 
does manifest and persist: the cup of coffee, or the person. Both the changing and the enduring 
aspects are discernible qualities of experience, and neither should be dismissed as less real 
(although this does not stop us from asking about the founding relations of these phenomena). 
‘Synthesis-by-fusion’ names the process that is responsible for bringing into being a uniform 
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and persistent something through the constant flux of change.44 
 I believe that Husserl derived the idea of the natural attitude by extending this analysis 
of straightforward perception of individual objects to our experience of the world as a whole. 
But what I think is actually going on here is that Husserl’s initial investigation of 
straightforward perception was in fact an investigation of ‘mundane’ perception, which is but 
one form that perception can take. And what makes a perception mundane is that it occurs on 
the background of the natural perspective—the all-encompassing synthesis-by-fusion. To put 
it differently, the synthesis-by-fusion that Husserl discerned as an intrinsic moment of 
perception is something like a reflection of the underlying universal synthesis-by-fusion which 
defines the natural perspective. According to this suggestion, synthesis-by-fusion is not an 
intrinsic quality of perception; perception need not construct actual objects. It only takes on 
that role when it occurs within the natural perspective (in earlier terms: mundane perception 
helps make up the pattern of the natural attitude). And because the descriptions of the Logical 
Investigations were undertaken from within the natural perspective, what Husserl’s was trying 
to describe there is not perception as such but mundane perception.45 I would now like to take 
a closer look at how the universal synthesis-by-fusion is reflected in mundane perception. 
 There are two directions that the perceptual exploration of the coffee cup can take. It is 
possible to travel inside the cup, as we do when we focus on its handle, investigate the material 
that it is made of and so on. Here the cup persists as the background context while the 
synthesis-by-fusion continues its work inside it: its parts, and their parts, become constituted 
 
44 The ‘adumbration’ of the object through its aspects (which are equally objective) should not be confused with 
the adumbration of the objective through the hyle. 
45 As Moran (2000, p. 125) writes: “Husserl came to suspect that his attempt to study the essential features of 
consciousness in the Logical Investigations still harboured certain naturalistic presuppositions about 
consciousness…” 
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as objects in their own right, in exactly the same way that the cup was earlier. Here the cup is 
the actuality upon which everything else that we encounter as we explore inside it appears; 
everything is seen as within and as a part of the actual cup. This is its inner horizon. But we 
can also travel in the other direction, from the cup to the table, from the table to the room, 
from the room to the house and so on. When we do that, the object becomes straightforwardly 
integrated into a larger and larger context (something analogous is going on in the temporal 
direction but I will leave the illustration of this in the hands of the reader). This is the outer 
horizon. Now, even if we do not follow the horizon inwards or outwards in this way: even if 
we do not give rise to an actual experience of, say, the other side of the cup, there is 
nevertheless an implicit sense that these horizons are there—that the cup has parts, and that it 
too is a part of a wider environment, however vague and indeterminate this sense may be. 
These inner and outer horizons are already sketched out (and must be sketched out, whenever 
we glance upon anything) and it is on the basis of this sketch that the drama of ordinary life 
plays out. It will not take us long to realise that there are no limits to this sketching out, the 
horizon is infinite. As Husserl (1982) puts it “any actual experience points beyond itself to 
possible experiences which, in turn, point to new possible experiences and so ad infinitum”. I 
could in principle travel inside the cup forever, without ever hitting a limit, and the same holds 
in the outer direction. Note that to speak of ‘infinity’ and ‘foreverness’ here is to speak of 
certain experiential qualities. According to Husserl, it is this infinite horizon that we are really 
referring to (phenomenologically speaking) when we speak about a ‘world’ or the ‘lifeworld’ 
(the noematic correlate of the universal synthesis-by-fusion). 
 To notice the lifeworld as a descriptive feature of our experience—it is necessary to not 
look away from objects that we find within the world (not even to collections of them 
mistakenly thinking that the world is some kind of an aggregate of individual things).46 The 
 
46 Husserl may have at certain points in his philosophical career held the view that the world is an aggregate of 
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world is an integral structure of the actual object. In order to notice it, instead of looking away 
from the object, it is necessary to look into it in a certain way. To perceive this cup, for 
example, is to perceive it as something within-the-world. The world is already present in the 
very structure of the cup as the infinite horizon, that we can—and indeed must—enter as long 
as we remain in the natural perspective; but we can never reach the end of it. Differently put, 
when we reflect on what it means to be an actual object, we realise that the sense of an object 
or entity is inseparable from the sense of world. While the entity and the lifeworld are deeply 
interconnected, they are nevertheless different phenomena; they exist in different ways, a point 
that Husserl (1970a, p. 143) makes when he writes that “the world…does not exist as an entity, 
as an object, but exists with such uniqueness that the plural makes no sense when applied to 
it. Every plural and every singular drawn from it, presupposes the world horizon”. 
 The following analogy may help direct the reader’s mind to the lifeworld’s unique 
phenomenological presence.47 If you focus on the tip of a candle flame and hold your attention 
there you will soon notice, in the ‘corner of your eye’, a reddish ring appear around the flame.  
And the more intensely you focus on the flame, the more strongly does the ring assert itself in 
the fringe of your awareness. But if you try to focus on the ring directly—to make it into an 
object of your attention—it will vanish without a trace. The lifeworld can be compared to the 
ring, while the entity within-the-world can be compared to the flame; the more we engage the 
entity, the stronger we feel the presence of the world—the all-encompassing context, in the 
background. But if you try and grasp the world directly—in an attempt to make it an explicit 
object of attention, to experience it just as another entity—it will slip through your fingers like 
sand. To do justice to the lifeworld as a phenomenon, it is necessary to respect its tendency-
 
individual objects. But he eventually articulated a much more satisfactory description, one that we are now 
working with. For a good discussion of this, see: Overgaard (2004, chapter IV.) 
47 I would like to thank my friend Zakaria Garmsiri for this analogy. 
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to-hide as a positive, constitutive feature. By its very nature, the world is a shy phenomenon. 
 A key idea that will accompany us through the rest of this discussion will be that every 
perspective has a unique possibility structure. In the natural perspective, actuality has an 
ontological priority over possibilities. From this perspective, all possibilities appear as 
possibilities of something actual, ultimately the lifeworld—the all-encompassing actuality. 
From here on, I will call these kinds of possibilities—which always presuppose something 
actual and which are only possibilities of some actual thing—‘potentialities’. Every object 
within the world has its range of potentialities. This cup, for example, is an actuality that has 
the potential of holding coffee, of breaking if dropped on the floor, of being stored in the 
cupboard and so on.  
 Another question that I will briefly touch upon now is: what form does awareness take 
in the natural perspective? In the natural perspective, as we have seen, the lifeworld is 
differentiated into two basic regions of self and not self  (the region of not-self is further 
subdivided in various ways, which I will not go into here). The ‘self’ here designates the 
‘psycho-physical subject’, the ‘character’, or simply the ‘person’ (terms that I will use 
interchangeably). The psycho-physical subject is an object within the world that ‘we’ identify 
with in the natural perspective: just as in the dream the dreaming consciousness identifies 
itself with one part of the dream—the dream character. Like all other worldly actualities, the 
psycho-physical subject has its own range of potentialities. For example, my psycho-physical 
self has the potential of, say, writing a philosophical paper but does not have the potentiality 
of playing the piano or running one hundred meters in under ten seconds.48 
 Most human beings live their entire life from within the natural perspective, and will die 
 
48 Of course, I can learn to play the piano. But as this possibility is not at this time a possibility of my character, 
it is not a potentiality (potentialities are the possibilities that ‘really’ pertain to my character). More needs to be 
said about this but this is not the place to do that. I am grateful to Brett Allen for raising this issue with me. 
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without ever having suspected that there is anything beyond—that a shift in perspective is 
possible. According to Husserl (1982), a shift is indeed possible: to bring it about, it is 
necessary to suspend or neutralise the universal synthesis-by-fusion that runs through all our 
experiences, binding them into a straightforward experience of the lifeworld. Husserl 
developed a method for doing this and called it the phenomenological epoché (ibid.). After 
the successful use of the epoché, one becomes sober from one’s drunkenness in the world, and 
comes to see that, underneath the natural perspective there exists a different perspective—the 
transcendental perspective. The epoché will be taken up as an explicit theme in section (iv). 
For now its possibility will be taken for granted. The next task will be to bring forth some of 
the key characteristics of the transcendental perspective that the epoché is claimed to disclose. 
 
iii. THE TRANSCENDENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
 In the midst of a dream: I am aware of myself as being a particular dream character—
living with and struggling against, other things that I find within the dream world. When I 
either become lucid or remember the dream later on, however, I can become aware of myself 
in an entirely new way. This is the awareness that the whole dream world—including the 
object that I identify as myself—is manifesting or appearing to my dreaming consciousness. 
The ‘place’ now in question is obviously not just another part of the dream; it is something 
else altogether. A shift in perspective has taken place. 
 According to what is arguably the key idea of Husserlian phenomenology—the natural 
perspective is subject to a similar shift. After the epoché, I come to the realisation that the 
lifeworld—and everything within it, including my psycho-physical self—is an appearance to 
‘my’ consciousness. I become aware of myself as the ‘dative’ of manifestation.49 As a 
 
49 According to Overgaard (2004, p. 45), Thomas Prufer was probably the first to coin the expression ‘dative of 
manifestation’. 
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phenomenologists, I go from objects that I straightforwardly encounter in the world (the what) 
to the appearances that make those objects possible (the how) (Zahavi, 2017, p. 57).50 For you 
to get a taste of the shift, try holding the thought “All of this, including, this thing here that I 
identify with myself, is appearing to my consciousness”; but please do not allow yourself to 
be satisfied too easily that you have successfully undergone the shift in perspective, or that 
you have truly understood it. Just think of how radical the difference is between being 
absorbed in the dream world, on the one hand, and then becoming lucid in the dream, on the 
other. Why should the shift from the natural to the transcendental perspective be any less 
radical? Indeed, should we not expect it to be even more radical? 
 What form does awareness take in the transcendental perspective? I believe that 
transcendental awareness can be described as a creative or free self-awareness. While Husserl 
himself does not focus on this aspect of the transcendental as intensely as some of his 
 
50 There are different interpretations of the philosophical significance of the transcendental perspective.  
According to the metaphysical interpretation: the transcendental perspective is a whole new dimension of being, 
a dimension that was never completely absent—indeed it could not be—but which was previously covered up 
and hidden.  But it is also possible to put aside all metaphysical interpretations, and understand the shift as a 
purely epistemological or methodological procedure. According to this interpretation, the transcendental 
perspective is a condition of possibility for knowing or having a representation of the world; here all metaphysical 
questions are ‘bracketed’ and the phenomenologists is only concerned to decipher the structure of that without 
which there would be no world for us. Both interpretations have been defended in the secondary literature 
(Zahavi, 2017, Chapter 3). While I am drawn towards the metaphysical interpretation, I do not think (as Husserl 
arguably thought and as he is certainly often represented as having thought) that the metaphysical interpretation 
necessarily leads to transcendental idealism (if that view is interpreted as implying that transcendental 
consciousness is a necessary and sufficient condition of the existence of the world). For it could be that while 
the transcendental perspective is necessary, it is not sufficient to account for the being of the world. For the 
following purposes, this issue can be left aside. I would like to thank Peter Poellner for encouraging me to think 
bout this.   
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existentialist successors (and especially Jean Paul-Sartre), nevertheless I believe that the root 
of the existentialist’s account of freedom can be found in Husserl’s thought.51 While I cannot 
here give the topic the attention that it deserves, the idea that transcendental awareness is free 
or creative in a very special sense follows from Husserl’s description of appearances—which 
are dependent on our possibilities, as which will be discussed shortly. To illustrate the sense 
in which transcendental consciousness is free, it will help to consider the dream analogy again. 
From the ordinary, dreaming perspective, the creativity of the dreaming self is limited by the 
potentialities of its character: what I apprehend this object that I identify as myself as being 
capable of. But in coming to the realisation that “this is all a dream” (becoming lucid) I can 
become aware of myself as creative in an entirely new way. I can now come to an 
understanding that the whole dream world—including my dream character—is ‘produced’ by 
my dreaming consciousness. Or, at the very least, I now understand that my consciousness has 
much more of a say in how the dream appears—about the structure of the dream world—
compared to the natural dreaming perspective. In becoming lucid, I am no longer bound up 
with my situation and the ‘potentialities’ of my dream character (at least not in the way that I 
was previously). I am now free to break down and recreate the entire dream world in an 
entirely new way.52 (Note, though, that even transcendental freedom or creativity is not 
 
51 Edie (1984) writes that Husserl’s account of…  
 
 … transcendentality which enables me to take even myself as an object, is the most fundamental root 
of the later existentialist conception of freedom, a conception which was orchestrated by Jean-Paul 
Sartre both in his The Transcendence of the ego and in Being and Nothingness. 
 
On a similar theme, see: MacDonald (2001). 
52 A lot more work needs to be done in order to understand the precise meaning of the kind of freedom that the 
lucid—and the transcendental—perspective opens up. It is not the case (commonly at least) that in virtue of 
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absolute; it is limited by such factors as my history and knowledge, by my ‘facticity’—I could 
not, for example, create the dream worlds that Albert Einstein could. But it is important to 
keep in mind that such limitations are not identical to the limits of my dream character.) 
 Above I spoke about the essential role that the dreaming mind has in the constitution of 
the dream world. This was meant to serve as an analogy for the essential role that the 
transcendental consciousness plays in the constitution of the lifeworld and the objects that 
populate it. What does this constitution of objects by transcendental consciousness amount 
to? This coffee cup will serve as an example for our explorations.  
 From the natural perspective: the cup is an object that has its place in the lifeworld, e.g. 
it is now on the table, and later, when I have finished drinking from it, it will continue its 
existence in the cupboard. As a worldly actuality the cup has its own unique range of 
potentialities (e.g. it can store coffee, it can break and so on). From the transcendental 
 
entering the lucid (or transcendental) perspective one suddenly acquires the ability to create the dream world in 
any way that one likes. In an important sense, the dream world continues to resist my projects and I continue to 
be at the mercy of its happenings (but not in the way that I am when I identify myself with the dream character). 
The minimal point that I am trying to make here is the following. In entering the lucid perspective I can (if I 
reflect in the right way) come to the understanding that what I previously took to be ‘external’ objects (with more 
or less determinate properties that do not depend on what I think and believe about them) are in fact—at least to 
a large extent—dependent on my (dreaming) consciousness. From the natural dreaming perspective, I believe 
(implicitly) that the only way to change the ‘external’ dream things is by modifying them mediately through my 
dream body. The lucid perspective opens up the possibility of understanding that I can alter the dream world by 
simply changing the beliefs that I hold and the projects that I pursue (if for example I acquire the beliefs and 
projects of an astronomer, then the way that extraterrestrial phenomena appear in my dreams will also alter). 
Something analogous is true of the transcendental perspective. For the classical description of transcendental 
freedom along roughly these lines, see: Sartre (2003a, Part Four, Chapter One, Section I.) I would like to thank 
Brett Allen for raising this issue. Let me also note that transcendental freedom must not be identified with the 
kind of freedom that mindfulness opens up. But this is not a theme that I will explicitly address in this work. 
145 
perspective the cup is not given in this way.  After the shift, the actual cup is ‘replaced’ by 
something that can be described as a cup manifestation or appearance. The cup is now only 
what it appears to be in and for (transcendental) consciousness. After the shift, we are no 
longer concerned with what the cup is but with how it appears. In order to illustrate this 
difference: contrast how you relate to a cup in the context of an ordinary dream, on the one 
hand, with how it appears in a lucid dream, on the other. With the onset of lucidity, let us 
assume, the cup did not vanish into some kind of dream ether. It continues to be there. But 
there has been a radical shift in its very sense or meaning. For example, while lucid, when you 
are no longer dreaming of the cup, the sense that it continues to exist somewhere else in the 
dream (such as in some dream cupboard that is not currently appearing) is not a part of your 
experience—for you know that there is nothing more to the dream world other than what is 
appearing to your (lucid) awareness. From the lucid perspective, for the “cup to exist in the 
cupboard” is for you to sense the possibility of giving rise to a continuum of experiences; it is 
to have the sense that I can “…walk, then reach, then open the cupboard and retrieve the cup”. 
“To retrieve the cup from the cupboard” means to set into motion a series of experiences that, 
through their synthetic interconnection, constitute the sense that the cup was somewhere 
beforehand, and that you are now holding it in your hand. Everything now becomes a matter 
of (transcendental) experiences, and syntheses of experiences, that constitute the sense that 
things endure even when they are not being experienced. Something analogous, according to 
Husserl, is going on in the shift from the natural to the transcendental perspective; we go from 
objects (broadly understood) to the appearances that, in their synthetic connections, make 
them possible. What we need here are two ways of speaking, which will help us clarify the 
occasions when we are making references to (transcendental) appearances and (actual or 
natural) objects. In referring to appearances I will resort to double quotation marks (as I have 
already been doing):  “I turn the cup in my hand”. “I place it back down on the table”. “I look 
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up at the sky”.  
 Here we see that—even from the transcendental perspective—change is constantly 
taking place. The shift has not done away with the stream of consciousness; appearances 
continue to flow and to follow one another. But the meaning of ‘experience’ has now been 
radically altered; what were previously ‘mundane experiences’ have now become 
‘transcendental experiences’. At first, this may strike you as trivial: “If before and after the 
shift of perspective” you may wonder, “…we are left with the stream of consciousness, then 
is this so called ‘shift of perspective’ so much ado about nothing?” But what appears as a 
trivial difference is in fact of central philosophical importance, as Husserl (1964, p. 32) writes: 
“we have here one of those seemingly trivial nuances that make a decisive difference between 
right and wrong paths to philosophy”. To help further alleviate the discomfort, recall briefly 
what was already said above. The mundane stream of consciousness contains the 
transcendental stream within itself (although the latter is covered up in the context of ordinary 
life). From the other direction, the transcendental stream takes on the mundane form with the 
onset of the natural attitude—the universal synthesis-by-fusion that binds the transcendental 
experience together in a certain way. This makes it unsurprising that, after suspending the 
operation of this synthesis through the epoché, what we have left is (in some sense) the ‘same’ 
thing as before. For what remains is the very crux of the mundane stream—an integral part 
from which certain layers have been ‘removed’ or put out of operation.  
 The time has now come to consider the possibility structure of the transcendental 
perspective. This brings us to the idea of the transcendental horizon, an idea that will play a 
crucial role in the remainder of this work. 
 
iv. TRANSCEDENAL HORIZON: THE HORIZON OF OUR POSSIBILITIES 
 To illustrate what the transcendental horizon is, let us go back to the “coffee cup”—an 
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appearance that is structured by the sense that I can “hold it in my hand”, “fill it up with 
coffee”,  “put it back down on the table”, “articulate it into parts” and so on. In other words, 
the appearance ‘carries’ with it a horizon of possible intentional experiences, experiences that 
are not now actual but which are given as able-to-be-actualised. Here it is crucial to 
distinguish the transcendental horizon itself from the intentional possibilities that fill it and 
the latter from the actual intentional experience that is now occurring in the (transcendental) 
stream of consciousness. To illustrate, consider the actual experience of “seeing this cup”. 
This is not itself an intentional possibility; it is not given as an unactualised possibility in the 
horizon of the appearance (as is the experience of “picking the cup up”): it is an actual 
intentional experience in which the cup is given. While actual intentional experiences must be 
distinguished from both the transcendental horizon and the intentional possibilities that fill it, 
actual experiences are founded on the transcendental horizon (and the intentional possibilities 
that fill it) and could not exist without it (the converse is probably true too). In other words, 
whenever there is an actual experience of something there is at the same time a horizon of 
intentional possibilities.53  
 The transcendental horizon is filled in by different kinds of intentional possibilities, 
examples of which include: the possibility of perceiving, judging, remembering and so on. As 
suggested by the notion “I can”, for Husserl intentional possibilities are practical possibilities. 
 
53 That Husserl would probably approve of these distinctions (which, as far as I know, he does not explicitly 
draw) finds support in the following statements. Husserl (1970, p. 159) writes that “[i]mplied in the particular 
perception of the thing is a whole “horizon” of non-active and yet co-functioning manners of appearance and 
syntheses of validity”, that “…[t]he individual thing in perception has meaning only through an open horizon of 
“possible perceptions” insofar as what is actually perceived “points” to a systematic multiplicity of all possible 
perceptual exhibiting belonging to it harmoniously…” (ibid.), and that  “[t]he total multiplicity of manners of 
givenness, however, is a horizon of possible realizable processes, as opposed to the actual process, and as such 
it belongs to each experience, or rather to the intention which is operative within it” (ibid. p. 167). 
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As has been noted in the secondary literature, however, the sense in which this is so is not 
altogether clear. And some, like J.M. Mohanty (1999), have resisted the suggestion. Mohanty 
(ibid. p. 165) writes: “…there is something dissatisfying in subsuming all acts that generate 
possibilities under the concept of practical possibility”. The difficulty, as Mohanty sees it, 
arises from the fact that what we usually mean by ‘practical’ is closely tied to kinaesthetic 
sensations and possibilities of movement. But it is not clear that such intentional possibilities 
as imagining, reasoning, doing phenomenological analysis and so on, are bound up with 
kinaesthesia and movement in a way that would warrant speaking of them as ‘practical’ in the 
strict sense of the term. Mohanty (ibid.) continues: “…there would appear to be higher forms 
of “I can”-consciousness which are not tied up to corporeality in the manner that kinaesthesia 
is”. Mohanty (ibid.) goes on to suggest that perhaps we could resolve this issue by introducing 
the idea of “theoretical” as opposed to pure practice, but in my opinion he ends the discussion 
without a satisfactory account of what makes intentional possibilities practical. In the same 
spirit, Andrea Zhok (2016) speaks of the I can as “…a dimension of powers and therefore of 
possibilities which is hard to consider “practical”, if we take what is practical to depend on 
will and valuation.” In what sense, if at all, then, are intentional possibilities practical? Zhok  
(ibid.), I believe, points in the direction of the right answer when he writes that “…practical 
possibility is essentially tied to motivations, and in this sense it is itself a motivated 
possibility”.  
 As I see it, what makes intentional possibilities practical is that they are founded on 
another kind of possibility, which I have been calling ‘projects’. Examples of projects include 
the possibility of enjoying a cup of coffee, repairing the house, becoming a philosopher and 
so on. My view is that there is a layer of the transcendental horizon that is filled in by 
projects—a layer presupposed by the layer filled in by intentional possibilities—and this layer 
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of projects determines the structure of intentional possibilities themselves.54 This means that 
the appearance of something as a “coffee cup” is not only structured by the feeling that I can 
“lift it”, “turn it around”, “fill it” and so on—all of which are intentional possibilities. Projects 
(such as the having this writing done) play an essential role in determining the structure of 
this appearance; and it is in light of projects that appearances have an instrumental dimension 
(for example, the “cup of coffee” is given as to-be-drank-from). It is this bond with projects, 
I propose, that makes intentional possibilities ‘practical possibilities’. For the following 
purposes, ‘our possibilities’ will be used as an umbrella term to encompass both intentional 
possibilities and projects. The crucial point here is: that the transcendental horizon is filled in 
by our possibilities (projects and intentional possibilities). It is now time to ask: how are we 
aware of our possibilities?  
 Note, first, that this is not the same question as: how are we aware of the transcendental 
horizon as such (the structure that is filled in by our possibilities)? Leaving that aside for now, 
the above question splits up into two questions. How are we aware of intentional possibilities? 
How are we aware of projects? Husserl’s answer to the first question is that we are aware of 
intentional possibilities through the feeling or consciousness of “I can”. I believe that this 
‘feeling’ is at the same time an understanding. Intentional possibilities are not felt in some 
general and indeterminate way. The awareness of these possibilities involves an implicit 
understanding of the differences between the kinds of intentional possibilities that fill in the 
transcendental horizon: of the experiences that I can, and cannot, actualise. Moreover, the 
understanding now in question cannot be just another element of the transcendental stream; it 
is not something that comes and goes sporadically. This is because every actual experience 
(as discussed above) is founded on the transcendental horizon, and therefore on the 
 
54 I also believe that the converse is true: that projects are founded on intentional possibilities. In other words, 
intentional possibilities and projects are co-founded. But I cannot go into the details here. 
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understanding that discloses the transcendental horizon. The next question is: is the 
understanding that discloses intentional possibilities the same understanding that discloses 
projects?  
 While I cannot go into the details here, I do not think that it is. I believe (again under 
the influence of Heidegger) that projects are understood in a distinct way. I will call this 
understanding ‘projective understanding’. If the feeling that discloses intentional possibility 
can be described as “I can”, then we could describe the feeling that discloses our projects as 
the feeling of “I am”—I say this under the influence of the view that in some sense a person 
(the transcendental self and also the psycho-physical self) can be defined by their projects.55 
This opens up the important task of working out the precise nature of the dynamic relationship 
between the projective understanding and the understanding of intentional possibilities, 
between the “I am” and the “I can”—the two inseparable dimensions of the transcendental 
horizon. But that task will not be undertaken here. For out purposes, the crucial point is that 
the transcendental horizon—which is filled in by our possibilities—is ‘disclosed’ or 
‘constituted’ in a certain kind of understanding that does not occur sporadically within it but 
which is its essential and omnipresent structure. The next crucial point is that the natural and 
transcendental perspectives are particular modes or configurations of the transcendental 
horizon. 
 Husserl (1970a, p. 176) writes that “…objective world-life is only a particular mode of 
the transcendental life which forever constitutes the world…”, a mode where one “…lives  in 
“infatuation”, so to speak, with the poles of unity without being aware of the constituting 
multiplicities belonging essentially to them…” I interpret this in the following way (which 
may or may not accord with Husserl’s true intentions). The natural perspective (which is what 
Husserl is speaking about here under the title ‘objective world-life’) is a mode of the 
 
55 See: Sartre (2003a, Part IV, Chapter Two, Section I.)  
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transcendental horizon—a mode where the intentional possibilities crystallise and thereby 
take the form of the lifeworld and the objects that populate it. In this ‘crystallised mode’, the 
transcendental horizon (and the possibilities that fill it) is itself lost or forgotten in the process 
of constituting the world. In choosing this expression, I had in mind the image of water 
crystallising into ice, of something fluid and flexible becoming solid and rigid. Analogously, 
here the fluid transcendental horizon—a characteristic that reflects its creative quality—
crystallises into the rigid world of determinate objects.56 And, I believe, it is only when the 
transcendental horizon crystallises in this way that the previously discussed synthesis-by-
fusion comes to be; it is only now that transcendental experiences are synthesized into 
mundane experience of actual objectivities.57 But the transcendental horizon also contains the 
possibility of de-crystallising—an event where the transcendental horizon (and the 
possibilities that fill it) comes into view as such, and where the rigid world is disclosed as 
being founded on something quite different and much more fluid. The image here is of ice 
melting into water, of something solid becoming fluid and flexible. For the transcendental 
 
56  It could be argued that in order to pursue the realization of our projects it is necessary to apprehend them as 
something foreign and external to ourselves. And this is exactly the form that they take when the transcendental 
horizon crystallises into the ‘external’ objects and the lifeworld. Lusthaus (2003, pp. 3-4) makes a similar point 
in the following way: “Ironically, in order that our projected images and ideas become graspable and 
appropriatable, we have to dispossess them, i.e., disown and disavow them as our own projections. If we 
recognized them as already ours, pursuing them further would be redundant. Only by pretending that they are 
not ours, can we appropriate them. We use all the means and strategies at our cognitive disposal such as language, 
sensation, reason, belief, willful ignorance, hedonistic tone to maintain this pretense.” 
57 This implies that the synthesis-by-fusion is not the basic characteristics of the natural perspective, for it itself 
is founded on the phenomenon of crystallization. A lot more work is required to elucidate the phenomenological 
nature of the relation between the crystallised transcendental horizon and synthesis-by-fusion. But that is a task 
for another day. 
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horizon to be in the de-crystallised mode is for one to be standing in the transcendental 
perspective.  
 This brings up another crucial difference. Recall the earlier distinction between the 
absorbed-in ordinary life and the natural perspective (the objectification of that life). A similar 
distinction must now be drawn between the absorbed-in transcendental perspective (the 
absorption in phenomena as constituted), on the one hand, and the objectified transcendental 
perspective, on the other hand. To speak of the ‘transcendental perspective’ is already to 
distance oneself from it. As to the perspective that allows the transcendental perspective to 
come into view—that will be discussed in the next chapter. For now, when I speak of the 
‘transcendental perspective’, what I have in mind is the absorbed-in transcendental 
perspective. 
 Crystallisation and de-crystallisation are possibly quite rare and unfamiliar events. But 
analogous structures are at work in more localised and familiar experiences, such as illusions, 
which we can consider for the sake of illustration. Consider the experience where a piece of 
rope appears as a snake. When the illusion is exposed, and we reflect on what was involved 
in the earlier experience of the snake, we can become conscious of the role that our 
possibilities play in constituting the snake appearance. Reflecting back, it becomes clear that 
the appearance of this something as a snake involved a whole range of intentional possibilities: 
of walking around it in a very particular, measured way, or else of stopping dead in my tracks, 
that if I stamp my feet on the ground that it will slither away and so on. And it also involved 
the experience of certain projects, such as the project of saving my life and keeping myself 
out of danger. In reflecting back like this, I become aware of the essential role that such 
possibilities play in constituting the snake appearance. However, before I become aware of 
the illusory nature of the experience, I do not experience all this. Rather, in ordinary, absorbed 
experience, the horizon of possibilities can be described as crystallising into the snake that I 
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see right there, with its actual frightening teeth, and its actual and intimidating way of 
occupying actual worldly space. According to the above interpretation of Husserl’s view, in 
an analogous manner the transcendental horizon crystallises into this all-encompassing world, 
including all the objects that appear within it. This is the natural perspective. But the 
transcendental horizon contains the possibility of de-crystallising—where the horizon 
becomes visible in its function of constituting the lifeworld. This is the transcendental 
perspective. To nurture the possibility of de-crystallisation is to practice the phenomenological 
epoché, as I will now explain in more detail. 
 
v. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL EPOCHÉ 
 I will now formulate what will probably strike many as an idiosyncratic definition of the 
phenomenological epoché. The epoché, according to the interpretation now to be developed, 
can be understood in two complementary ways, depending on the mode in which the 
transcendental horizon happens to be in. If it is de-crystallised, then the epoché can be 
understood as the project of preventing crystallization. If the transcendental horizon is in the 
crystallised mode then the epoché is the project of realizing de-crystallisation. What does the 
epoché, thus understood, presuppose? What are its conditions of possibility? To approach 
these questions, I would like to begin with a dilemma: what could possibly motivate such a 
strange practice as this? 
 Eugene Fink (1933), who may have been the first to note this dilemma, wrote that as 
long as one remains in the natural perspective one will find no reason to practice the epoché. 
Sartre (2004b, p. 102) comments on this as follows: “In fact, this natural attitude is perfectly 
coherent. There one will find none of those contradictions which, according to Plato, lead the 
philosopher to effect a philosophical conversion. Thus, the epoché appears in the 
phenomenology of Husserl as a miracle.” Arguably, however, the issue in question is treated 
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most thoroughly in Lenkowski’s (1978) excellent article, ‘What Is Husserl’s Epoché: The 
Problem of The Beginning of Philosophy in the Husserlian Context’.  
 For Lenkowski, the issue takes on the form of the following dilemma. On the one hand, 
the epoché puts the absoluteness of the world into question. In my terms: by bringing about 
de-crystallisation, the epoché shows the world to be founded on the transcendental horizon. 
The purpose of the epoché is neither to annihilate nor to doubt the existence of the world, but 
to disclose its founded character: to show it as something abstract and dependent, a moment 
in a larger whole and not, as it initially pretends to be—self-sufficient. Anything that we might 
encounter within-the-world presupposes the belief in the absoluteness of the world. It is as if 
every worldly object exclaims, “the world is absolutely real!” But, at the same time, for 
something to motivate the epoché it would have to also say “the world is not absolutely real” 
or at least it would have to push us in that direction. But what could possibly speak in such a 
contradictory way? According to the first horn of the dilemma, then, there appears to be a 
radical discontinuity between the epoché and all intra-worldly, mundane events.  
 But, on the other hand, if nothing within-the-world is able to serve as a motive for the 
epoché, then its very possibility becomes a mystery: how could we ever come to suspend our 
belief in the absoluteness of the world, if nothing that shows up in the natural perspective 
moves us in that direction? The epoché must have a motive, otherwise its very possibility turns 
into an enigma, but this motive cannot stem from any mundane, intra-worldly phenomenon. 
This brings up another puzzle. That which motivates the epoché must already have put the 
world into question; the motivating event must already have de-crystallised the transcendental 
horizon, for only then could it serve as a motive at all. But, if the transcendental horizon is de-
crystallised prior to the execution of the epoché, what purpose would the epoché serve? It 
would seem the work we need the epoché to do has already been done. 
 This is how Lenkowski escapes the dilemma. Yes, the motivating event must have 
155 
already brought about de-crystallisation and put the absoluteness of the world in question. But 
this is, precisely, an event, a passive occurrence that happens to us. Something arises 
interrupting the familiar flow of the world, revealing its groundless and dependent nature. We 
fall into a kind of perplexity: “Falling into perplexity involves the slipping away of the totality 
of what is accepted and taken for granted for everyday understanding” (Lenkowski, 1978). It 
is as if the solidity and rigidity of things is swept away by something outside of us, by an alien 
force. We can speak of this event as a passive de-crystallisation. Because we never encounter 
the world except through some particular entity within-the-world, passive de-crystallisation 
will always be experienced as the de-crystallisation of something; something which loses its 
familiar character and strikes us as strange, unfamiliar and groundless. It may be the root of a 
chestnut tree, as it was for the protagonist in Sartre’s (1964) Nausea, that suddenly sheds the 
human meaning that we have imposed upon it and strikes us a something alien and 
unfathomable. But, at the same time, de-crystallisation is never constrained to a particular 
entity—for then it would be more like an illusion—but rather through that entity the 
absoluteness of the world itself is put into question. Correlatively, passive crystallisation 
designates the return of familiarity, to a way of life where we once again gain a foothold in 
things. 
 This brings us back to the other issue: if de-crystallisation is an event that precedes and 
motivates the epoché, then what is the purpose of the epoché? This is my way of phrasing the 
question that Lenkowski (1978) answers by saying that it is only by the means of “…such an 
act of will, such an act of self-generated effort, that this return of familiarity can be prevented”. 
The insight here (which I take to be a good one) is that the epoché is the practice of 
intentionality and actively preventing crystallisation: “…once having fallen out of the world—
we tend to be pulled back into our prior understanding, our familiarity” (ibid.). The epoché is 
the project of resisting this tendency of the world to pull us back in. Here we find a “…constant 
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tension between the power of what is taken for granted in the natural perspective (the power 
of “common sense”) and the opposite attitude of the “disinterested spectator”, which is 
“…extremely difficult to carry out in a radical way…” (ibid). Having occurred, it is impossible 
to know how long the de-crystallised state will last; the phenomenon is beyond our control—
it is a part of nature (broadly understood).  
 From one angle, then, the epoché is the project of preventing crystallisation. But it can 
also be conceived as the project of realising de-crystallisation, which may have the same 
outcome as preventing crystallisation—i.e. of keeping us anchored in the transcendental 
perspective—but which is nevertheless qualitatively different. It does not seem to me that 
these are exclusive descriptions: the epoché is both, depending on the state that the 
transcendental horizon is in (if it is crystallised, then the epoché is the project of realising the 
de-crystallised state, if it is already de-crystallised, then it is the project of preventing 
crystallisation).  
 In passing, I will note a new dilemma that arises when the epoché is conceived in this 
way. According to the above picture, the epoché is a projection of a certain kind of context 
onto the transcendental horizon, a context wherein this horizon is pushed towards de-
crystallisation, or away from crystallisation. But is not such a context precisely a world, in the 
phenomenological sense that we have been discussing? If so then in what sense, if at all, have 
we escaped the world and the natural perspective through the epoché? I will let these questions 
rest for the time being.  
 In the next section, I begin drawing out the elements of the above discussion that will 
allows us to construct a bridge that will take us from the epoché (and the other Husserlian 




vi. THE OPEN HORIZON: THE HORIZON OF THINGLY POSSIBILITIES 
 I will begin with the observation that crystallisation and de-crystallisation are intrinsic 
possibilities of the transcendental horizon. Just as sight and only sight has the possibility of 
disclosing colour, so (arguably) it is the transcendental horizon and only it that has the 
possibility of crystallising and of de-crystallising.58 The crucial question is: what kind of a 
possibility is in question here?  
 Crystallisations and de-crystallisation are not intentional experiences. They are modes 
of that which is presupposed by all intentional experiences—the transcendental horizon. It 
follows that they are not intentional possibilities either; unlike intentional possibilities, 
crystallization and de-crystallisation do not fill the transcendental horizon but are its possible 
modes. Are they perhaps projects? Crystallisation and de-crystallisation can take the form of 
projects (as they do in the practice of the epoché). But in order for these possibilities to be 
‘projected’, they must have been disclosed first. The farmer must first come to understand that 
the tree has the possibility of giving fruit, before nurturing this possibility by bringing it into 
actuality faster than nature would have done if she were left to herself. Likewise, in order to 
nurture the possibilities offered by the transcendental horizon, these possibilities must have 
first been discovered or disclosed in some way. And the event of passive de-crystallisation is 
an occasion for such a discovery to be made. The question now becomes: what kind of a 
possibility is at work in the event of passive de-crystallisation?  
 In order to address this question, it will help to first consider a different phenomenon 
that exhibits a similar structure. Consider the relationship between a straightforward 
 
58 It is not obvious that only the transcendental horizon possesses the possibility of crystallisation and de-
crystallisation. For it could be that these are possibilities of all horizons (and not just the transcendental). I must 
leave this question alone for now. For the present purposes, this does not matter very much. 
158 
perception and a categorial intuition. According to Husserl’s analysis (which I will considered 
in some depth in Part II, Chapter III, Section i.), a categorial intuition is both founded on and 
originates from a straightforward perception. Before I explicitly see that this cup is black, I 
must first (straightforwardly) see the cup. This means that when a categorial intuition comes 
into being as an actual experience, it does so in virtue of having unfolded-from a 
straightforward perception. The crucial question here is: what is the possibility structure of 
this ‘unfolding’—I am speaking this way for a reason, which will become clear in due course? 
Is the categorial intuition an intentional possibility of the straightforward perception? In one 
sense it is; for I sense the straightforward perception as something that I can articulate into 
parts (which means that I sense the possibility of categorial intuition in its transcendental 
horizon). But to say that the “straightforward perception contains the categorial intuition as 
an intrinsic possibility” is not to say, “that it is something that I can articulate into parts”. The 
straightforward perception can develop into a categorial intuition; it offers that possibility. The 
possibility of becoming a categorial intuition is intrinsic to the straightforward perception; it 
is a straightforward perception and not, say, a feeling or a rock, that can become a categorial 
intuition. The same cannot be said about the cup; while the categorial intuition is also given 
in the horizon of the cup as an intentional possibility, the cup does not offer the possibility of 
a categorial intuition in the way that the straightforward perception does. Here we can say: the 
straightforward perception has a horizon of its own (in contrast to the horizon that we impose 
upon it), and this horizon is filled in by its own possibilities—of which the possibility of 
becoming a categorial intuition is an example. For reasons to be given later, I will call this 
horizon the ‘open horizon’ and the possibilities that fill it ‘thingly possibilities’. 
 Applying this understanding to the topic at hand, we can say that crystallisation and de-
crystallisation are thingly possibilities of the transcendental horizon. One of the key questions 
that we have been pursuing is: what conditions the possibility of the epoché? What kind of 
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possibility does the epoché presuppose? The answer can now be given: the epoché 
presupposes thingly possibilities. It does so because it is the practice of nurturing the thingly 
possibilities of the transcendental horizon itself, possibilities that must be disclosed before 
such a practice can take place. What is true of straightforward perception and the 
transcendental horizon is true more generally. Phenomena have their own way of unfolding 
towards the future, their own rhythm and patterns of becoming. The future states, or the future 
phenomena that these phenomena become, are outlined in the phenomena themselves as their 
thingly possibilities. This naturally opens up the further question: from what perspectives do 
thingly possibility come into view? To answer this question is to take a crucial step towards a 
phenomenological account of mindfulness. Before turning to that task, which we will do in 
the next chapter, I will conclude this chapter with the following remarks.  
 As thingly possibilities, crystallisation and de-crystallisation are ‘natural’ phenomena 
that come in and out of existence in their own time, in accordance with their own rhythm. 
Now, if the transcendental horizon is crystallised, and a desire or project arises to alter it to 
the de-crystallised mode, a kind of a tension will arise from this mismatch between how things 
actually are and how we desire them to be. The desire to remain in the transcendental 
perspective and the aversion towards falling back into the natural (into the mundane and the 
familiar) can even manifest as a kind of emotional block. I think that this stems from the fear 
of unclarity and uncertainty; it is the intellectual mind panicking at losing the perspective that 
promised ultimate philosophical clarity. I am pretty sure that Husserl suffered from it.59 I 
empathise with him. As a practicing phenomenologist, I deeply feel the appeal of the kind of 
clarity on offer in phenomenological practice, and the sheer wonder that arises when we 
 
59 One of Husserl’s diary entries reads: “I have been thoroughly tormented from lack of clarity and from doubt 
that wavers back and forth…Only one need absorbs me: I must win clarity, else I cannot live, I cannot bear life 
unless I can believe that I shall achieve it.” Quoted by Spiegelberg (1965, pp. 81-82). 
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discover a deep richness in something that up to then looked so simple and mundane 
(something that we usually take for granted). But to repeat a simple fact of life: nature has its 
own ‘desires’, its own rhythm and its own time for bringing its possibilities into being; and 
when it closes up—when the transcendental horizon crystallises—a longing may arise for the 
state of clarity; a longing for the de-crystallised state.  
 I don’t know about others, but this caused me no small degree of distress in a period 
when I was intensively engaging in phenomenological work. For example, I can remember 
reading Sartre’s magnificent descriptions of the Look in Being and Nothingness, and 
marveling at the phenomenon of intersubjectivity. Something that I of course experienced all 
the time but which I mistook for something relatively simple and straightforward, and 
therefore never gave it much attention, but which, while following Sartre’s description, 
appeared as something deeply complex, a true source of wonder! Reading Husserl had a 
similar effect. As did my own attempts to describe aspects of my own experience.60 In these 
moments I had the wonderful, awe inspiring feeling that I would never see the world in the 
same way again—that I had finally found a way of escaping from that dreaded thing called 
‘the mundane’. But the feeling never lasted. Not long after I put down the phenomenological 
text, or walked away from my own investigations, the world and others returned in all their 
familiarity and mundaneness. All I would need to do was walk down the street and there I was 
again, absorbed in the world, experiencing people and others in the way I always did. When 
that happened, I was forced (if I was able to muster the willpower after the betrayal) to execute 
the descriptions again, to try and rediscover the mystery and depth in the ordinary.  
 This aversion to the mundane—which I carry at the bottom of my heart—is rooted in 
the feeling that I developed when I was a child: when being ‘integrated’ into the world of adult 
concerns, and hence pulled out of the wonders of childhood (the never-ending mysteries that 
 
60 For an example, see: Copelj (2016) 
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I found in the forest, underneath the giant oak trees, or in the silent presence of the animals, 
such as squirrels and wild boars, that surrounded and kept an eye out on us). We (my friends 
and I) tirelessly explored that forest from morning to night. Then I would return to the warmth 
of my grandmother’s house (where the smell of freshly baked bread would saturate the 
atmosphere). And I would be greeted with warmth and love, oblivious to all the painful human 
emotions that were in fact simmering under the surface in our family; also in the general social 
atmosphere of Yugoslavia at the time. That, soon, war would break out in Yugoslavia, and that 
I would, because of my mixed cultural background, suffer an alienation from my neighbours—
in fact from those very same friends with whom in earlier years I called the forest “home”—
is not insignificant. Perhaps it is the reason I felt the line between childhood and adolescence 
and then adulthood so strongly. Whatever the reasons are, I have always looked at my life as 
being divided into the mystery and wonder of childhood, on the one hand, and the misery and 
wretchedness of later life, on the other. I always had a deep longing in me, a restlessness even, 
to return to something beautiful and mysterious, which I always opposed to the mundane and 
familiar. When I discovered phenomenology (I had the feeling even earlier when I discovered 
philosophy, I especially recall a class on Descartes’s Meditations by a wonderful teacher 
Aubrey Townsend) I thought that I had finally found the key to that door. But, alas, it was not 
to be. While phenomenology (understood as involving the practice of the epoché) does point 
the way to something like what I was looking for, and while I certainly did get glimpses of it, 
as phenomenologists, we must come to recognise the impermanence of the kind of clarity that 
is on offer here. Just as we awaken from the natural to the transcendental perspective, so we 
must allow ourselves to go back to sleep—when the rhythm of the things themselves so 
dictates. Only then will we be able to make the next step in the right direction. Perhaps this is 
the deep truth behind Merleau-Ponty’s (2002, p. xxvii) profound statement that “[t]he most 
important lesson of the reduction is the impossibility of complete reduction”. 
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 Is this where the story ends? That we must give up our craving to live from the 
transcendental perspective. That we must allow ourselves to be thrown about—from naivety 
to clarity and back again, when Nature so wills it? Or do we perhaps, in the spirit of Merleau-
Ponty, accept the dialectic and try to find a kind of harmony in this ceaseless back and forth? 
In a sense, I agree with Merleau-Ponty, that we must find a common ground between the 
natural and the transcendental perspectives, without falling into the wrongheaded project of 
trying to reduce the one to the other. The task as I see it, is to build a bridge between the 
transcendental and the natural perspectives (including its offshoot, the natural sciences), 
without getting stuck in the wrongheaded project of building a tower—where one of the 
perspectives is built upon, and thereby reduced, to the other.61 To put it differently, what we 
are looking for is a deeper kind of unity that will make sense of the fragmented relation 
between the two perspectives. However, contrary to Merleau-Ponty and his followers, I do not 
think that naturalism (broadly construed) and transcendental phenomenology equip us with 
all the tools necessary for bridge building; the solution is not to simply recognise the validity 
of both approaches, even though that is called for also. The missing piece of the puzzle, I 
believe, is to be found in the practice of contemplation. I am open to the idea that this role can 
be fulfilled by different contemplative traditions, however in this work I am focusing on this 
practice as described in the original teachings of the Buddha (as found in the Pali Canon).  
 Having become familiar with some of the main features of Husserlian phenomenology, 
and having understood them in the way we did, we are now finally in a position to attempt to 
fill in our initial pre-phenomenological sketch of mindfulness, and related phenomena. 
  
 
61 In formulating the matter in this way I have been influenced by my reading of Piet Hut’s wonderful 
forthcoming book titled ‘Everything is Possible: the No-Limits Working Hypothesis’. 
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CHAPTER II:  
A Phenomenology of Mindfulness, and Related Phenomena 
 
 
 I proposed at the end of Part I that mindfulness is a feeling of being. Feelings of beings 
are differentiated by the kinds of possibility that different members of this class open up or 
disclose (and by those that they close). But back then I lacked the tools with which to approach 
the natural follow up question: what kind of a possibility does mindfulness—as the feeling of 
being tuned-in—open up? The last chapter brought a new kind of possibility into view: thingly 
possibility. Putting the two together, it can now be said: mindfulness is the feeling of being 
tuned-in to thingly possibilities. With this proposition, the discussion takes a firm step towards 
a phenomenological account of mindfulness, and related phenomena. In order to take the next, 
this chapter will begin by raising the question: from what perspective do thingly possibilities 
come into view? 
 Section (i) tries to show that thingly possibilities come into view from a perspective that 
does not feature (explicitly at least) in Husserlian phenomenology. I call this perspective the 
‘open perspective’. The first section also brings forth certain structures of the open 
perspective, the most important of which is the open horizon: the horizon that is filled-in by 
thingly possibilities. On this basis, section (ii) begins to fill in the pre-phenomenological 
sketch by refining the initial definition of the practice of cultivating mindfulness: the practice 
of tuning-out-tuning-in. Tuning-out is now understood as the movement of distancing oneself 
from the transcendental horizon altogether. Tuning-in is a positive movement towards the open 
horizon. This allows section (iii) to define mindfulness as the feeling of being tuned-in to the 
open horizon. This account opens the door towards a description of other phenomena that are 
closely related to mindfulness. Section (iv), articulates a complementary description of 
concentration as a specific modification of the feeling of being tuned-in, where the open 
horizon is narrowed down in a certain manner. Section (v) sketches a description of a different 
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kind of mindfulness and concentration (forms that are considered ‘unwholesome’ from the 
Buddhist point of view). 
 
i. THE OPEN PERSPECTIVE 
 To get the initial glimpse of the open perspective consider the dream again, or, rather, 
the event of becoming lucid. This event has a beginning and an ending point—the dreaming 
and the lucid perspective, respectively. Putting it that way allows the question to be raised: 
from what perspective does the event of becoming lucid as a whole appear? The answer cannot 
be either the dreaming or the lucid perspective for these are only the terminal points of the 
event. I propose that in order to account for the transition itself, it is necessary to take into 
account a third perspective: the ‘open perspective’. I am not suggesting that in normal 
circumstances there is an explicit awareness of the event (becoming lucid) or of the open 
perspective that allows it to take place. In fact, I am inclined to believe that (commonly) there 
is no such explicit awareness; we are dreaming then we are lucid—the transition is not 
something that is explicitly noticed. Nevertheless even in such cases, I believe that there is an 
implicit, unarticulated awareness or understanding (an integral structure of what I will shortly 
call the ‘open horizon’) that a transition has taken place—an awareness that can be explicated 
(even if it is usually not). And, in any case, by reflecting on the event after the fact, or on a 
possible event of this kind (as we are doing now) it is possible to infer that such an awareness 
and understanding was there—indeed, that it must have been there—even if it was not explicit 
at the time. 
 Something analogous, I believe, is true of the transition from the natural to the 
transcendental perspective—in the event of de-crystallisation (it is also true of crystallisation 
but the focus here will be on de-crystallisation). Like becoming lucid, de-crystallisation has a 
starting and an ending point: the natural and the transcendental perspective, respectively.  To 
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put it differently, de-crystallisation is an event where the transcendental horizon reconfigures 
itself from the crystallised to the de-crystallised mode. This allows the question to be raised 
here too: from what perspective does the event of de-crystallisation as a whole come into view 
(again, ‘come into view’ designates the implicit understanding that a transition has taken 
place)? Again, I suggest, it is the open perspective. In short: the open perspective makes 
possible the transition from the natural to the transcendental perspective (and from the 
transcendental to the natural). 
 While reading the above, the following concern may have crossed the reader’s mind. 
“Didn’t I say earlier that de-crystallisation is a possibility, a ‘thingly possibility’, of the 
transcendental horizon?  But if that is so, does not this event come into view from the 
transcendental perspective, the perspective that brings the transcendental horizon itself into 
view?  If so, is it not superfluous to introduce another perspective to account for it?”  It is true 
that de-crystallisation is a transition of the transcendental horizon. And, in that sense, the 
transcendental horizon conditions the possibility of the transition. But here it is essential to 
keep apart what is brought into view (and the transition of what is brought into view) from the 
perspective from which what is brought into view comes into view. What we have in view here 
is the transcendental horizon as it transitions from the crystallised to the de-crystallised mode 
(from the natural to the transcendental perspective). But the crucial question is: from where 
are ‘we’ observing the transition? The answer, I propose, is the open perspective.  
 To expand upon this, recall the difference between the absorbed-in transcendental 
horizon (where everything appears as constituted and in the light of our possibilities), on the 
one hand, and the objectified transcendental horizon, on the other hand. Now, it is true that the 
transcendental horizon itself can come into view as constituted—as it does in the practiceof  
the epoché: where the transcendental horizon is ‘pushed’ towards the possibility of de-
crystallisation. But, as argued in the last chapter, the epoché is founded on the event of passive 
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de-crystallisation—where the transcendental horizon (in and of itself) brings a possibility into 
being. In other words, before it can appear as constituted, the transcendental horizon must first 
be disclosed or ‘objectified’—it must first be brought into view in light of its own possibilities. 
And what allows it to be brought into view in this way is the open perspective. 
 This implies that the phenomenological descriptions of the transcendental horizon (in 
contrast to the descriptions of appearances that come into view from the transcendental 
perspective) require of the phenomenologist to take a stand in the open perspective. This 
means that (in describing the transcendental horizon) Husserl himself must have been tapping-
in to the open perspective. This will become clearer in the next chapter—where I will try to 
show that Husserl’s phenomenological investigations in general (and not just the 
investigations of the transcendental) were undertaken from within open perspective and 
involved tuning-in to thingly possibilities (without Husserl himself being explicitly aware of 
the fact). 
 The open perspective allows thingly possibilities to come into view. The transition from 
the natural to the transcendental perspective, the event of de-crystallisation, is only one 
instance (arguably a very important instance) of a very general phenomenon. Another is the 
transition where a straightforward perception (passively) becomes a categorial intuition; here, 
too, a thingly possibility comes into being, and what allows it to do so is the open perspective. 
The next task is to bring forth and describe certain key features of the open perspective. The 
aim here is not an exhaustive treatment but to do only as much phenomenology as is necessary 
in order to set the foundation for articulating a phenomenology of mindfulness. 
 Just as ‘our’ possibilities fill-in the transcendental horizon, so thingly possibilities fill-in 
the open horizon—a horizon constitutive of the open perspective. The open horizon is a 
unified, integral structure. But this does not prevent it from being a multifaceted totality of 
167 
which different abstract parts (moments) can be discerned and described.62 The first is a 
structure that I will call unfolding-towards. This is a categorial structure that is filled-in by 
futural (thingly) possibilities—the possibilities towards which the phenomenon is unfolding 
(the future phenomena that the phenomenon will become, in and of itself).63 And when that 
futural possibility comes into being, it will do so in virtue of having unfolded-from the earlier 
phenomenon. In the state of affairs where A unfolds-towards B and B unfolds-from A: A and 
B are separated in time. But it is also possible that the realisation of a thingly possibility A 
implies the simultaneous realisation of some other thingly possibility B—a situation where A 
will be said to unfold-together-with B. Unfolding-towards, unfolding-from and unfolding-
together-with are not the only structural moments of the open horizon, but for the present 
purposes it is unnecessary to enumerate anymore (or to describe these in more detail). 
 The above description of the open horizon is ‘formal’ in the sense that the demarcated 
structures pertain to all phenomena—all phenomena unfold-towards, unfold-from and unfold-
 
62 Here, as elsewhere in this work, when I use such terms as ‘moment’ and ‘foundation’ I do so in the technical 
sense articulated in Husserl (1970b, Investigation III). 
63 In formulating the matter in this way (i.e. talking about ‘categorial’ structures) I am influenced by the 
ontological phenomenological approach as practiced by Heidegger in Being and Time. But this requires some 
qualifications. In that text, Heidegger reserves the term ‘categories’ for the structural moments of the modes of 
being of entities that exist in-the-midst-of-the-world (i.e. the ready-at-hand and the present-at-hand) and 
‘existentialia’ for the structural moments of being-in-the-world, the mode of being of entities that we ourselves 
are and which Heidegger calls ‘Dasein’ (Heidegger, 1967, p. 67). If the open horizon is understood to be a 
structural element of some mode of being (and it can be understood that way, although I will not speak of it in 
this manner here), this mode of being is different from the present-at-hand, the ready-at-hand and being-in-the-
world (I understand being-in-the-world to be Heidegger’s description of the transcendental perspective). The key 
point here is that when I use the expression ‘categorial’ I am doing so in a much broader sense than Heidegger; 
for me it designates the structural moments of any mode of being, even thought the focus here is on a specific 
mode. 
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together-with other phenomena. But depending on the nature of the phenomenon (its material 
content) these structures will be filled-in by different thingly possibilities. To take an example, 
a concrete instance of the formal structure A unfolds-together-with B is that physical pain 
necessarily unfolds-together-with bodily materiality. Or, to employ a proposition from the 
Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination: the formal structure A unfolds-from B is filled-in 
thus: feeling (vedāna) necessarily unfolds-from contact (phassa). Qualifying these structures 
with necessary illustrates that the coming into being of thingly possibilities is not a random 
process; there are laws that govern how phenomena unfold. And it is the existence of these 
laws that make the practice of insight (vipassanā)—a practice that mindfulness as the feeling 
of being tuned-in to the open horizon opens up—possible. I will have more to say about this 
later. 
 With the help of a concrete example, I would now like to draw an even sharper contrast 
between the transcendental and the open horizon. Take the experience of reading a sentence, 
and why not this one that you are currently reading? When your reading reaches the word this, 
the remaining part of the sentence is sketched out in the transcendental horizon as intentional 
possibilities. In other words, for this word to appear as it does in the context of reading, means 
for you to sense certain intentional experiences as able-to-be-actualised—possibilities that are 
constitutive of the act of reading and in which the remainder of the sentence will appear. 
Moreover, the experience of reading also involves the project of, say, extracting information 
from this text. For the sake of simplicity, let us say that both the intentional possibilities and 
the project(s) are sketched out in a structure that Husserl (1991) calls the ‘protention’. The 
task now is to show how this protential horizon (the futural dimension of the transcendental 
horizon that is filled-in by our possibilities) differs from the unfolding-towards structure (the 
futural dimension of the open horizon that is filled-in by thingly possibilities). 
 Returning to the example, your reading has once again reached the word this. But, this 
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time, instead of continuing to read, you pause and simply become open to the expression as a 
phenomenon. As you do so, you can come to the awareness that it is characterised by a kind 
of a dynamic movement. At one time, it shows itself through its meaning dimension. But, as 
you keep the meaning dimension in view, there will come a moment when something like a 
sinking occurs—a sinking away from the meaning into the material dimension, where the 
expression shows itself as black lines surrounded by a white space. These transitions (from 
the meaning to the material dimension and from the meaning to the material) are (thingly) 
possibility of the expression itself. Here the meaning dimension can be described as unfolding-
towards the material dimension and the material dimension as unfolding-from the meaning 
(and conversely).64  
 If you did not already know that the expression offers these possibilities—their coming 
into being will be accompanied by a feeling of surprise. Generally speaking, this means that 
it is possible to be surprised by the coming into being of thingly possibilities. By contrast, it 
is impossible to be surprised by the coming into being of our possibilities. Allow me to 
illustrate. In the context of reading, the word ‘this’ is surrounded by a horizon of intentional 
possibilities. An example of which is the possibility of experiencing the next word in the 
sentence (in the current example this is the word ‘one’). But even before this experience comes 
into being, its possibility is recognised as one’s own (this is the feeling of “I can read”). As 
this possibility comes into being, it is (usually implicitly) re-cognized as one’s own possibility. 
And this moment of re-cognising is incompatible with the possibility of being surprised.65 This 
 
64 That is one way of describing the situation. But it could also be argued that the two dimensions existing 
simultaneously—that the material dimension unfolds-together-with the meaning dimension. For the following 
purposes, I will assume the earlier description to be the right one. 
65 It is crucial to understand this in the right way. Of course, one can be surprised by the content of the actual 
intentional experience that the possibility becomes. And one can also be surprised by the realisation or fulfilment 
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is one way of differentiating the unfolding-towards structure of the open horizon and the 
‘protentional’ dimension of the transcendental. 
 The difference will become even clearer if we consider the situation where I 
intentionally push the expression towards a particular possibility (say, the possibility of 
showing itself in its material dimension—as marks on paper). Here the thingly possibility 
takes the form of a project (of realising a state wherein the expression will show itself in its 
material dimension). And when the material dimension does show itself, it will do so with the 
sense of having fulfiled this project. But when the material dimension shows itself as a 
realisation of a thingly possibility, it is not accompanied by this sense of fulfilment. 
Contrasting these two situations allows the difference between (a) the unfolding-towards 
structure when it is accompanied by a protentional horizon and (b) the unfolding-towards 
structure as such to be brought into view. Moreover, before I discovered (which I did by 
reading Husserl) that the expression has this possibility, I could not have converted it into a 
project. Nevertheless, that possibility was still there ‘in’ the expression’s unfolding-towards 
structure—it is just that it was not discovered or disclosed. I say this because when I do 
discover the possibility for the first time, it gives itself with the sense of having-been-there-
before (in the phenomenon as its possibility). And, as always, we must learn to have faith in 
and trust what the phenomena are saying. 
 The experience of reading (to return to that example for the moment) itself has its own 
thingly possibilities, but to bring them into view you must—without ceasing to read—open 
up to the act of reading in the way that you did to the word this above. If you do so, your 
 
of one’s possibility (project). But this is something different. The point here is that one cannot be surprised by 
the fact that this possibility is one’s own possibility (or, at the very least, one cannot be surprised by one’s own 
possibilities in the sense that one can be surprised by thingly possibilities). To make all this more precise, further 
phenomenological investigations are called for. 
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creative, transcendental self-awareness that is constitutive of the act of reading will suddenly 
find itself in the company of a different kind of awareness, which simply stands back and 
allows the act of reading to unfold its own possibilities. 
 I will call the form that awareness takes in the open perspective ‘open awareness’. Open 
awareness contrasts with both the creative awareness of the transcendental perspective and 
the psycho-physical self awareness of the natural. Open awareness is also a kind of knowing 
or understanding—a ‘thingly’ understanding of phenomenon in their thingly possibilities. Just 
as the projective understanding discloses projects, so thingly understanding discloses thingly 
possibilities. But while projective understanding anticipates the projects by clinging to and 
grasping at to them, thingly understanding discloses thingly possibilities through a kind of 
listening, a patient awaiting for the phenomenon to become what it is. Moreover, this open 
awareness and understanding does not set up any sense of opposition between itself and the 
phenomenon that it discloses. Rather, it serves as a kind of space that allows the phenomenon 
to be what it is and to unfold in accordance with its own possibilities.  
 These (admittedly rough and sketchy descriptions) of the open horizon will suffice for 
the present purposes. The next task is to use them in order to attempt to refine our pre-
phenomenological sketch of mindfulness (which will simultaneously enrich and refine our 




ii. CULTIVATING MINDFULNESS: TUNING-OUT-TUNING-IN 
  According to the initial sketch, to cultivate mindfulness means to practice tuning-out of 
our possibilities and tuning-in to the intrinsic intelligibility of the things themselves, where 
this practice calls for a specific kind of effort (ātāpi). The above critical engagement with 
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Husserlian phenomenology will now allow us to refine this sketch. 
 Tuning-out, I propose, is the practice of distancing oneself from the transcendental 
horizon altogether. This means that tuning-out is something quite different from the practice 
of the epoché, and a brief contrast of the two will help bring tuning-out into sharper focus. 
According to our interpretation, the aim of the epoché is to bring about a certain 
transformation in the transcendental horizon; if it is crystallised, then the objective is de-
crystallisation, and if it is already de-crystallised then the aim is to prevent crystallisation. To 
put it differently, the epoché is the practice of distancing oneself from the naive absorption in 
and fascination of the world, a distancing at the end of which the phenomenologist is made 
aware of the transcendental horizon that constitutes the lifeworld (precisely in its function of 
constituting it). Like the epoché, tuning-out can also be described as a practice of distancing. 
But what one aims to distance oneself from here is the transcendental horizon as such. It does 
not matter, in so far as the practice of tuning-out is concerned, whether the transcendental 
horizon is crystallised or de-crystallised, whether one is absorbed in the world or has taken a 
‘philosophical’ step back from it; tuning-out can be practiced from either the natural or the 
transcendental perspective. This means that a successful execution of the epoché is not a pre-
condition for the practice of tuning-out. But—as tuning-out is only a moment of tuning-out-
tuning-in—the movement of distancing from the transcendental horizon is at the same time a 
movement of becoming intimate, of tuning-in to something. And this something is the open 
horizon, which is usually covered up or forgotten (in a very special sense) in our experience. 
Tuning-in is the practice of remembering or recollecting this forgotten dimension. This still 
leaves the issue open: what is the relation between the open horizon and the ‘intrinsic 
intelligibility of the things themselves’ that we are trying to tune-in to? I will return to this 
question below. 
 To practice tuning-out-tuning-in means to constantly be pulled towards the 
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transcendental horizon, and to constantly try to pull oneself into the open. As I listen in to the 
way that the phenomenon (my meditation object) is bringing its own possibilities into being—
to the way that it transforms in and out of itself—there will come a moment when I am pulled 
back into seeing it once more in light of my possibilities. And when that moment comes, the 
task is to, gently, become open to the phenomenon once more: to allow it to unfold its 
possibilities. This situation is comparable to that meta-stable place that exists on the boundary 
between a nightmare and waking life: where one is stuck in the nightmare for a few moments 
and then, suddenly, one wakes up realising that “it was only a dream”. Before one is able to 
gain a foothold in the waking perspective, however, one finds oneself drawn into the 
nightmare once more. But, here, one is not drawn in so far that one loses all contact with the 
waking perspective; a glimmer of wakefulness remains, and this glimmer serves as an escape 
route back to the waking state which, upon being reached, again collapses into the nightmare, 
and so on. In essence, I propose, something like this is going on in the case of the meditator 
seriously practicing tuning-out-tuning-in. For a few moments, the meditator succeeds in 
tuning-in to the open perspective, and during those few wonderful moments the meditator 
enters the open perspective from where the phenomenon is freed to be what it is and to unfold 
in accordance with its own (thingly) possibilities. But in the context of the practice of tuning-
out-tuning-in, one can only remain in this perspective for few moments before the object 
‘withdraws’—throwing the practitioner out of the open into, say, the natural perspective 
(where the phenomenon just becomes another actuality that is being observed by someone). 
At that moment open awareness is lost and the meditator once more becomes the psycho-
physical self. This means that the loss or withdrawal of the meditation object is at the same 
time the transformation of the awareness that is (was) observing it (see: Part II, Chapter III, 
Section iii.). 
 This peculiar and difficult to understand transformation holds the key to the correct 
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understanding of ātāpi: the kind of effort involved in the practice of tuning-out-tuning-in. 
Ordinarily ‘effort’ designates the energy that is called for in order to bridge the gap between 
how things actually are and how we desire them to be. Otherwise put, it is the effort required 
to push the phenomenon towards some possibility of ours. This cannot be ātāpi for, as long as 
phenomena are being pushed in this way, one is standing in the transcendental horizon—while 
ātāpi designates the kind of effort that goes into releasing oneself from the very tendency to 
push phenomena towards our possibilities. While it is relatively straightforward to see what 
ātāpi is not, it is much more difficult to say what it is in positive terms. In the next chapter, an 
occasion will open up to take a closer look at this phenomenon. 
 
iii. MINDFULNESS: THE FEELING OF BEING TUNED-IN TO THE OPEN 
HORIZON 
 At some point the practice of tuning-out-tuning-in yields fruit.  That fruit is mindfulness: 
the feeling of being tuned-in. The meditator now effortlessly dwells in the open perspective—
the phenomenon has now been freed to be what it is. According to the pre-phenomenological 
sketch, this state can be seen from two complementary perspectives. ‘Subjectively’, it is the 
state of lucid awareness and clear comprehension. ‘Objectively’, it is the vivid presentation 
of the phenomenon’s intrinsic intelligibility.  
 Back in the Satipaṭṭhāna chapter, however, it was unclear what ‘subjective’ and 
‘objective’ meant in this context. It is now possible to be more precise. To enter the open 
perspective is to become the phenomenon and here the feeling of opposition between the 
observer and the observed collapses. Nevertheless there is still a sense in which it makes sense 
to differentiate (within the open perspective) between the open or lucid awareness and the 
vividly presented phenomenon. One reason to say this is that the phenomena are constantly 
changing (at one time the breath is vividly present, at another the clouds drifting across the 
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sky). But open awareness itself does not come and go—at least not in the way that these vividly 
presented phenomena do. It is more accurate to say that open awareness takes the shape of 
whatever it is that is appearing in it (the traditional metaphor being that of water, which takes 
the shape of the container that it fills). To put it differently, open awareness is reflected in the 
phenomenon, as light is in the mirror, and this reflection endows the phenomenon with the 
quality of being vividly present.66 There is therefore a sense in which open awareness is the 
subjective and the vividly presented phenomenon the objective dimension of the open 
perspective (although ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ carry very distinct meanings here). 
Something similar can be said about the other complementary pair: clear comprehension and 
intrinsic intelligibility.  
 Above, unfolding-towards, unfolding-from and unfolding-together-with were given as 
examples of formal categorial structures of the open horizon (‘formal’ because they are 
constitutive of all vividly presented phenomena). In other words, whatever manifests in the 
open perspective will express these (together with other, similar, categories). These structures, 
as moments of the open horizon, are disclosed in thingly understanding. And this thingly 
understanding is nothing but ‘clear comprehension’. Intrinsic intelligibility (the objective 
dimension of clear comprehension) can be understood as designating the unique range of 
thingly possibilities that fill-in these categories for the particular phenomenon in question (its 
material content). 
 To shed more light on this, it will be instructive to reflect on the meaning of ‘sampajāna’, 
the Pali expression that is here being translated as ‘clear comprehension’ and ‘intrinsic 
intelligibility’. ‘Sam’ means together-with and ‘pajanna’ means knowing. At this point it will 
 
66 This analogy is not altogether suitable for, unlike in the example of the mirror, there is no space that separates 
open awareness from its ‘reflection’ in the phenomenon and in an important sense what appear as two are really 
the same thing. 
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also help to recall that anupassanā (the contemplative state of which sampajāna is a moment) 
can be understood as the close-seeing-of-how-the-phenomena-fit-together. This implies that 
to become tuned-in to the phenomenon means to come to the understanding of the relations 
of this phenomenon with other phenomena—of how this phenomenon fits-together-with other 
phenomena. In what sense can this (i.e. that becoming tuned-in discloses how phenomena fit-
together) be said to be so? To answer this question, it will help to begin by considering how 
phenomena appear from the natural perspective: as isolated, self-sufficient and determinate 
objects. And from that perspective we also speak of things as though they were really separate 
from each other. As an example, it may be instructive to consider how, from the natural 
perspective, we look at or speak about the difference between a perceptual object, say coffee 
cup, and the sense perception in which it appears. We do so as if these were separate and 
isolated things, that just happen to enter into some kind of a relation: the coffee cup is one 
thing, something “out there” in the world, and my perception of it is something else, something 
happening “in my head”. Suppose that I now tune-in to the sense perception—I become 
mindful of it. When I do that, I can discover that the sense perception necessarily unfolds-
together-with ‘a sensuous object’. In other words, I can come to an understanding that the 
possibility of the sensuous object is sketched out in the sense perception itself, and conversely. 
At that moment, I can gain the knowledge that these phenomena always go-together, not as 
two separate things that happen to be, so to speak, joined at the hip, but in the sense that the 
‘one’ phenomenon belongs to the very definition and internal makeup of the other, that it is 
sketched out in it as a thingly possibility. But, at this point, this understanding of how 
phenomena fit together is implicit. In order for it to become explicit, the ‘mere’ feeling of 
being tuned-in must be modified in such a way that the categories of the open horizon (such 
as unfolding-towards) and their contents, are explicitly brought into awareness.  And that takes 
the practitioner from ‘bare’ mindfulness to the practice of insight or vipassanā, a theme that 
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will be taken up explicitly in the next chapter (see: Part II. Chapter III, Section iv.).  
 When one becomes tuned-in to open perspective, what happens to the transcendent 
horizon? Has one lost all connection with it? Or does it remain as an element of one’s 
experience in some way? To put it differently, in entering the open perspective, has one 
completely left behind both the natural and transcendental perspectives? For the sake of 
simplicity, in the following I will focus exclusively on the natural perspective. 
 Here it is necessary to draw a distinction between (1) ‘tapping-in’ to perspective A while 
one’s standpoint remains in perspective B, and (2) actually ‘shifting the standpoint’ from A to 
B. The difference between tapping-in and shifting standpoints appears to me to be a very 
general capacity, one that reappears across many different contexts. For the sake of illustration, 
it will help to consider a more familiar example first. Consider the following way of 
differentiating a daydream from an actual dream. The daydream can be conceived as a (mini) 
dream that occurs within the waking perspective. According to this way of looking at things, 
while one’s standpoint remains in the waking perspective, one ‘taps-in’ to the dreaming 
perspective, which appears as a kind of rupture in the closely woven fabric of wakefulness. 
And it is possible that, while one remains standing in the waking perspective, for one to 
become quite absorbed in the daydream—and for one to, in a sense, cease paying attention to 
the waking reality which, nevertheless, persists in one’s experience as the (back)ground on 
which one is standing. This situation contrasts with the one where one enters the dream proper 
and where one’s standpoint shifts from the waking to the dreaming perspective. And if there 
are such things as ‘lucid moments’—not full blown lucid dreams but momentary flashes of 
lucidity in the dream—they can be conceived as moments of “tapping-in” to the waking from 
within the dreaming perspective. There is another possibility that must be mentioned and 
which will have an important role to play in the next chapter. Tapping-in to perspective B from 
within perspective A may be something one does occasionally. But it can also happen that the 
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state of being tapped-in to B becomes one’s ‘default’ state. This means that while one has not 
switched standpoints, the state of being tapped-in to B persists in perspective A as something 
constant and continuous. For example, repeatedly tapping-in to the dreaming perspective may 
turn you into a ‘daydreamer’, a person who is, in some sense, continuously daydreaming. 
 Returning to the case at hand, the above forces us to make a distinction between tapping-
in to the open perspective while our standpoint remains in the natural perspective and the quite 
different situation where the standpoint actually shifts from the natural to the open perspective. 
To tap-in to the open perspective means for open awareness (to focus on that aspect for now), 
to appear within and as a kind of modification of the psycho-physical or mundane awareness. 
Here open awareness takes the form of a peculiar mental state, something occurring within 
us. And the psycho-physical self can then use this state to achieve certain worldly ends. Here 
one remains conscious of and invested in one’s worldly pursuits, and one uses the open 
awareness as a means to realising them (this can take the form of simply relaxing in open 
awareness, becoming calm and thereby regaining one’s energy so that one can engage the 
world once more). It is also possible to become so absorbed in this ‘mental state’ of open 
awareness that one in a way ceases living-in the natural perspective—which nevertheless (like 
in the example of being absorbed in the daydream) continues to functions as one’s standpoint.  
 Mindfulness, I propose, is the feeling of being tapped-in to the open perspective from 
within the natural (or the transcendental) perspective. In other words: the feeling of being 
tuned-in is also the feeling of being tapped-in. This gives some justification for describing 
mindfulness as a ‘mental state’. Mindfulness should be distinguished from something that we 
may call ‘continuous mindfulness’ where repeatedly tapping-in to the open perspective results 
in a situation where the feeling of being tuned-in and tapped-in becomes one’s default state of 
mind. 
 In the earlier discussion of ‘becoming free from desires and discontent’, this ‘freedom’ 
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was describes as a temporary freedom (see. Part I, Chapter II, Section iii.). Complete and 
permanent freedom from desires or cravings can be described as the end goal of the Buddhist 
path; and to establish mindfulness—to have tapped-in to the open perspective—is to still be 
very far away from that goal. The open perspective can be described as being intrinsically free 
of craving because the open horizon is not filled in by our possibilities (and projects in 
particular). The freedom from projects is temporary because the state of being tapped-in to 
this open horizon (while intrinsically free of projects) is bound to lapse, like all other mental 
states. And, moreover, our projects have not been removed by tapping-in, they are only asleep 
in the background, and can awaken at any time. Differently put, to allow the light of open 
awareness to shine in is not to eradicate all our cravings—or even any of them. These cravings 
only become temporarily dormant and sink to the background, like mud. The value of 
mindfulness (in the context of the Buddhist path) is that it allows us to become open to 
different phenomena, to reveal their inner intelligibility and to begin the process of explicating 
that intelligibility and thereby nurturing wisdom about the various ways that phenomena fit 
together. And one thing that we can come to have insight into in this way is the state of affairs 
that the transcendental horizon is founded on the open horizon. But to have such an insight is 
something much more difficult and rare than becoming proficient at the practice of tuning-
out-tuning-in and being able to establish the feeling of being tuned-in at will.  
 Imagine a man confined to a dark room all his life, which for him exhausts all that there 
is. While the room is filled with various kinds of objects, he does not see them clearly; what 
he knows about them is constrained by what his impoverished vision and sense of touch tell 
him. One day, this man finds a switch somewhere in the room, and when he presses it, 
something unknown to him manifests in the room: from one of the walls a beam of light 
appears and falls onto an object. For the first time, he sees the object as it is. He now sets 
himself the task of bringing one thing after another into the light in order to decipher its true 
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nature. It never crosses his mind, at this point, that the room is not the ultimate reality, that 
there is something else beyond it. As it appears to him, he has found a special phenomenon 
within the room, one that shines upon and within things, bringing their true nature into view. 
But, one day, the man gets closer to the light and, to his astonishment, the effect of the earlier 
button press was in fact to puncture a small hole in the wall, from which, he can now see, light 
is shining in. “The light was no mere thing in the room!” “It is coming from the ‘outside’!” 
As he spreads the hole further apart, more and more light shines in. Excited, and in what must 
be a feeling of ecstasy, he now frantically rips away at the walls; with every tool at his disposal 
he proceeds to smash the room into pieces. When he is done, he finds himself standing in the 
light from which everything, including his room, manifests.  
 To establish mindfulness—to be tuned-in and tapped-in to the open perspective—is 
comparable to understanding the light as just another phenomenon in the room. The room 
stands for the natural perspective that, at this point, continues to be experienced as the ultimate 
reality—it is just that something new, something with awe inspiring power, has appeared 
therein. But if we direct the light of mindfulness on the natural perspective itself, we can come 
to understand that, in fact, the open perspective is ontologically more fundamental; that we 
have an identity that is more real than the psycho-physical identity. Just like the man, after 
destroying his room to walk on in the infinite light, to take our standpoint in the open 
perspective and to come to the insight that it is foundational, is to smash the natural perspective 
we are standing in to bits, to break out and see that perspective for what it truly is: something 
that arises, persists for a while and passes away. But we are now looking from an entirely 
different place. As to the significance of this realisation for the Buddhist path, this is not the 
place to comment. 
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iv. CONCENTRATION: NARROWING DOWN OF THE OPEN HORIZON  
 While the above is far from being an exhaustive phenomenological account of 
mindfulness, it does set the foundation upon which future descriptions of this kind can build 
upon. To push forward in that direction, it is now time to attempt a description of a 
phenomenon that is very closely related to mindfulness. This is concentration (samādhi). A 
brief recap of what we already know about it is now in order (the topic was touched upon in: 
Part I, Chapter III, Section ii.). Unlike mindfulness, which expands the breadth of awareness, 
concentration restricts or narrows it in a certain manner. But this does not imply that the 
phenomena are incompatible; in an important sense the movements of expanding and 
narrowing must be compatible and complementary, since certain meditative states involve the 
presence of both. What is concentration? How does it relate to mindfulness? In what sense are 
these phenomena compatible? 
 To be mindful is to be tuned-in to the open horizon. While always established on a 
particular object (such as the natural movement of the breath or on the solemn stroll of the 
clouds across the sky) the feeling of being tuned-in is never constrained to a single object 
alone. While before becoming tuned-in ‘the world’ was pushed in the direction of our 
possibilities (towards what we desire for it to be like or not to be like) it is now given as 
unfolding-towards its own possibilities—towards future states that are sketched out in the 
‘world’ itself. But what at first appears as a homogenous flow, on closer inspection shows 
itself to be constituted of a multiplicity of sub-flows, as a river made out of many diverse 
currents. For example, the process of breathing unfolds-towards its possibilities in a different 
manner than pain unfolds-towards its but both are constitutive of the general flow that one 
discovers upon tuning-in. I think that it is this disclosure of a multiplicity of flows that Anālayo 
(2003, p. 63) is pointing at when he describes mindfulness as expanding the breadth of 
‘attention’. Allow me to illustrate. Consider the experience of pain. From the natural 
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perspective, pain appears as a more or less rigid and solid actuality that is located somewhere 
in the actual body (which is itself apprehended as a part of the psycho-physical self). Suppose 
that you now become mindful of the pain, you tune-in to it. At first, this means that you sense 
the pain as uniformly unfolding-towards future moments of pain, which are sketched out in 
the pain as its own possibility—in contrast to experiencing the pain as unfolding towards a 
pain free state (a possibility that is imposed on the pain from without). But that which at first 
appears as a uniform pain is in fact constituted from multiplicity of pain currents, each of 
which is unfolding in its own unique way (this pain is sharp, this one is dull, this one moves 
and spread this way, this one that way etc.). This allows the following distinction to be made. 
Upon tuning-out of the transcendental horizon what one tunes-in to is the primary open 
horizon. This primary open horizon is constituted by sub-horizons; the horizon of all the 
different phenomena that appear upon becoming tuned-in. This is represented in Figure 1. 
      




The crucial point here is this one: the primary open horizon 
offers the (thingly) possibility of being narrowed down to 
one of its sub-horizons. And when this possibility is 
realized the sub-horizon in question becomes the new 
(secondary) primary horizon. This new primary horizon is 
also constituted by a multiplicity of sub-horizons and it too 
offers the possibility of narrowing and so on. Narrowing 
is depicted in Figure 2. 
 To nurture the possibility of narrowing is to cultivate concentration. This will involve 
resisting the tendency of the horizon to ‘broaden’ back to the earlier primary horizon. To 
actually narrow down the primary horizon to one of the sub-horizons, is to establish oneself 
in a concentrative state (where the degree of concentration will be determined by the extent 
of the narrowing). This allows a sharp line to be drawn between mindfulness and concentration 
in the following way. Mindfulness is the state of being tuned-out of the transcendental horizon 
and the feeling of being tuned-in to the (primary) open horizon. By bringing the open horizon 
into view, mindfulness can serve as the foundation for concentration. But, note, concentration 
need not arise from within the feeling of being tuned-in. In other words, while concentration 
necessarily unfolds-from mindfulness, the converse is not true: mindfulness does not 
necessarily unfold-towards concentration. The latter possibility must be actively nurtured 
from a whole range of other possibilities that mindfulness affords. Concentration, if it should 
arise, is the state where the (primary) open horizon has been narrowed down to one of its sub-
horizons. This allows ‘broadening’ to be defined as the event where the secondary primary 
horizon reverts back to its sub-horizon status, reestablishing the primary open horizon. In 
order to be able to use the terms ‘mindfulness’ and ‘concentration’ in this way, however, there 
is a complication that must be dealt with first. 
Figure 2 Narrowing down of the 
primary open horizon to one of its sub-
horizons 
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 Recall the notion of ‘khanika samādhi’ or ‘momentary concentration’, a kind of 
concentration mentioned briefly in the Satipaṭṭhāna chapter and of which Bodhi (1994, pp. 
109-110) offers the following description: 
 
…there is another kind of concentration which does not depend upon restricting the range of awareness. 
This is called "momentary concentration" (khanika-samādhi). To develop momentary concentration the 
meditator does not deliberately attempt to exclude the multiplicity of phenomena from his field of 
attention. Instead, he simply directs mindfulness to the changing states of mind and body, noting any 
phenomenon that presents itself; the task is to maintain a continuous awareness of whatever enters the 
range of perception, clinging to nothing. As he goes on with his noting, concentration becomes stronger 
moment after moment until it becomes established one-pointedly on the constantly changing stream of 
events. Despite the change in the object, the mental unification remains steady, and in time acquires a 
force capable of suppressing the hindrances to a degree equal to that of access concentration. This fluid, 
mobile concentration is developed by the practice of the four foundations of mindfulness, taken up along 
the path of insight; when sufficiently strong it issues in the breakthrough to the last stage of the path, the 
arising of wisdom. 
 
According to the earlier interpretation (see: Part I, Chapter II, Section iii.), momentary 
concentration is a positive description of ‘being free from desires and discontent’ (one of the 
factors that necessarily accompanies mindfulness in the context of anupassanā). This 
compliments Bodhi’s claim that momentary concentration does not “attempt to exclude the 
multiplicity of phenomenon”. In other words, momentary concentration is intrinsic to 
mindfulness.67 But how does this sit with the above claim that mindfulness can but need not 
 
67 This account is slightly at odds with Bodhi’s description (in the above passage) according to which the 
practitioner develops momentary concentration by directing ‘mindfulness’ (which would mean that mindfulness 
does not imply the presence of momentary concentration). As I see it, the need to “[direct] mindfulness to the 
changing states of mind and body” is a description of tuning-in-tuning-out, the practice of cultivating 
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be developed into concentration? There is indeed a tension here.  
 On the one hand, momentary concentration is said to be intrinsic to mindfulness. But, 
on the other hand, it is also asserted that while mindfulness can, it need not be developed into 
concentration. One way of resolving the tension is to deny that momentary concentration is 
concentration at all. Concentration, as per the above definition, is the narrowing of the open 
horizon. Momentary concentration, however, does not require such a narrowing; it is intrinsic 
to ‘bare’ mindfulness: the feeling of being tuned-in to the open horizon prior to all narrowing. 
It would follow, then, that momentary concentration is not concentration at all but a different 
phenomenon altogether. But this is not the only way of resolving the tension, and therefore it 
is not evident that it is the right way. For ‘narrowing’ could be conceived more broadly as a 
universal operation that is performable on any kind of horizon; it is not a possibility unique 
to the open horizon. This way of looking at things opens up the possibility that the initial 
movement of tuning-in—the movement from the transcendental to the open horizon—is itself 
a kind of narrowing (although tuning-in would also involve more than narrowing). Under this 
proposal, concentration per se could be formally defined as the operation of narrowing down 
a horizon (where the content or nature of the horizon is left undetermined), while the kinds of 
concentrative states that involve the narrowing of the open horizon could then be distinguished 
from the kinds that involve the narrowing of other kinds of horizons. Momentary 
concentration would then belong to this second category. To decide on which possibility is 
correct calls for careful and painstaking phenomenological investigations, investigations that 
cannot be attempted here. For the following purposes, the terms ‘samādhi’ and ‘concentration’ 
will be used to exclusively designate the narrowing down of the open horizon. 
 
 
mindfulness. And the point where the “unification of mind remains steady” is the point where tuning-in-tuning-
out gives way to both mindfulness and momentary concentration (which are co-joined). 
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v. ‘WRONG’ MINDFULNESS AND CONCENTRATION 
 According to the above account, to cultivate mindfulness is to practice tuning-out of the 
transcendental horizon and tuning-in to the open horizon. Mindfulness is the feeling of being 
tuned-in to the open horizon, while concentration is the modification where the primary open 
horizon is narrowed down to one of its sub-horizons. These propositions can be formalised in 
the following way. Cultivating mindfulness is the practice tuning-out of A and tuning-in to B, 
mindfulness is the feeling of being tuned-in to B, while concentration is the modification 
where B is narrowed down to one of its sub-horizons. Putting it that way allows the question 
to be posed: can the variables ‘A’ and ‘B’ be filled otherwise than as above? This is to ask: are 
there kinds of mindfulness and concentration other than the above? I believe that the answer 
is affirmative and in this section I will attempt to briefly sketch a description of another form 
of mindfulness and concentration.  
 From the Buddhist perspective, the following are ‘wrong’ forms of mindfulness and 
concentration. ‘Wrong’ in the sense these states do not lead (or do not lead directly) to the 
ultimate goal of the Buddhist path, which is the end of all suffering. I will have something 
more to say about this below. Bringing these ‘wrong’ forms into view will enable us, by way 
of contrast, to get a more solid grip of the wholesome or ‘right’ forms described above. Now, 
the key difference between the wrong and right forms of these phenomena is found in the fact 
that the former can be understood in terms of the transcendental horizon alone; they do not 
require us to take the open horizon into account at all. But in order to understand the sense in 
which this is so, it is necessary to expand the earlier description of the transcendental horizon.  
This is the first task. 
 The transcendental horizon is filled in by our possibilities (a notion that encompasses 
both intentional possibilities and projects). For the sake of the following discussion, 
intentional possibilities will be left aside and the focus will be exclusively on projects. 
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Following Heidegger (1967, pp. 116-117) I will refer to that dimension of the transcendental 
horizon that is filled-in by projects as the ‘for-the-sake-of-which’.68 To illustrate, this laptop 
is useful for-the-sake-of writing this chapter, this window for-the-sake-of letting light into the 
room (allowing me to read these books) and so on. But here it is necessary to make certain 
further distinctions that Heidegger himself does not make (or at least does not make explicitly 
and clearly enough). 
 The first distinction is between immediate and mediated for-the-sake-of-whichs or 
projects—I will use these terms interchangeably from now on. An immediate project is a 
project that is present directly, without intermediary. A mediated project is present ‘through’ 
some other, more immediate, project. An illustration will help. Reflecting on my current 
situation, I find the project of writing this section as an immediate for-the-sake-of-which. The 
project of finishing this chapter is mediated. The project of finishing this whole work is more 
mediated still. The relation between these projects is such that the mediated projects appear 
through the immediate one—a phenomenon that is comparable to the way in which the parts 
of the house that are not currently visible ‘appear’ through those that are. But the project of 
writing this section is not the only project in my situation that can be described as ‘immediate’. 
As I write this section, I sense other projects: of remaining alert to my phone (I am waiting 
 
68 Here I should note that the term ‘project’ does not refer to “…a plan that has been thought out…” (Heidegger, 
1967, p. 185). As I am using the term, ‘project’ refers to the possibilities towards which we as beings that exist 
in the mode of being-in-the-world (to speak in Heidegger’s terms for the moment) are always projecting (whether 
we explicitly plan or not). I completely agree with Heidegger (ibid.) that “…any Dasein has, as Dasein, already 
projected itself; and as long as it is, it is projecting. As long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and 
always will understand itself in terms of possibilities”. But what Heidegger overlooked, (at least in Being and 
Time), is the possibility that Dasein can transform its very mode of being, from being-in-the-world to the mode 
of being that is disclosed when one ‘enters’ what I am here calling the open perspective. After this transformation, 
Dasein (if we can still call it that) no longer projects itself towards its own possibilities.  
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for a friend to respond to a questions that I asked of him) keeping track of what is happening 
in my immediate environment, taking sips of my coffee and so on. All of these projects are 
also present immediately, without intermediary. That which I will call ‘projective space’ or 
‘projective horizon’ is a dimension of the transcendental horizon that encompasses all 
immediate projects, which are its ‘sub-projects’ or ‘sub-horizons’. What is the difference 
between the immediate sub-project of writing this section and the other sub-projects with 
which it co-exists in the projective horizon? A key difference is that, in my current situation, 
the project of writing this section is foregrounded, while the other sub-projects, such as 
keeping track of the happenings in my environment, remain in the background. 
 The second crucial distinction is between present and absent projects. All of the projects 
that feature in the example just given are present or alive in my current situation. This is also 
true of the mediated projects (e.g. the project of having this work finished), which are present 
‘through’ the immediate project of writing this section. Present projects must be distinguished 
from absent projects. To begin demarcating the latter phenomenon, it will help to consider 
some examples. All of the following projects can be described as absent from my situation: 
the project of doing a meditation retreat, working at the library (I am currently at home), 
watching a movie and so on. While these examples give some taste of what absent projects 
are, it is not at all straightforward to pin down the phenomenon in a more rigorous 
phenomenological fashion. The best I can do here is sketch a few of its characteristics, leaving 
a more rigorous treatment for another occasion.  
 Firstly, absent projects must be distinguished from non-existent ones. There are projects 
of which I cannot even conceive. For me, these projects are not absent, they are non-existent; 
they do not feature in my experience at all. By contrast, absent projects appear as absent. 
While I cannot justify this here, I think that absent projects are constituted through acts of 
imagination and other similar phenomena, which come and go in the stream of 
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consciousness.69 Absent projects also appear in isolation from their projective space—the 
concrete context in which they would appear if they were actually present. This means that an 
absent project is a kind of abstraction. For example, as I write away at home, the project of 
working at the library appears before my mind, tempting me to engage it. This image presents 
only a few details of that possible situation—I’ll be sitting at that desk, drinking coffee from 
this cafe—but most of the other immediate sub-projects that would co-exist with the project 
of writing at the library (say, remaining alert to when the library closes) do not feature in my 
current experience at all (except as a kind of an undifferentiated background of the image). 
This will have to suffice as a description for now. I have tried to represent the above ideas in 
Figure 3. 
        
Figure 3. The large diamond with solid borders represents the (primary) projective space. The diamonds 
that make it up (project A, B, C, and D) represent the immediate sub-projects, while the large diamonds 
with dotted lines represent the mediated projects. The diamonds with dashed lines floating above the big 
diamond represent flux of absent projects as they enter and leave the mind. 
The dynamic interplay between present and absent projects permeates ordinary life. Here one 
 
69 Sartre (2004a) argues that imagination is distinctive in that it is the only intentional act that can present 
something in the mode of absence. 
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is immersed in some present project for a while but, soon enough, an absent project appears 
before the mind (through imagination, daydreaming etc.). I am writing when suddenly the 
possibility crosses my mind: perhaps I should go to the kitchen and get some food. This 
possibility lights up certain practical possibilities: the work appears as to-be-left-aside, the 
door as to-be-opened and so on. But these instrumental possibilities only light up briefly, while 
the absent project is imaginatively present. Then—with the disappearance of the project—
they subside again. I get back to my writing. Soon enough, however, I am pulled away again… 
But there is a way out of this constant back-and-forth. 
 When an absent project arises, the habitual response is to become absorbed in it for some 
time. But this is not the only possibility that the situation offers. Another is to distance oneself 
or tune-out of the absent project: “Now is not the time to think about that!” And how does one 
tune-out of the absent project? One way is by tuning-in to a present project. From a different 
perspective, this kind of tuning-in involves immersing oneself in the ‘present’ practical 
possibilities—the practical meanings constituted by the present projects—and distancing 
oneself from ‘absent’ practical possibilities that the absent projects introduce into experience. 
An illustration will help. I am writing this chapter and, for some time, I am completely 
absorbed in the task. But suddenly a thought crosses my mind about the meditation retreat that 
I am planning to do after the writing is done, and the temptation is there to open up this thought 
and to dwell in that distant and absent reality. But instead of going down that path, I tune-out 
of the thought by tuning-in to the project of writing—I immersed myself in the solicitation of 
the keyboard as to-be-typed-upon, of the paper as to-take-notes-on and so on. But, soon 
enough, I am pulled away again. As soon as I notice this, I again turn towards the present 
project, becoming immersed in the possibilities that it opens up.  
 Because it instantiates the form tuning-out-tuning-in, to engage in this practice is to be 
cultivating a kind of mindfulness. But evidently this is something quite different from the 
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practice of tuning-out of the transcendental horizon altogether—including all of one’s 
projects—and tuning-in to the open horizon, to the thingy possibilities of the phenomena 
themselves. Figure 4 represents this difference. 
    
Figure 4 This figure contrasts the practice of tuning-out of absent projects and tuning-in to the present 
projects (left) with tuning-out of the projective (and transcendental) horizon altogether and tuning-in to 
the open horizon (right). 
 But just as the other kind of tuning-out-tuning-in can yield the feeling of being tuned-in 
to the open horizon, so the kind of practice now under discussion can yield a kind of 
mindfulness—the feeling of being tuned-in to the (primary) projective horizon. On 
establishing this state, no more effort is required to tune-out of absent projects, for here such 
projects have ceased knocking on the door of the mind. One no longer wastes mental energy 
in planning and thinking about what is absent, which allows one to invest all of one’s energy 
into one’s present projects. This is a very exhilarating, happy state of mind, which has other 
facets also (for example, one is highly alert to when a present project lapses and when it is 
time to take up another project). But this is not the place for an exhaustive study of this 
phenomenon. These descriptions suffice to illustrate both what is common and what is 
different between the feeling of being tuned-in to thingly possibilities and the feeling of being 
tuned-in to one’s present projects. 
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 It is now time to turn to the question: what kind of mindfulness was the Buddha speaking 
about when he discoursed on ‘sati’? The answer, I propose, is the feeling of being tuned-in to 
the open horizon. One reason for saying this is that ‘wholesome’ mindfulness is necessarily 
accompanied by the factor of freedom from desires and discontent. Without the presence of 
this factor, mindfulness is not ‘right’ or ‘wholesome’ mindfulness, in the Buddhist sense. Now, 
according to the earlier discussion, freedom from desires and discontent was described as a 
complete (but temporary) absence of our possibilities (and projects in particular). To put it 
differently, this is the feeling of being (temporarily) tuned-out of all of one’s projects. But this 
factor does not accompany the feeling of being tuned-in to one’s present projects. That is the 
first reason for thinking that this is not the kind of mindfulness that features in the teachings 
of the Buddha. The second reason has to do with the fact that right mindfulness is a condition 
of possibility for the practice of insight (vipassanā)—the practice of seeing things as they are. 
Seeing things as they are can be contrasted to the experience of seeing them as instruments, 
which is how they appear in the light of our projects. But the feeling of being tuned-in to the 
present projects does not remove the instrumental layer from things, which still appear as 
means towards the end of realising one’s (present) projects. And this keeps their intrinsic 
intelligibility hidden, preventing the arising of true insight (more will be said about this in the 
next chapter). 
 As described earlier, the feeling of being tuned-in to the open horizon opens up the 
possibility of narrowing this horizon to one of its sub-horizons—and to nurture that possibility 
is to nurture concentration. The feeling of being tuned-in to the (primary) projective horizon 
opens up a similar possibility: the possibility of narrowing down this horizon to one of its sub-
projects. This, too, is a kind of concentration. In the above analysis of concentration, I did not 
emphasis enough the difference between the practice of cultivating concentration and the state 
of concentration itself. I would like to make a few remarks about this now. The need to 
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cultivate concentration arises from the situation where the attempt to narrow down the primary 
horizon (whatever it may be) to one of its sub-horizons, meets with the counterforce where 
the sub-horizon automatically and passively broadens back into the primary horizon. To 
cultivate concentration is to resist the movement of broadening by cultivating the possibility 
of narrowing. To illustrate, in my current situation, I am aware of a multiplicity of present 
projects: the work to be written, the project of pushing the noise of the neighbour’s children 
into the background, of sipping tea, keeping track of the music playing in the background and 
so on. Now, I attempt to narrow down this project-space to the project of writing; I attempt to 
become entirely absorbed in it. From here two things can happen.  
 Either broadening wins out and I return to the primary projective 
horizon and the multiplicity of sub-projects that constitute it, or I succeed 
in the practice—in which case the primary projective space is narrowed 
down to the sub-project of writing, which becomes the new primary 
(secondary) projective horizon. At this point, I enter into a kind of a 
concentration. This is represented in Figure 5. 
 It is essential to understand this in the right way. This is not a state 
of where one simply becomes more attentive to one of the sub-projects—
while the other sub-projects remain present in the background of one’s 
awareness. While that is possible too, it is not the phenomenon now in 
question. The narrowing down of the projective space implies the 
disappearance of the other sub-projects entirely from the sphere of 
awareness. The sub-project in question now saturates the entire 
projective space. To illustrate, suppose that I have succeeded in narrowing down my current 
projective space to the sub-project of writing. Here I no longer sense such projects as sipping 
tea, blocking out the outside noise, being alert to the happenings in the environment, at all. 
Figure 5 The 
narrowing down of the 
primary projective 
space to one of the sub-
projects, which 




The whole projective (and transcendental) horizon has become saturated by the project of 
writing. No matter how deeply absorbed I become in a sub-project, as long as the other sub-
projects remain in the sphere of awareness, that is not the phenomenon of concentration now 
in question.  
 Establishing this concentrative state has a profound effect on the instrumental 
significance and the spatial quality of my lifeworld. To show this, a brief detour is necessary. 
My projects determine the instrumental dimension of the surrounding entities (in Heidegger’s 
(1967, p. 98) language, their being as ready-at-hand (zuhandenheit)). Moreover, individual 
instruments can only occur as moments of instrumental totalities (ibid.). For example, this 
laptop is given as serviceable-for writing, this cup for holding tea, this window for letting the 
light in (in order that I can see what I am doing), and so on. And it is not the case that these 
instruments are first given as isolated entities that must somehow be combined together into 
a whole: the workspace. Rather, according to Heidegger’s analysis, which I agree with, the 
workspace as totality of relations is given first; the individual instruments can be highlighted 
in this totality only through a kind of abstraction. Moreover, these instrumental totalities 
constitute a kind of (practical) spatiality, which is not identical to the geometrical space in 
which isolated things appear. The geometrical space arises from practical space through a kind 
of abstraction (Heidegger, 1967). Heidegger (ibid.) has, in my opinion, convincingly shown 
that it is this instrumental space (and not the three-dimensional geometrical space) that is 
responsible for the sense of the vastness of the word, the sense that the world spreads infinitely 
in all directions.  
 This sense of the vastness of the world is founded on the multiplicity of instrumental 
totalities, which is itself founded on the multiplicity of projects. The narrowing down of the 
projective horizon—the ‘collapse’ of the multiplicity of projects to a single project—does not 
do away with this practical space. What happens, rather, is that the entire practical space 
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condenses in a certain manner into a single instrumental totality—the instrumental totality 
determined by the project to which the primary horizon has been narrowed down to. In the 
running example, the entire world appears as the project of writing; and it is impossible, from 
within this remarkable state of mind, to even conceive that anything else could exist. I have 
become the project of writing—and the world is nothing but this writing to be done. The 
project of writing now fills the entire world. And this state is accompanied by a kind of 
effortlessness that arises due to the fact that there are no other instrumental totalities that would 
draw my energy away from the project of writing; no effort is required to return to writing, 
for there is nothing to return from. Even the tiredness that I usually experience during the 
process of writing has vanished, together with the global awareness of my body; there is no 
pain or tiredness because there is no project of resisting the pain.70 These descriptions will 
have to suffice for now.71 
 
70 However, when this remarkable state lapses, as it is bound to do, there is a sense that certain parts of one’s 
experience, (such as bodily sensations) were neglected during the time that one was in it. William James (1890, 
p. 180) gives the example of a professor who: “…frequently begun a lecture whilst suffering neuralgic pain so 
severe as to make him apprehend that he would find it impossible to proceed; yet no sooner has he by a 
determined effort fairly launched himself into the stream of thought, than he has found himself continuously 
borne along without the least distraction, until the end has come, and the attention has been released; when the 
pain has recurred with a force that has overmastered all resistance, making him wonder how he could have ever 
ceased to feel it.” This is one way to distinguish right and wrong mindfulness and concentration: the former do 
not make one unconscious of any aspect of one’s experience but bring about a kind of optimal lucidity and 
clarity. 
 
71 I believe that the old man’s experience in the following passage of the Zhuangzi (2009, p. 270-271) is a 
description of this state: 
 
When Confucius was traveling through the forest of Chu, he came upon a hunchback who was 
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 Sometimes the following question is asked in the contemporary discussion of 
mindfulness: is mindfulness a kind of “flow experience” that high performing athletes and 
others sometimes talk about? Differently phrased, is being mindful or concentrated (in the 
sense required by the teachings of the Buddha) the same as “being in the zone”? I think that 
when people speak of “flow experiences” what they have in mind is the kind of concentration 
that I have been trying to describe: the narrowing down of the primary projective horizon to a 
single project.72 If I am right about this, then “flow” is not Buddhist mindfulness because it is 
not mindfulness at all. It is a kind of concentration—the ‘wrong’ kind in the context of the 
Buddhist path (as set out in the Pali texts). On the difference between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ 
samādhi, Bhikkhu Jayasaro (2017, p. 361) writes:  
 
A cat watching a mouse hole has a kind of samādhi and so does a safe-cracker, but theirs is a 
natural, amoral concentration of instinct and desire, not samādhi issued from a disciplines 
gathering of inner forces and which provides the foundation for wisdom. [This is] ‘Right 
 
catching cicadas with a glue-tipped stick as if plucking them up with his hand. Confucius said,  “How 
skillful you are! Or do you have a course?” 
 The old man said: “I have a course. For five or six months, I practiced piling one pellett on top 
of another. When I could make a stack of two without it toppling over, already I would lose only a 
few cicadas. When I could make a stack of three, I could catch nine of ten. By the time I was able to 
balance a stack of five, I could catch the cicadas as if plucking them up with my hand. I settle my 
body like a twisted old stump, holding my arm still like the branch of a withered tree. Although heaven 
and earth are vast and the ten thousand things numerous, I am aware of nothing but cicada wings. 
Motionless, neither turning nor leaning, I would not trade away a single cicada wing for all of creation. 
How could I fail to catch them, no matter what I do? 
 Confucius turned to his disciples and said: “Using his will undividedly, the spiritual in him 
converges and solidifies—such would perhaps be a description of this hunchbacked gentleman here!”  
72 For a discussion of “flow”, see: Nakamura (2002) 
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Samadhi’ (sammasamadhi), an essential element of the path to liberation, and ‘wrong samadhi’ 
(micchasamadhi), which leads away from it.  
 
 Right concentration is necessarily accompanied by right mindfulness: the feeling of 
being tuned-in to the open horizon—but the kind of concentration that I have been discussing 
is not. Ajahn Chah makes this point in the following words (where ‘awareness’ can be 
interpreted as open awareness and ‘knowing’ as the understanding of thingly possibilities):  
 
No matter how deep Right Samadhi becomes, it is always accompanied by awareness. There 
is a perfect mindedness and alertness, a constant knowing. Right Samadhi is a kind of samādhi 
that never leads you astray. This is a point that the practitioner should clearly understand. You 
can never dispense with the knowing. For it to be Right Samadhi, the knowing must be present 
from the beginning right until the end. Please keep observing this. (Jayasaro, ibid.)73 
 
73 The situation is in fact more complex than I have portrayed it to be. For there is (at least) another kind of wrong 
concentration. Above I said that the narrowing down of the open horizon necessarily unfolds-from the feeling of 
being tuned-in. But, in fact, this is not sufficient to make narrowing into ‘right’ concentration. For, in addition, 
once the primary horizon has been narrowed down, it is necessary to again become tuned-in to its sub-horizons; 
to become aware of the multiplicities that constitute it. In other words, for concentration to be right concentration 
is not sufficient that it unfold-from mindfulness it must also constantly unfold-together-with it. If the latter 
condition is not satisfied, a kind of wrong concentration will result. I think that this is the kind of wrong samādhi 
that Ajhan Chah had in mind when he spoke the words recorded in the following passage: 
 
Samadhi can be divided into two kinds: wrong samādhi and right samādhi. Take good notice of this 
distinction. In wrong samādhi the mind is unwavering. It enters a calmness which is completely silent 
and lacking all awareness. You can be in that state for a couple of hours or even a whole day, but 
during that time you have no idea where you’ve got to or what the state of your mind is.  This is wrong 
samādhi. It is like a knife that you’ve sharpened well and then put away without using. You gain no 
benefit from it. It is a deluded calm that lacks alertness. You think that you’ve reached the end of the 
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 While ‘flow’ is not an integral part of the eightfold path, I suspect that it has its own 
benefits. It may even aid the development of the factors that do constitute that eightfold path. 
To give an example: to develop flow is also to increase one’s general concentrative capacity 
(it is, after all, a kind of concentration), and this may carry over to the development of the 
right kind of concentration. But, it must be admitted, there are also reasons to doubt this (that 
wrong concentration aids the path). For flow still involves a project (a craving) to realise a 
goal, and the suffering caused by holding onto this project may offset the benefits of increasing 
one’s general concentrative capacity. On a related point, I suspect that unwholesome 
concentration is an essential moment of many kinds of (unwholesome) phenomena, one being 
sexual craving. For, one characteristic of sexual craving is that it completely absorbs the one 
of whom it takes hold into the project of getting the object of desire. In this case at least, the 
suffering that arises from not being able to fulfil the project clearly offsets the benefits that 
come from the associated concentration. Incidentally, and I will end the chapter with this 
thought, it seems to me that in large part the pleasure associated with sexual craving stems 
from the high degree of (wrong) concentration that this phenomenon brings with it. 
 
practice of meditation and don't search for anything more. It's a danger, an enemy. At this stage, it is 
dangerous because it prevents wisdom from arising (ibid.). 
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CHAPTER III: 
Mindfulness in Action 
 
While the last chapter took important steps towards a phenomenology of mindfulness and 
related phenomena, much work still needs to be done. But much of that work, which would 
involve expanding these investigations into such phenomenological themes as temporality, 
embodiment and intersubjectivity, can be left for another occasion. There are, however, two 
glaring gaps in our analysis that must be filled before this discussion can draw to a close.  
The first has to do with the practice of insight (vipassanā) that, according to the teaching 
of the Buddha, mindfulness makes possible. The issue, sometimes spoken of under the 
heading of the relationship between mindfulness and wisdom, has been with us from pretty 
much the beginning of the discussion, and the last chapter itself was not entirely silent on the 
topic. There it was said that mindfulness brings into view the way that phenomena fit-together, 
that this disclosure is only implicit and that a special kind of reflectivity is called for in order 
to make it explicit. To nurture this reflective stance is to practice insight or vipassanā. But 
what is meant by ‘reflectivity’ here? Is it actually a question of a reflective act, the kind of 
intentional experience that bends back in order to take the stream of consciousness as its 
intentional object? Or is it rather a matter of some kind of judgment? Is it a combination of 
the two, perhaps, or something else altogether? And, whatever its precise nature, how does 
this reflectivity arise from within the feeling of being tuned-in; how, in other words, does 
mindfulness make vipassanā possible? And what is the role, if any, of concentration (the 
narrowing down of the open horizon) in all this? 
The second issue has to do with the phenomenological nature of ātāpi, the kind of effort 
that is constitutive of tuning-in-tuning-out. The last chapter did have something to say about 
what ātāpi is not: it is not the kind of effort that goes into the realisation of a project. But it 
left us in the dark regarding the positive nature of this phenomenon. This, too, is something 
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that we now need to try and get a handle on. 
In order to tackle these issues, this chapter will take a somewhat different approach than 
the previous ones. It will attempt to learn about these matters by scrupulously observing—
through the lens of the framework developed in the preceding chapters—two individuals who 
are, or so I will claim, actually engaging in a practice of this kind. The individuals are Edmund 
Husserl himself and the renowned master from the Thai Forest Tradition of Buddhism: 
Ãcariya Maha Boowa. This approach also promises to show that actual practitioners move 
within the categories of our framework—that the preceding efforts were not merely an 
exercise in abstract and futile speculation. 
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i. MINDFULNESS IN HUSSERL’S PHENOMENOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS 
In addressing the themes that he was addressing, Husserl was constantly skirting around 
phenomena—such as the open perspective and thingly possibilities—in terms of which I tried 
to develop a phenomenological account of mindfulness, and related phenomena. If it is true, 
as I tried to show, that these phenomena are very tightly intertwined with and even 
presupposed by some of the key ideas of his own phenomenology (such as the epoché) then 
it may appear as quite surprising that in Husserl’s work we fail to find a systematic discussion, 
or even a recognition, of these themes. Despite this absence, however, in his actual 
phenomenological investigations, Husserl was in fact practicing tuning-out-tuning-in. Or so I 
will attempt to show in this section. I expect this claim to strike many Husserl scholars as very 
surprising, if not totally outlandish. For this reason, it is necessary to build a convincing case 
for it, and to do so slowly and carefully. To approach this goal, I will take apart what I consider 
to be one of Husserl’s most impressive phenomenological investigations, in such a way as to 
reveal the machinery of mindfulness, and related phenomena, as they churn away in the 
background thereof. 
 But at the very outset it is necessary to deal with the following objection to our thesis. 
Tuning-out, according to our definition, is the practice of distancing oneself from our 
possibilities, including intentional possibilities. But, according to Husserl, every phenomenon 
is a correlate of some intentional experience. If this is so, how can I possibly claim that Husserl 
was practicing tuning-out? For, one may wonder: would that not imply that he was distancing 
himself from the intentional experience in which the phenomenon in question is given? But 
how could distancing himself from the experience that gives the phenomenon, be a way of 
getting to know and describe that phenomenon? What an absurdity! The thesis that Husserl 
was practicing tuning-in-tuning-out seems to be in danger of crumbling to the ground even 
before its defense can get underway. Let us see if we can rescue it. 
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 Here it is essential to keep in mind the difference between the actual intentional 
experience in which the phenomenon is given and the intentional possibilities that fill-in the 
transcendental horizon. While the intentional experience is founded on the transcendental 
horizon—there could be no intentional experience without a transcendental horizon of 
intentional possibilities—the two are not identical. It seems to follow from this that tuning-
out of intentional possibilities is not the same as tuning-out of the intentional experience that 
gives the phenomenon. So one way of responding to the above objection is to say that the 
claim that Husserl was tuning-out of intentional possibilities does not imply that he was 
tuning-out of the intentional experience in which the phenomenon in question is given. This 
response will not do.  
 The intentional experience is founded on the transcendental horizon (and the intentional 
possibilities that fill-it). For this reason tuning-out of intentional possibilities will bring about 
a certain distance between oneself and the intentional experience in question—even though, 
strictly speaking, this distancing is not the same as tuning-out. Let us rephrase the objection 
in light of these remarks and see if that opens up another, more satisfactory way of responding 
to it: if tuning-out brings about a distance between oneself and the intentional experience in 
which the phenomenon is given, and if Husserl claims that every phenomenon is given in some 
intentional experience, how can I claim that Husserl was practicing tuning-out?  
 The key phrase is ‘Husserl claims…” For it is essential to keep apart Husserl’s 
methodological reflections (what he thinks he is doing when practicing phenomenology) from 
what is actually going on in his phenomenological investigations. As a number of scholars 
have noted, Husserl’s methodological reflections are often much less convincing than his 
actual phenomenological work, and the former often lag behind the latter.74 With this in mind, 
 
74 According to Poellner (2007) Husserl’s “… actual practice is often more persuasive than his second-order 
reflective characterization of it.” Heidegger, according to Zahavi (2017, p. 43), “…observed that Husserl’s 
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it is time to deal with the above objection. I agree with Husserl that every appearance is 
constituted in some intentional experience. But is the mode of appearance the only mode that 
a phenomenon can take? If the phenomenon can assume other modes, what mode does it 
assume in the context of concrete phenomenological work? To approach this crucial question, 
I will begin with some reflection on the phenomenon of correlation itself (arguably the key 
theme of Husserlian phenomenology). In bringing the phenomenon of correlation between the 
intentional experience and its object into view as a phenomenological theme, did Husserl have 
it in view as an appearance? 
 If he did have it in view in that way then the phenomenon of correlation must have 
appeared to him in light of his own possibilities. And it is plausible that Husserl’s 
phenomenological investigations were coloured by the feeling of “I can describe this 
 
original self interpretation in Logische Untersuchungen was quite inadequate, and that it was consequently 
necessary to distinguish between Husserl’s meta-reflections and his actual analyses ...” To give a specific 
example, according to his own meta-reflections on his practice, Husserl believed that in the Logical 
Investigations he was only investigating the ‘really inherent content of intentional experiences’ and not the 
intentional object towards which the experience is directed. But the actual phenomenological investigations 
themselves make it pretty clear that he was in fact taking the intentional object into account. As Zahavi (ibid.) 
comments “[g]iven that Husserl as a matter of fact does investigate the correlation between act and intentional 
object in Logische Untersuchungen , he is contradicting some of his own methodological guidelines.” Another 
example is where Husserl tries to impose his general model of intentionality (and in particular the schema 
‘apprehension-sensation”) on all intentional experience and in particular on the categorial intuition, as 
Sokolowski (1964, p. 71) writes: “…Husserl felt that his general theory of intentional structure was valid for all 
intentional acts, categorical ones included. It shows also to what extent Husserl felt that his schema of 
apprehension and sense content was absolutely necessary for the constitution of objectivity. In trying to find 
representants for categorial objects, Husserl is simply trying to force his schema on their constitution. He is so 
convinced that any objectivity we encounter can only be accounted for by dualistic schema “apprehension-
sensation,” that he construes a way in which to fit this schema into our constitution of categorial objects”. 
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phenomenon”. In other words, the phenomenon here appears on the ground of the 
phenomenological project—a project that endows the phenomenon with the instrumental 
meaning: to-be-described. But even if this stance of the phenomenological investigator plays 
a role in phenomenological investigations, the crucial question here is: is this the standpoint 
or perspective that allows the inner structure of the phenomenon to show itself?  
 A key characteristic of the phenomenon of correlation is the moment of mutual 
dependency between the actual intentional experience and the transcendental horizon. 
Differently put, every intentional experience necessarily unfolds-together-with a 
transcendental horizon; whenever the possibility of the one comes into being so does the 
possibility of the other. If these are the kind of structures and laws that Husserl was 
discovering in his phenomenological work, then everything that we have found out up to this 
point suggests that such discoveries involve tuning-out of the transcendental horizon and 
tuning-in to the open horizon. If that is correct, Husserl did not have the phenomenon of 
correlation in view as an appearance—as something given to and constituted in light of his 
own possibilities—but as vividly present, as manifesting within the open perspective and in 
light of its own, thingly possibilities. But admittedly this is no more than a hint. In order to 
more conclusively establish the proposition that Husserl was practicing tuning-in-tuning-out, 
I will now deconstruct what I consider to be one of his most impressive phenomenological 
descriptions in order to show the presence of tuning-out-tuning-in therein. This is the study of 
‘categorial intuition’ in the Investigation VI.75 
 Not everything in Husserl’s writings (including the piece of writing with which we will 
 
75 If I am correct in what I aim to show here, then the gap between the ‘realist’ phenomenology of the Logical 
Investigations and the later, transcendental phenomenology, is not as great as it is often portrayed as being. For, 
the essence of all phenomenological work involves tuning-in-tuning-out and the transcendental is just another, 
potentially quite important, field of such work.  
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be concerned in the following) is phenomenological, in the strict sense of the term. Often we 
find the philosopher engaging in arguments, drawing distinctions, appealing to what is 
obvious to common sense, expounding the views of someone else, criticising those views 
through various considerations and so on. If this were all that he did, in essence, Husserl would 
have been no different from any other philosopher. But he was different and what made him 
so is the presence of what may be called the phenomenological element in his work. But it is 
also true that the two approaches—the argumentative (understood in a very broad sense) and 
the phenomenological—co-exist harmoniously therein. In fact, the preparatory stages of 
phenomenological analyses frequently involve the use of arguments and other such 
philosophical tools. This often yields a hypothesis—the confirmation, refutation or refinement 
of which is the purpose of the phenomenological study. But while Husserl employed a wide 
variety of methods in the preparatory stages, he was fully conscious that the final verdict on 
all truth claims must be left to intuitive evidence and the phenomenological investigations by 
means of which such evidence can be achieved. As Husserl (1970b, p. 179) writes:  
 
The real premises of our putative results must lie in propositions satisfying the requirement 
that what they assert permits of an adequate phenomenological justification, a fulfilment 
through evidence in the strictest sense. Such propositions must not, further, ever be adduced 
in some other sense than in which they have been intuitively established. 
 
Husserl undertakes some of his phenomenological investigations with the goal of addressing 
some longstanding philosophical issue (such as the status of ‘ideal’ entities). Others arise from 
the need to address an outstanding question that arose from an earlier phenomenological study 
of his. The latter is the case with the study of ‘categorial intuition’ in the Investigation VI. 
 Earlier on in the Investigations, Husserl circumscribed a phenomenon that he termed 
‘fulfilment’ (Husserl, 1970b, Investigation VI, Chapter II). Fulfilment is what happens when 
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a meaning-intention comes into contact with a corresponding intuition: where we go from 
emptily entertaining a meaning (such as ‘white’ or ‘paper’) to actually having an intuitive 
acquaintance with that to which the meaning-intention refers. Here the meaning-intention and 
the corresponding intuition enter a particular kind of union of which we say that the intuition 
has fulfilled the meaning-intention or, from the perspective of the object referred to, that we 
now actually have before us what we were previously merely thinking about. Husserl (1970b, 
p. 272)  writes:  “I see white paper and say ‘white paper’, thereby expressing, with precise 
adequacy, only what I see.” Difficulties arise, however, when we consider ‘complex meaning-
intentions’, such as the thought or judgment that ‘this paper is white’.76 As Husserl affirms in 
the continuation of the above passage, complex meaning-intentions, too, are subject to 
fulfilment: “…[t]he same holds of complete judgments. I see that this paper is white, and 
express this by saying ‘this paper is white’. In other words, it is not only that ‘white’ and 
‘paper’ find fulfilment in intuition but we also ‘see’ that the paper is white.” The being white 
of the paper, too, “…is self-given, or at least putatively given, in the fulfilment which at times 
invests the judgment, the becoming aware of the state of affairs supposed.” Switching 
examples, Husserl further enforced the point: “…[n]ot only what is meant in the partial 
meaning gold, nor only what is meant in the partial meaning yellow, itself appears before us, 
 
76  What I am here calling ‘complex meaning-intention’, Husserl speaks of (in translation) in a number of 
different ways and from a number of different perspectives. The terms he uses to point towards this phenomena 
include ‘complex meanings’, ‘categorial forms’ ‘total statements’, ‘structured, articulated expressions’, 
‘complete judgments’, ‘the predicate mode of statement’ and so on. Here it is important to keep in mind the 
fourfold difference between (1) the intentional experience (2) its meaning, (3) the grammatical form that this 
meaning may take and (4) the intentional object towards which the intentional experience is directed (and which 
the meaning expresses). These are all ‘aspects’ of the complex meaning-intention. It seems to me that Husserl 
often prefers to speak in terms of complex or propositional meanings. In my exposition, I am primarily looking 
at the phenomenon as an intentional experience.  
207 
but also gold-being-yellow thus appears” (ibid. pp. 278-279). Husserl’s question is: what 
fulfils the complex meaning-intention?  
 The answer is not straightforward. “If a man thinks the fulfilment of nominal meanings 
clear enough…” Husserl (ibid. p. 271) writes “…we shall ask him how we are to understand 
the fulfilment of total statements…What may and can furnish the fulfilment for those aspects 
of meaning which make up the propositional form as such, the aspects of ‘categorial form’ to 
which, e.g. the copula belongs?” The issue can also be expressed in the following way. The 
simple meaning-intention and the corresponding sense intuition are the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for ‘simple’ fulfilment. In the case of ‘complex’ fulfilment, however, 
while it will turn out that the complex meaning-intention and the sense experience are 
necessary conditions, they are not sufficient. In particular, sense intuition is not the experience 
that fulfils the complex meanings-intention, “…[i]t is hopeless, even quite misguided, to look 
directly in perception for what could give fulfilment to our supplementary formal meanings”, 
“[f]orms…as forms of meaning craving fulfilment, can find nothing that could fit them in 
perception or acts of like order” (ibid. p. 276), “[t]he ‘a’ and the ‘the’, the ‘and’ and the ‘or’, 
the ‘if’ and the ‘then’, the ‘all’ and the ‘none’, the ‘something’ and the ‘nothing’, the forms of 
quantity and the determination of number etc.—all these are meaningful propositional 
elements, but we should look in vain for their objective correlates (if such may be ascribed to 
them at all) in the sphere of real objects, which is in fact no other than the sphere of objects of 
possible sense perception” (ibid. p. 278).  
 The phenomenological investigations that we are going to study below were undertaken 
with the end in view of addressing the question: what are the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for complex fulfilment? Let us pause at this point in order to reflect on the nature 
of Husserl’s strategy so far. He first draws the reader’s attention to an actual, existent 
phenomenon: complex fulfilment. Then he proceeds to point out a lack in our knowledge of 
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the conditions (to be more precise, the experiential conditions) under which this phenomenon 
comes into being. There must be something, Husserl maintains, that fulfils the complex 
meaning-intention, but this something cannot be sense perception, even if (as we shall see) 
sense perception is involved—and in fact plays a key role—in the process. Finding this 
something that fulfils the complex meaning-intention calls for phenomenological 
investigations. 
 Having formulated the issue that he sets out to resolve, Husserl sketches out a possible 
solution, ‘the hypothesis’. And the role of the phenomenological study is to confirm, refute or 
refine this hypothesis. In this sense, Husserl is working like an empirical scientist: formulating 
hypotheses and testing them through experience (but ‘experience’ does not mean for Husserl 
what it does for the scientist). In the case at hand, the hypothesis is stated in the following 
passage: 
 
Certainly one can tell one’s auditors intelligibly and unambiguously that ‘I see that this paper 
is white’, but the thought behind such talk need not be that the meaning of this spoken sentence 
expresses a mere act of seeing. It may also be the case that the epistemic access of our seeing, 
in which the apparent object announces itself as self-given, serves to base certain connective 
or relational or otherwise formative acts, and that it is to these that our expression in its 
changing forms is adjusted, and that it is in such acts, performed on a basis of actual 
perception, that our expression, in respect to such changing forms, finds fulfilment. If we now 
combine these founded acts or rather act-forms with the acts which serve as their foundation, 
and give the comprehensive name ‘founded act’ to the whole act-complex that result from 
such formal ‘founding’, we may say: Granted the possibility just sketched, our parallelism 
may be re-established, but it is no longer a parallelism between meaning-intentions of 
expressions and mere percepts which correspond to them; it is a parallelism between meaning-
intentions and the above mentioned perceptually founded acts (ibid. p. 273). 
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In short, the hypothesis is that there exists a particular kind of intentional experience, which 
Husserl will shortly call a ‘categorial intuition’ (or a ‘supersensuous percept’), that is distinct 
from but not unrelated to sense perception and it is the categorial intuition that fulfils the 
complex meaning-intention.  
 Up to this point, Husserl has been setting the stage for the actual phenomenological 
work. As he himself writes in the beginning of §46 of Investigation VI, which is where that 
work truly begins and which is revealingly titled ‘Phenomenological analysis of the distinction 
between sensuous and categorial intuition’: 
 
The division between ‘sensuous’ and ‘supersensuous’ percepts was only very superficially 
indicated and quite roughly characterised above. Antiquated talk of external and internal 
senses, plainly stemming from the naive metaphysics and anthropology of daily life, may be 
useful for pointing out the sphere to be excluded, but a true determination and circumspection 
of the sensory sphere is not thereby reached, so depriving the concept of categorial perception 
of its descriptive underpinning. To ascertain and clarify the said distinction is all the more 
important, since such fundamental distinctions as that between categorial form and sensuously 
founded matter, and the similar distinction between categories and all other concepts, depends 
wholly on it. Our concern is therefore to seek more profound descriptive characterisations, 
which will give us some insight into the essentially different constitution of sensuous and 
categorial percepts (or intuition in general) (ibid. pp. 281-282, my emphasis). 
 
 The phenomenological investigation begins with ‘straightforward’ or ‘sense’ 
perception, which Husserl demarcates in a preliminary manner as follows: “[i]n sense-
perception, the ‘external’ thing appears ‘in one blow’, as soon as our glance falls upon it. The 
manner in which it makes the thing appear present is straightforward…” (ibid. p. 283). Earlier 
(see: Part II, Chapter I), I suggested that such a perception (a perception of an actual object, 
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an ‘external’ thing within the world) is the form that perception takes in the natural attitude. I 
called it mundane perception (for the following purposes, ‘mundane’ and ‘straightforward’ 
will be used interchangeably). If I am right about this, then Husserl’s phenomenological 
investigations of sense perception are from the start constrained by this starting point. In other 
words, while he does disclose the ‘deep structure’ of sense perception, that structure only 
appears to him in the role of making possible mundane perception. This may have prevented 
him from getting at this deep perceptual structure in its purity and in all its possibility. But 
this is not a point that I now wish to pursue (although I will have a bit more to say about it as 
the discussion progresses). 
 Breaking into the ‘deep structure’ of straightforward perception, Husserl finds “…a 
continuous perceptual flux…an immediate fusion of part-intentions...of part-acts into one act” 
(ibid. p. 284). The part-intentions or ‘percepts’ that make up this continuum can be divided 
into two kinds, which I will call ‘partial-percepts’ and ‘disjoined percepts’. Partial-percepts 
exist simultaneously and as a group in every phase of the continuum. An illustration will help. 
I throw my glance at the cup and see it straightforwardly. This means that it appears to me as 
a unified, unarticulated object in the midst of the world. I am not, at this point, explicating the 
cup into parts. Nevertheless I have an implicit awareness that the cup is made up of a 
multiplicity of parts: it has a handle, a certain shape, colour and so on. How am I aware of 
these implicit parts? The answer, according to Husserl, is that this straightforward perception 
of the cup is itself constituted of a multiplicity of co-present partial-percepts, each of which is 
directed at a different part of the cup. To phrase this in terms developed in the last chapter: 
partial-percepts necessarily unfold-together-with other partial-percepts. The straightforward 
perception is not static, it is constantly changing; now I am perceiving the cup from one angle, 
now from another, now I am feeling it in my hand, against my lips and then I am hearing the 
sound that it makes at it thumps on the table…These are the ‘disjointed-percepts’ or phases of 
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the continuum. Moreover, every such phase is constituted out of partial-percepts; for every 
‘time slice’ of the continuum is directed towards a multiplicity of parts. In our terminology, 
here one disjoined-percept or phase (A) is unfolding-towards another (B), and when (B) comes 
into being will do so by unfolding-from (A). (A) and (B) are constituted of a multiplicity of 
partial-percepts that are unfolding-together-with each other. I have tried to represent all this 
in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6 The ‘deep structure’ of straightforward perception. A, B and C stand for the disjointed percepts or 
phases of the continuum. The white headed arrow represents the unfolding-towards structure. The black headed 
arrow represent the unfolded-from structure. The dotted wavy lines within each phase represent the partial-
percepts. The line with the two circles at each end represents the unfolding-together-with relation that obtains 
between the partial-percepts. 
 The phases of the continuum that are yet-to-come are sketched out in the unfolding-
towards structure of the phase that is right now in existence. And, I propose, they are sketched 
out therein as thingly possibilities. I say this because there is a whole range of future percepts 
that the actual percept could unfold-towards; the perception could transform in this, that or 
any which way. To see how it will actually unfold, which possibilities out of the whole range 
it will bring into being, it is necessary to tune-in to the continuum, to its own rhythm and 
patterns of becoming. And that requires that one tunes-out of one’s own possibilities that have 
been imposed on this continuum (possibilities the realization of which, in normal 
circumstances, one is pursuing ‘through’ the continuum). If I am right about what I have been 
saying, then in bringing this continuum into view and discerning its structure, Husserl must 
212 
have been practicing tuning-out-tuning-in.  
 At this point the reader may be getting an uncomfortable feeling that I am imposing my 
own terminology and ideas onto Husserl in order to justify the thesis that he was practicing 
tuning-out-tuning-in. Am I perhaps rigging the description for my own ends? That is not my 
intention at all. I have no investment in being right about this; it is not as if I desperately want 
to show that Husserl was in fact doing what I claim that he was doing. I am only trying to 
describe things as I see them. Having said that, I do appreciate the value of not jumping to 
conclusions too quickly. So let us slow down and reflect more carefully on what I have been 
saying. In what sense are the future phases of the continuum thingly possibilities of the ‘actual’ 
phase, the percept now in existence? That they are possibilities is evident; the future phases 
are not now here but are coming-to-be. But, note, the future percepts are present in the sense 
that they contribute to the sense of the actual percept. This is comparable to the way that this 
individual tone only has the meaning that it does because it refers to the future tones of the 
melody that are yet to come, and to the way that the word in the sentence that is right now 
actual in your awareness only has its meaning in virtue of the possible words that are yet to 
come. What makes these possibilities thingly possibilities? To address this question, I would 
first like to return to something that I touched on above.  
 This is the idea that the perceptual continuum only takes the form of mundane or   
straightforward perception in the natural attitude. The mundane perception is founded on a 
(crystallised) project, such as the project of finishing this chapter, or the project of being 
caffeinated. In light of the project, the continuum assumes the form of straightforward 
perception which discloses some external object with an instrumental meaning, say, the cup 
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as something to-be-drank-from. To be more 
specific, the presence of the project modifies 
the unfolding-towards structure of the 
continuum in such a way that its phases are 
now, so to speak, ‘forced’ to unfold-towards a 
particular set of future percepts through which 
the experience of the cup will be constituted.77 
This ‘forcing’ of the continuum in a particular 
direction also has the effect of modifying its 
unfolding-towards structure in such a way that the disjointed percepts now become fused-with 
each other. The difference between the two structures, or at least one such difference, is found 
in this.  When percept A is experienced as unfolding-towards percept B, there is a sense that 
A is both different from B and that B (because it has unfolded-from it) is dependent on A. But 
in the fusion of A with B, something like an ironing out of these differences and dependencies 
takes place. And in that way, on a higher level, the uniform, straightforward perception of an 
actual object comes into being. The modification of the continuum by the presence of the 
project is represented in Figure 7. With this in mind, let us now return to the issue of the sense 
in which the disjointed percepts of the continuum are thingly possibilities.  
 Note, first, the phenomenological difference between (a) the experience where each 
phase of the continuum is given as being-fused-with the others into the straightforward 
perception and (b) the experience where the phases are experienced as unfolding-towards and 
unfolded-from each other. Two kinds of possibilities are at work in these different experiences. 
In (a) my possibility or project is sensed through and in the background of the straightforward 
 
77 ‘Inserted’ need not here be interpreted as some explicit act; I insert things in this way in virtue of the mere fact 
of existing in a certain way, as being-in-the-world or as a transcendental subject. 
Figure 7 A projection modifies the continuum of percepts 
in such a way as to give rise, through fusion, to the 
straightforward perception. 
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perception (or its object); the possibility of being caffeinated is present through the experience 
of the cup as something to-to-be-drank from. Let us now contrast this with (b) where the 
coming to actuality of each phase also gives me a sense of possibility, but this is clearly not a 
possibility that I have put into the phenomenon but is inherent in the continuum itself. In (b) 
I experience a thingly possibility. Moreover, the ‘insertion’ or ‘projection’ of a project into 
the continuum only has the effect of pushing or directing a process that is already unfolding, 
or trying to unfold, in its own way, in its own direction and in accordance with its own, thingly 
possibilities. To put it differently, the perceptual continuum is itself characterised by the 
(thingly) possibility of supporting a project, of being pushed in a particular direction through 
the insertion of a project. But even if this possibility does not come into being, the continuum 
is already moving in its own direction, in accordance with its own possibilities (although, in 
the natural attitude, we are not explicitly aware of this). In order to disclose the continuum in 
its own possibilities, then, Husserl must have been practicing tuning-out of his projects (which 
would imply a distancing from the uniform straightforward perception itself) and tuning-in to 
the (thingly) possibilities of the continuum itself, as depicted in Figure 8. 
     
 Figure 8 Ordinarily (top), due to the presence of a project the continuum of percepts takes the form of 
mundane or straightforward perception. In order to disclose the continuum as it is, it is necessary to 
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tune-out of the project(s) and to distance oneself from the straightforward perception, and to tune-in to 
the (thingly) possibilities of the continuum itself (bottom). 
 Depending on the phenomenon, thingly possibilities will actualise themselves in 
different ways. In other words, not every phenomenon unfolds-towards (to focus on that 
structure for the moment) its future states in the same manner. I believe that Husserl (ibid. p. 
284) is getting at this point when he writes that the relation between the phases of the 
perceptual continuum “…does not amount to the mere fact of temporal adjunction…” In other 
words, it is not as if the only thing that we can say about the continuum is that the phases that 
make it up succeed and precede each other temporally. Rather, the above sentence continues, 
“…the series of individual acts rather has the character of a phenomenological unity, in which 
the individual acts are fused”. This is a point that I already touched on above: that when a new 
percept comes into actuality, it does so by fusing with the percept from which it is unfolding-
from. This allows us to speak of a synthesis-by-fusion. In this kind of a synthesis, the percepts 
that are coming into being do not alter the intentional object of the percepts from which they 
are unfolding-from. Rather they fuse with their predecessors in such a way as to maintain the 
intentional reference to the object in existence, while enriching the overall quality of the 
experience in a certain manner. It is as if each new percept is feeding the earlier one, and as a 
result of this feeding, the original percept (the one with which this particular continuum began) 
fattens, and through this growth, on a higher level, the straightforward sense perception comes 
to be. 
 It is becoming clear that Husserl was not merely tuning-in to the continuum, finding its 
natural rhythm and allowing the phenomenon to, so to speak, carry him along with it. Having 
tuned-in Husserl was also isolating, comparing and contrasting the unique way in which the 
perceptual continuum brings its possibilities into actuality. This reflective stance is not, I 
believe, a moment of mindfulness (of the feeling of being tuned-in as such). For it is 
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conceivable that one could merely tune-in to the phenomenon without reflecting on and 
isolating its structure in the way that Husserl is doing here. While mindfulness opens up the 
possibility of taking up this reflective perspective, this possibility is not necessary but is rather 
one that must be cultivated. What is in question here, I propose, is nothing other than 
‘vipassanā’, the kind of wisdom practice that, according to the teachings of the Buddha, 
mindfulness makes possible. This practice, according to what we have learnt so far, involves 
isolating the unique way that a phenomenon brings its possibilities into actuality. And that 
often involves contrasting the phenomenon in question with some other phenomenon. Let us 
now take a closer look at how such contrasting works in the context of Husserl’s 
investigations. 
 Earlier I quoted a passage where Husserl speaks of the simple meaning-intention as 
craving fulfilment. It is possible to interpret this in the following way. The meaning-intention, 
in itself, refers to the corresponding intuition as a possibility towards which it is naturally 
unfolding—and if this possibility comes into actuality, it will do so by entering the relation of 
fulfilment with the meaning-intention. Like the perceptual continuum, the meaning intention, 
too, is unfolding-towards something: the corresponding sense intuition, (which makes up the 
terminal point of the same flow or process to which the meaning-intention itself belongs, a 
process that of course does not always live out its full lifespan and which is often cut short by 
some happening or other). Even in his earlier study of the simple meaning-intention, then, 
what Husserl was doing can be described as tuning-in to the possibilities offered by the 
phenomenon itself. But tuning-in was not all that he was doing. He was also isolating the 
possibilities offered by the phenomenon and discerning the manner in which it brings these 
possibilities into being. Formally speaking, we can say that the meaning-intention stands in 
the same relation to the intuition that fulfils it, one of temporal adjunction, as two disjointed 
percepts or phases of the perceptual continuum do. Unlike the percepts of the continuum, 
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however, the meaning-intention does not synthesise with the corresponding intuition by fusing 
with it. Rather, the synthesis between the meaning-intention and the intuition is one of 
fulfilment; the sense intuition illustrates or confirms what the meaning-intention sketched out 
in an empty manner. The important point here is that contrasting the synthesis-by-fulfilment 
with the synthesis-by-fusion as two ways that phenomena bring their possibilities into being 
allows Husserl to bring into explicit awareness the unique phenomenological nature of the 
perceptual continuum. And to do that is to have an insight into what this phenomenon truly is 
and of how it differs from other phenomena. Here, I propose, Husserl was practicing 
vipassanā, the kind of reflective practice that arises only once the phenomenon’s thingly 
possibilities have been disclosed through the feeling of being tuned-in. 
 I hope that at this stage the reader is getting a solid glimpse into the true mechanism at 
work behind the scenes of Husserl’s phenomenological investigations. To get an even clearer 
view, let us now return to the main question of the current investigations: what fulfils the 
complex-meaning intention? Like its simple counterpart, the complex meaning-intention is 
‘craving’ fulfilment. It, too, is unfolding-towards something the synthesis with which would 
fulfil it. What is this ‘something’? To answer this question, Husserl (ibid. p. 286) now takes 
what we can consider as his second meditation object: the fact that something can always 
“…be grasped by us in explicating fashion: acts of articulation can put its parts ‘in relief’, 
relational acts bring the relieved parts into relation, whether to one another or to the whole.” 
Note that because this phenomenon of articulation is directed at some actual object within the 
world, it too represents the mundane form of judgment (the form judgment takes in the natural 
attitude). 
 Tuning-in to this phenomenon, Husserl finds himself in the deep structure of the 
straightforward perception, the perceptual continuum that we have been studying. In the next 
phase of the analysis, Husserl discerns that this continuum contains different possibilities. One 
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such possibility dictates that the continuum will develop into a straightforward perception of 
something. The process may then die off. This possibility can be described as necessary; it is 
always coming into being (as long as the straightforward perception lasts at least).78 Another 
possibility dictates that every partial-percept of a continuum A can be ‘promoted’ into the first 
member of a new continuum B. This is a situation where the partial-percept in question 
becomes a straightforward perception in its own right. This possibility, however, is not 
necessary; the continuum will only develop in this direction if certain conditions are met. 
Where such conditions do obtain, the partial-percept (α) of a perceptual continuum A becomes 
the first member of a new continuum B (represented in Figure 9 by the thick red background 
line—which is meant to signify that the object of α is the intentional object or the main theme 
of continuum B). At the same time as it takes this new role, α continues to perform its old 
function in A: of presenting an implicit part of the object (in figure 9, this role of α is 
represented by the red wavy line, a partial-percept of continuum A).79 Here continuum A can 
be described as splitting into continuum B. While it is necessary, splitting is not sufficient for 
the original straightforward perception to become an act of articulation.80 In addition, A must 
continue to be held-on-to in the background.  And while it is being held-on-to in this way, B 
 
78 Even in the situation where the straightforward perception develops into a categorial intuition, a situation that 
we will now study, the straightforward perception is there as a basis or foundation. 
79 Note that ‘α’ does not here carry the same meaning as it does in the Husserlian text being discussed. 
80 On its own, splitting of a continuum results in a phenomenon where we delve deeper into the object, e.g. we 
go from the experience of the cup to the experience of its handle, and then perhaps from the experience of the 
handle to the fine grained material of which it is made, and then further down. This sounds like a kind of 
concentration. It is revealing, in this connection, that Husserl (ibid. p.287) describes what I am here calling 
‘splitting’ as a ‘narrowing down’ of the total percept to a partial-percept. It would be interesting to investigate 
further whether this is in fact a kind of concentration and, if it is, of how it differs from and relates to the kinds 
of concentrative phenomena discussed in this work.  
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arises, so to speak, within and on top of A. Differently put, here B does not unfold-from A, 
which would imply a temporal disjunction between the two. Rather B both originates-from 
and unfolds-together-with A. Here we do not, so to speak, allow ourselves to fall into the 
object—say from the experience of the cup into the experience of the handle, which would 
involve losing awareness of the cup altogether and becoming aware only of the handle. The 
awareness of the cup (which includes the awareness of the handle as an implicit part) persists 
in the background. And while it does so, a new perceptual awareness arises and directs itself 
at the handle as its explicit intentional object. The presence of α in both A and B brings about 
a coincidence between them, which ensures that A and B do not merely float side by side or 
on top of each other as two distinct sense perceptions. Rather, because of the coincidence, A 
and B enter a relation of foundation through which a novel, ‘founded’ intentional experience 
arises that has as its intentional object the state of affairs that the cup has a handle (or that the 
handle is a part of the cup). This founded intentional experience is the categorial intuition 
(represented in Figure 9 by ). And it is the categorial intuition that, according to 
Husserl’s phenomenological analysis, fulfils the complex meaning-intention. 
 
 
Figure 9 The process where the straightforward perception becomes a categorial intuition.  
 It should be clear from the above that the categorial intuition, like the straightforward 
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perception, is a kind of process.81 It is, in other words, a form that evolves across time in its 
own particular way. While this form arises on the basis of, and presupposes, the 
straightforward perception, it is something different from it. Moreover, the categorial intuition 
is present in the perceptual continuum as a possibility. While, as far as I can see, Husserl does 
not say this explicitly, that this is his view can be straightforwardly inferred from both the 
above analysis and the following statements that he does make. Categorial forms (the 
objective correlates of categorial intuition) Husserl (ibid. p. 288) says, are “…not genuinely 
present in the unarticulated percept … as a straightforward phenomenon, but…are in it only 
as ideal possibilities...”82 Husserl (ibid. p. 286) repeats essentially the same point in reference 
to the sensible object: “A sensible object can be apprehended by us in a variety of ways. It 
can, first of all, be apprehended in ‘straightforward’ fashion. It is this possibility, which like 
all other possibilities here in question must be characterised as ‘ideal’, which characterises the 
sensible object as sensible object”. ‘All other possibilities here in question’ includes the 
possibility of the perceptual continuum becoming a categorial intuition. This means, to repeat 
the point already made, that the categorial intuition is contained in the continuum as an ‘ideal 
 
81  “Categorial constitution is a process, just like the constitution effected in [straightforward] perception” 
(Sokolowski, 1964, p. 68). 
82 Sokolowski (1964, p. 64) comments on this as follows: “It is…misleading to say that a categorial object results 
from the application of a logical form to first-order objects, as though the form existed first and then was placed 
on them. Instead, all we have to begin with are the first-order objects. An operation is carried out on them which 
results in a new, higher-order object…The logical form is like the trace of the operation performed on first-order 
objects; it comes at the end of the process, not at the beginning. It arises in or is constituted by our intentional 
activity” The crucial point that Sokolowski fails to make here is that the possibility of giving rise to the categorial 
form is an intrinsic possibility of the sensuous or straightforward object. So it is not true that “all we have to 
begin with are the first order objects”. Rather the first order objects are given in their possibilities, such as the 
possibility of giving rise to a logical form. 
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possibility’. And it is only a perceptual continuum and not, say, a rock or a wish that is 
characterised by this possibility. It should be clear that what Husserl is here calling ‘ideal 
possibilities’ overlaps closely with what I have been calling ‘thingly possibilities’. Husserl’s 
phenomenological investigations, then, involve listening to and isolating thingly possibilities 
and discerning the unique way that the phenomenon brings these possibilities into being. To 
listen in to the possibilities of phenomena in this way is just a description of tuning-in. But 
how could one tune-in and listen that way unless one tuned-out of the possibilities that have 
been imposed on the phenomenon and that prevent one from hearing what the phenomenon 
itself is trying to say? 
 
ii. THE SPIRITUAL PRACTICE OF ÃCARIYA MAHA BOOWA 
 I tried to show in the last section that phenomenological investigations involve the 
practice of tuning-out-tuning-in, and on the basis of having tuned-in, the nurturing of a kind 
of reflection that allows the manner in which the phenomenon brings its possibilities into 
being, to be brought into explicit awareness. While in Husserl’s work we fail to find explicit 
reflections on the nature of the ‘instruments’ (such as mindfulness) that make such work 
possible—what we do find therein are the concrete results that signify (for the one who knows 
what to lookout for) their inconspicuous background presence. This state of affairs contrasts 
sharply with the one that we find in the records left behind by a practitioner from whom we 
are going to attempt to learn from next: a meditation master from the Thai Forest Tradition of 
Buddhism: Ãcariya Maha Boowa. The text that we will be studying ‘Arahattamagga 
Arahattapalla: The path to Arahantship’, can be described as Boowa’s spiritual biography. It 
contains a quite detailed description of the path of practice Boowa walked towards the final 
goal of Buddhism (a goal that he is widely believed to have attained). The focus here will 
primarily be on the ‘second part of the book’, spanning from pages 17 to 32, where the practice 
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of insight is described in quite some detail, and which gives a strong impression of the 
phenomenological nature of ātāpi: the kind of effort that is constitutive of tuning-out-tuning-
in. 
 I will begin with the note that the text in question is not concerned with formulating 
precise definitions of such terms as ‘mindfulness’ and ‘concentration’ (or their Pali or Thai 
equivalents), nor is its aim to offer careful descriptions of the phenomena at which these terms 
point. And this is only to be expected. For the text is not a scholarly work. It was compiled 
from a collection of discourses that Boowa delivered to a mixed audience of monks and lay 
Buddhist followers, on the theme of “his own path and practice”. Its primary objectives (which 
in my view it accomplishes remarkably well) are: to motivate the audience to take up the 
actual practice, to install danger signs at places where the practitioner is likely to encounter 
obstacles, and to give some impression of the actual fruits that the path can yield. For better 
or for worse, a philosophical work such as the current one cannot rest content with this but 
must strive for clarity, both regarding the terms being used and the phenomena being referred 
to by those terms. This will involve seeing Boowa’s practice from the perspective of our 
framework (and seeing our framework from the perspective of his practice). And the hope is 
that through this dialogue further light will be shed on both. 
 Three instruments play a key role in Boowa’s description of his practice: mindfulness, 
concentration and insight (wisdom). Mindfulness and concentration—and Boowa’s account 
of the struggle that he went through in trying to gain mastery over them—are described in the 
first part of the text.  The practice of insight (what it involves and of how it relates to 
mindfulness and concentration) is described in the second. The following discussion proceeds 
roughly in that order.  
 The first task will be to align Boowa’s description of mindfulness and concentration 





83 This term appears to be used in different ways by different Buddhist schools (even within Theravada 
Buddhism). In his translation of the Abhidhammattha Sangha, Bodhi (2012, p. 27) writes that “[t]he Pali term 
citta is derived from the verbal root citi, to cognize, to know” and he translates the term as ‘consciousness’ or 
‘mind’: “…the principal element of experience, that which constitutes the knowing or awareness of an object”. 
For Bodhi (ibid. pp. 27-29) consciousness seems to mean the transient episodes of awareness that are constantly 
arising and ceasing “…citta is nothing other than the act of cognizing, and that act is necessarily impermanent, 
marked by rise and fall” (ibid.). In the Thai Forest Tradition to which Boowa belongs, however, the term appears 
to be used in a different way and, there, the distinction is often made between these transient experiences and the 
underlying, stable awareness (citta) that knows them. Another master from this tradition (a student of Boowa’s), 
Venerable Paññāvaḍḍho (2014, pp. 245-246) writes that the masters of… 
 
…The Thai Forest Tradition have always placed a special emphasis on what they call “the one who 
knows”. In doing so they make a fundamental distinction between two different aspects of the mind: 
the unchanging knower, and the fluctuating states of mind that are known. Because we fail to 
understand the difference, we take transient mental states to be real, to be the mind itself. In fact, 
they’re just changing conditions that never remain stable from one moment to the next. The knowing 
essence of the mind [citta]—the one who knows—is the only stable reality. 
 
Paññāvaḍḍho goes on to say that the term is better left untranslated:  
The Pali word “citta” is often used when referring to “the one who knows”. The word citta itself is 
very difficult to translate. When discussing the nature of the citta, language has its limitations. 
Attempts at translating a word like citta into English always leads to misunderstanding because no 
comparable English equivalent exists which encompasses all aspects of its true meaning. In fact, the 
true nature of the citta cannot be expressed in words or concepts. Concepts such as mind, soul or spirit 
all miss the point…the citta is completely unlimited. Because it encompasses everything, the citta has 
no boundaries by which to delineate it. 
 
224 
…gathers all of its outflowing currents into one point, this is known as citta ‘converging’. The 
practice of samādhi meditation is a method for concentrating all of these diverse currents into 
one focal point, thus centering the citta into a condition of complete stillness and calm (Boowa, 
2012, p. 108). 
 
‘Converging’ and ‘narrowing’, I propose, are alternative but complementary ways of 
describing concentration or samādhi. Allow me to expand upon this. To speak of the primary 
open horizon as being constituted by a multiplicity of sub-horizons is to speak from the 
perspective of the vividly presented phenomenon itself. It is to be saying something like: this 
coarse-grained reality is made up of subtler realities. Narrowing, then, is the event where the 
coarse-grained reality transforms into a subtler reality, and it brings samādhi into view from 
the perspective of the vividly presented phenomenon.  Now, the division of the coarse-grained 
phenomenon into subtler phenomena is mirrored in the dispersion of open awareness itself 
into subtler streams of awareness. This situation is comparable to the correspondence between 
the implicit parts of the perceived object and the partial-percepts of a straightforward 
perception that was described in the last section (but keep in mind that the relation between 
open awareness and the vividly presented phenomenon is not a intentional relation). In 
speaking of the mind’s ‘outflowing’ or ‘diverse currents’, I believe that Boowa is pointing at 
these dispersed rays of open awareness itself. And just as the vividly presented phenomenon 
is characterised by the possibility of being narrowed down to one of its constitutive parts, so 
open awareness is characterised by the possibility of “concentrating these diverse currents into 
one focal point”. ‘Converging’, therefore, brings samādhi into view from the perspective of 
open awareness itself. 
 This will help make sense of the difference between that which Boowa calls ‘continuous 
samādhi’ and ‘meditative calm’, which is described in the following passage: 
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…a fundamental difference exists between a state of meditative calm and the samādhi state. 
When the mind converges and drops into a calm, concentrated state to remain for a period of 
time before withdrawing to normal consciousness, this is known as meditative calm. The calm 
and concentration are temporary conditions that last while the mind remains fixated in that 
peaceful state. As normal consciousness returns, these extraordinary conditions gradually 
dissipate. However, as the meditator becomes more adept at this practice—entering into and 
withdrawing from a calm, unified state over and over again—the mind begins to build a solid 
inner foundation. When this foundation becomes unshakable in all circumstances, the mind is 
known to be in a state of continuous samādhi. Then, even when the mind withdrawals from 
meditative calm it still feels solid and compact, as though nothing can disturb its inward focus 
(ibid. p. 17). 
 
It should be clear that ‘meditative calm’ stands for samādhi. It is not as straightforward, 
however, to make sense of what ‘samādhi’ means in the context of the expression ‘continuous 
samādhi’. It cannot mean narrowing of the open horizon (to resort to that way of looking at 
samādhi for the moment). For in describing this state as ‘continuous’ and as being present in 
‘all circumstances’, Boowa is pointing towards something that is compatible with the 
existence of the multiplicities of phenomena that constitute ‘normal’ life. But in samādhi this 
multiplicity disappears as awareness withdraws into subtler and subtler realities. If continuous 
samādhi is not concentration, what is it? The last sentence of the above passage points the 
way towards an answer. Continuous samādhi, according to Boowa, arises from and upon the 
withdrawal from samādhi (meditative calm). ‘Withdrawing’, I propose, corresponds to what 
I earlier called ‘broadening’: the event where the secondary primary horizon reverts to its sub-
horizon status reestablishing the awareness of the primary open horizon (see: Part II, Chapter 
II, Section iv.). In other words, withdrawal is the return from samādhi to ‘bare’, unmodified 
mindfulness. This means that ‘continuous samādhi’ really means continuous mindfulness: the 
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state where the feeling of being tuned-in has become one’s default state of mind. A mind with 
continuous mindfulness is… 
…always even and unperturbed. It feels completely satisfied. Because of the very compact 
and concentrated sense of inner unity, everyday thoughts and emotions no longer make an 
impact…Completely peaceful and contented within itself, nothing is felt to be lacking (ibid. 
p. 17) 
In an apparent conflict with this interpretation, however, the following passage describes 
continuous samādhi as…  
…an intense state of focused awareness, assuming a life on its own, independent of any 
meditative technique. Fully calm and unified, the knowing presence itself became the sole 
focus of attention, a condition of mind so prominent and powerful that nothing else can arise 
to dislodge it. This is known as the mind being in a state of continuous samādhi. In other 
words, the citta is samādhi—both are one and the same thing (ibid.). 
Does this description of continuous samādhi as an ‘intense state of focused awareness’ not 
suggest that what is being referred to here is concentration after all? To deal with this question, 
the reader is asked to recall the difference between samādhi in the sense of momentary 
concentration (khanika samādhi), and samādhi in the proper sense of the term. Unlike the 
latter (which arises from the narrowing down of the open horizon), momentary concentration 
is intrinsic to mindfulness; it arises from the ‘narrowing’ of the transcendental to the open 
horizon. If ‘continuous samādhi’ is taken to mean continuous momentary concentration, then 
(in agreement with the above proposal) the expression refers to continuous mindfulness as 
seen from the perspective of its concentration aspect. And I propose that is how the expression 
should be interpreted. Here it is essential not to underestimate just how unified and focused a 
mind with momentary concentration really is. Relative to the ordinary mind (dispersed as it is 
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throughout all sorts of projects and worldly concerns) the mindful mind (the mind with 
momentary concentration) is indeed calm, unified and intensely focused. It is only relative to 
‘samādhi’ in the proper sense, that such adjectives may appear as inappropriate when applied 
to it. 
  This suggests that the practice of samādhi—“entering into and withdrawing from a 
calm, unified state over and over again”—can yield the state of continuous mindfulness. Does 
this not imply that mindfulness is dependent on concentration? And is that not in opposition 
to our account, according to which concentration is dependent on, and arises from within, 
mindfulness (the possibility of narrowing the open horizon opens up only once one has first 
tuned-in to it)? The conflict is only apparent. In certain cases, it can appear as if concentration 
is developed first and that mindfulness arises consequentially. This happens in the case of the 
practitioner who cultivates the possibility of narrowing—without first developing the feeling 
of being tuned-in independently, for its own sake. In the experience of such a practitioner, 
mindfulness and concentration may even be indistinguishable. Until and unless, that is, the 
practitioner reaches the point in the practice where samādhi drops off, (i.e. the practitioner 
withdraws from samādhi) while the feeling of being tuned-in (and the associated momentary 
concentration) remains as a continuous state of mind. In other words, the cultivation of 
samādhi is at the same time the cultivation of mindfulness, even if the practitioner is not 
explicitly conscious of this fact. This can be described as the practice of ‘indirectly cultivating’ 
mindfulness. This is comparable to the following situation. Suppose, if only for argument’s 
sake, that the feeling of anger presupposes the feeling of being hurt: whenever I am angry with 
someone, I have also been hurt in some way (either by the person at whom I am angry or by 
someone else). Consequently, whenever I allow anger to arise and grow in my mind I am at 
the same time allowing the underlying feeling of hurt to grow and increase. But I may not be 
explicitly aware that anger is dependent on the feeling of being hurt (the two may be 
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indistinguishable in my experience), and that the increase in the former leads to an increase 
of the latter. Nevertheless, whenever I ‘cultivate’ anger I am at the same time (indirectly) 
‘cultivating’ the feeling of being hurt, and it is possible that, after the anger disappears, the 
feeling of being hurt remains as my default mood. Likewise, even if concentration is 
dependent on and can only arise from within mindfulness (as the preceding chapter tried to 
show), it is still possible to cultivate concentration without directly cultivating (or even being 
explicitly aware of the presence of) mindfulness. This very well may be the path that Boowa 
himself took. This would explain why he emphasises the concentrative dimension of 
mindfulness instead of the other ways of seeing the phenomenon. 
 Not only is mastery of mindfulness and concentration not the ultimate goal of the 
Buddhist path, there is even a danger of becoming the victim of one’s success in these 
practices. The bliss and tranquility of these states may so enthrall the practitioner that he or 
she drops the motivation to develop further towards insight or wisdom. On this, Boowa (p. 
18) writes: 
… with samādhi as its habitual condition, the mind feels no desire to think about anything. It 
views thoughts as an unwanted disturbance…the citta is so inwardly concentrated that it 
tolerates no disturbances. Because of this sublime tranquility—and the tendency of samādhi 
to lull the mind into this state of serene satisfaction—those whose minds have attained 
continuous samādhi tend to become strongly attached to it. 
A little later in the text, Boowa (p. 32) retells his own experience of getting ‘stuck’ in this 
way: 
The problem is that samãdhi is so peaceful and satisfying that the meditator inadvertently 
becomes addicted to it. This happened to me: for five years I was addicted to the tranquility 
of samādhi; so much so that I came to believe that this very tranquility was the essence of 
Nibbãna. Only when my teacher, Ãcariya Mun, forced me to confront this misconception, was 
229 
I able to move on to the practice of wisdom.  
For us, too, the time is right to move towards the theme of insight and wisdom. As a first step 
in that direction, it is necessary to bring into view Boowa’s subject matter on which he will 
practice insight (vipassanā). The second part of the text describes, in Boowa’s (p. 31) own 
words, “…the path for those who are practicing meditation so as to penetrate to the truth of 
the khandhas [aggregates], using painful feelings as the primary focus”. For our purposes, 
however, it is not sufficient to know merely that painful feelings are the subject matter. It is 
also necessary to understand how they came to be so. How, in other words, does the pain 
‘announce’ itself as a theme of insight? The following passage describes the moment the pain 
appears in Boowa’s awareness: 
 
While sitting one night I started focusing inward as usual. Because it had already developed a 
good, strong foundation, the citta easily entered into samãdhi. So long as the citta rested there 
calmly, it remained unaware of external bodily feelings. But when I withdrew from samãdhi 
many hours later I began to experience them in full. Eventually, my body was so racked by 
severe pain that I could hardly cope. The citta was suddenly unnerved, and its good, strong 
foundation completely collapsed. The entire body was filled with such excruciating pain that 
it quivered all over (ibid. p. 18). 
 
 The first task is to align the main points with our framework. While practicing 
meditation one night, Boowa narrowed down the open horizon to such an extent that the sub-
horizon of pain completely vanished from his awareness; he “entered into samādhi [and while 
in that state] remained unaware of external bodily feelings”. Many hours later, Boowa 
withdrew from samādhi. This means: through broadening, the primary open horizon was 
reestablished in his awareness. As at this stage of his spiritual development Boowa had 
reached the state of continuous mindfulness—upon withdrawing from samādhi he did not 
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return to the ordinary way of relating to the world (mindlessly pursuing projects) but instead 
remained established in the feeling of being tuned-in. It is at this point that the pain appears. 
This means that Boowa’s initial encounter with the pain takes place from within the open 
perspective—implying that he is going through the ‘excruciating pain’ at the same time as he 
is experiencing the calm and equanimity that is intrinsic to the feeling of being tuned-in. The 
following passage seems to support this interpretation: 
 
Although the bodily pain was obviously very strong, I could see that the citta was calm and 
unafflicted. No matter how much discomfort the body suffered, the citta was not distressed or 
agitated. This intrigued me. Normally the kilesas [mental defilements] join forces with pain, 
and this alliance causes the citta to be disturbed by the body’s suffering (ibid. p. 20). 
 
But how to harmonise this with the statement (quoted above), that with the appearance of the 
pain his mind was “…suddenly unnerved, and its good, strong foundation completely 
collapsed”? Moreover, the following description makes it quite clear that in an important sense 
Boowa continues to identify with the pain:  
 
The pain began as hot flashes along the backs of my hands and feet, but that was really quite 
mild. When it arose in full force, the entire body was ablaze with pain. All the bones, and the 
joints connecting them, were like fuel feeding the fire that engulfed the body. It felt as though 
every bone in my body was breaking apart; as though my neck would snap and my head drop 
to the floor. When all parts of the body hurt at once, the pain is so intense that one doesn’t 
know how to begin stemming the tide long enough just to breathe (ibid. p. 19). 
 
There is a tension here. On the one hand, Boowa is openly aware and tuned-in to the pain—
he does not identify with it but allows it to unfold in accordance with its own possibilities. On 
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the other hand, he continues to experience the pain as an aspect of his psycho-physical identity, 
as something happening to and within himself. Two notions will play a key role in dissolving, 
or at least lessening, the tension: thematisation and the practice of tuning-out-tuning-in.  
 Thematisation (which precedes the practice of tuning-out-tuning-in) is the event where 
one’s projects—which were previously mindlessly pursued through external action— appear 
explicitly or thematically as contents of internal acts: such as thoughts, expectations and 
images (see: Part I, Chapter II, section iii.). In a slightly different form, thematisation 
continues to play a role in the practice even after mindfulness has been established, as I will 
now explain. The feeling of being tuned-in to thingly possibilities is at the same time the 
feeling of being tuned-out of one’s projects. But this is only a temporary freedom, where the 
projects retreat into a kind of dormancy. What can happen from here is that—with mindfulness 
established—a dormant project stirs into life: it arises thematically before the mind tempting 
the practitioner into becoming mindlessly absorbed in it. In Boowa’s case, this is the project 
of avoiding the pain:  
 
The desire to get rid of pain is a kilesa [mental defilement] that increases the level of 
discomfort by turning physical feeling [read: vividly presented pain] into emotional suffering. 
The stronger the pain is, the stronger the desire to rid oneself of it becomes, which leads to 
greater emotional distress (ibid. p. 29). 
 
This is what I think is happening here. For a few moments, Boowa is tuned-in to the 
possibilities of the pain itself. But with the thematisation of the project of avoiding the pain, 
the vividly presented pain transforms into pain to-be-avoided. This transformation throws 
Boowa out of the open perspective into the natural perspective.84 From here, his task is to 
 
84 Or it could be the transcendental. But for the sake of simplicity here I will focus on the natural. 
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tune-in to the pain again, and so on. Here Boowa finds himself in that meta-stable place, which 
the last chapter compared to the boundary that exists between a nightmare and wakefulness. 
And it is here that it is necessary to engage in the practice of tuning-out-tuning-in. But the 
following should be noted. In the cultivation of mindfulness, the practitioner is standing in the 
natural perspective and is attempting to tune-in to the open perspective. But here Boowa is 
already established in the open perspective and the role of tuning-out-tuning-in is to preserve 
and protect what has already been won. Nevertheless, the kind of effort that this practice calls 




 From what we know up to this point, ātāpi is a constitutive moment of tuning-out-
tuning-in; it can be conceived as a kind of force that lives in the space represented by the 
middle ‘-’. The last chapter showed that this is not the kind of effort that goes into the 
realisation of a project. But there the question was left open: what is ātāpi in positive terms? 
And how does it differ from that which is usually called ‘effort’? The discussion has brought 
us to a place where these questions can be addressed more thoroughly. To make a start, 
consider the following way of describing Boowa’s initial encounter with the pain. At first, he 
has the pain in view; he is mindful and tuned-in to it. With the thematisation of the project to 
get rid of it, the vividly presented pain withdraws from his awareness. Having ‘lost’ the pain 
in this way, his task is to bring it into view again. And for a while he succeeds. But before 
long the pain withdraws again, and so on. Ātāpi is the effort that goes into keeping the 
meditation object in view in this way, of preventing it from withdrawing. I think that most 
meditators will see in this a fair description of their practice. Underneath this apparently 
straightforward description, however, some profound things are going on. 
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 To show this, it will help to contrast the situation that the meditator finds himself in 
here, with that of the ornithologist. The ornithologist is trying to keep track of a bird that 
cannot stop fretting about—which rests still for a few moments before suddenly flittering 
away in a flash, frustrating the observer’s attempts to keep it in view. One moment the bird is 
there, in the purview of the binoculars. In the next, it ‘withdraws’ and is lost from sight. On 
the surface, the meditator’s relation to his meditation object (in the context of tuning-out-
tuning-in) appears to share a similar structure with the relation that obtains between the 
ornithologist and the bird. But note the following difference. In the latter case, the loss of the 
subject matter leaves the observer (and the instruments) intrinsically unaltered. When the bird 
disappears from sight, both the scientist and her binoculars remain intrinsically what they were 
before. It would be absurd to say that the disappearance of the bird altered the observer in any 
way other than removing the relational properties that obtained between them. The case is 
quite different in the case of the meditator. Here the loss or withdrawal of the subject matter 
implies an intrinsic modification of the observer. Let us look closer.  
 What does it mean to ‘lose’ the pain, for it to withdraw? It means that one is no longer 
conscious of the pain as it is, the pain no longer appears as vividly present and in the light of 
its own (thingly) possibilities. Rather, the pain now appears in the light of one’s own 
possibilities, such as the project of realising a pain-free state. Projecting a possibility of ours 
into its unfolding-towards structure transforms the vividly presented pain in a manner 
comparable to the way that a projection modifies the perceptual continuum into a 
straightforward perception (see: the last section, especially Figure 7.) Here I will only mention 
a couple of characteristics of this transformation, leaving a more detailed treatment for another 
occasion. Firstly, what were previously distinct and differentiated instances of pain now 
become merged in such a way that, on a higher level, something that I will call ‘psychical 
pain’ appears. Psychical pain is a relatively uniform and persistent structure. It is experienced 
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as an actual state of my actual body, itself apprehended as an actual dimension of my psycho-
physical self. To put it differently, the projection brings about a shift from the open to the 
natural perspective. Second, this psychical pain is characterised by the instrumental meaning 
to-be-overcome. And to respond to this instrumental solicitation—which means nothing else 
than becoming mindlessly absorbed in the project of avoiding the pain—is for the pain to 
withdraw, for it to be ‘lost from sight’. It is at this point that the vividly presented pain becomes 
suffering:   
 
…when you believe that you are your body, and your body hurts, then you are in pain. Being 
equated, body, pain and the awareness that perceives them then converge into one: your painful 
body (ibid. p. 25) 
 
As I said, the thematised project is the catalyst of this transformation. And this project is itself 
a manifestation of delusion (avijja). As Boowa (ibid. p. 22) writes... 
 
…pain, body and citta are all distinctly separate phenomena. But because of a single mental 
defilement—delusion—they all converge into one. Delusion pervades the citta like an 
insidious poison, contaminating our perceptions and distorting the truth. Pain is simply a 
natural phenomenon that occurs on its own. But when we grab hold of it as a burning 
discomfort, it immediately becomes hot—because our defining it in that way makes it hot.  
 
The key point here is the following one. The transformation or withdrawal of the vividly 
presented pain, is at the same time the transformation of open awareness (in front of which 
the pain was allowed to be what it is). In other words, the ‘loss’ of the subject matter is at the 
same time the loss of the observer. It is not as if, to describe the alternative situation, the pain 
simply disappears or withdraws from open awareness, leaving the latter as it is (which is the 
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situation of the ornithologist when she loses track of the bird).85 This opens up a new way of 
understanding the practice of tuning-out-tuning-in, and the kind of effort that this practice 
calls for. 
 Turning back to Boowa’s description, tuning-out-tuning-in can be described as the 
practice preventing the pain from becoming “…bound up with one’s sense of being”, of not 
allowing oneself to become “entangled in [the pain]” (ibid. p. 29). This is the practice of not 
allowing oneself to interpret:  
 
…the pain in personal terms, as an inseparable part of who you are, for that runs counter to 
the pain’s true nature. It also undermined the techniques used to investigate the pain, 
preventing wisdom from knowing the reality of feelings (ibid. 27).   
 
Here ‘entanglement’ can be defined as the event where open awareness (instead of simply 
allowing the phenomenon to be what it is) incorporates the phenomenon into its own identity.86 
This has the effect of transforming open awareness into psycho-physical awareness. The 
practice of tuning-out-tuning-in can therefore be described as the practice of transforming 
one’s very mode of being or way of existing. Here one goes from the human mode of existence 
(which is characterised by psycho-physical self awareness, and wherein the phenomena are 
either incorporated as something ‘internal’ or they are pushed out as something ‘external’ to 
this self), to a mode of being that allows the phenomena to be what it is. This allows the 
 
85 Of course, the pain can be lost in the sense of ceasing, in which case open awareness can remain unaltered. 
But the cessation of the pain is something different from its withdrawal from open awareness.  
86 Besides ‘entanglement’, Boowa speaks of this process as a ‘converging’ (not to be confused with the 
‘converging’ of samādhi) ‘merging’, ‘lumping’ and a ‘binding’ together of (to put it in our own terms) the vividly 
presented phenomena with the open awareness. 
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difference between ātāpi, and what is usually called ‘effort’, to come into a sharper focus. 
That which is usually called ‘effort’ is the expenditure of energy required to transform an 
unrealised into a realised project. This is a transformation within the human mode of being, 
and the effort that this transformation calls for is the effort to transform the human being from 
one mode or state into another. By contrast, ātāpi is the effort called for in order to bring about 
a transformation from the human mode of being to a different mode of being that is 
characterised by open awareness and thingly possibilities. Or, conversely, ātāpi can also be 
described as the effort required to prevent open awareness from transforming into psycho-
physical awareness. 
 Earlier I suggested that the practice of cultivating mindfulness should not be conceived 
as a kind of attention training (Part I, Chapter III, Section iv.). To train attention is to attempt 
to take control of reality in a particular way (my attention is like this, but I want it to be like 
that). The above discussion gives us even more reasons to look at things in this way. Any 
attempt to control a phenomenon (in the fundamental sense of inserting a project into its open 
horizon), will have the effect of transforming open awareness itself into psycho-physical 
awareness. As soon as you attempt to control something, you lose yourself. But the ‘purpose’ 
of tuning-out-tuning-in is precisely to prevent such a transformation, and this implies that such 
a practice is incompatible with the will-to-control. Ātāpi is much more like the ‘effort’ that 
goes into trusting something or someone. To assume the opposite attitude is to be saying to 
one’s meditation subject: “I do not trust you! I cannot allow you to be what you are! I must 
jump in to the drama and tell you what to do and what you should become, even if the price 
that I have to pay for that is the price of becoming something other than what I actually am 
(the open awareness that allows things to be what they are)”. To practice tuning-in-tuning-out 
is to practice letting go of the habit of speaking to things in this way.  
 I am not going to sit here and pretend that the above is the final word on the matter. 
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Indeed, it is no more than a start. But, alas, it is a start nevertheless. To end this discussion of 
ātāpi, I will leave the reader with a couple of analogies that may help bring this phenomenon 
into a sharper focus. 
 Perhaps the closest parallel to the above situation (that the natural attitude has to offer) 
is found in an experience that one can have when looking at oneself in the mirror (here it may 
help to imagine one of those unusual mirrors that stretch and warp the reflection in all sorts of 
ways). Imagine that you are looking into a mirror, but instead of apprehending what you see 
as a reflection of yourself, you are aware of it as a mosaic of colours and shapes. Here there is 
a clear sense of the difference between the observed and the observer. This stance is not easy 
to maintain, however. Soon enough, you will apprehend the mosaic as yourself. And with that 
transformation, the sharp line that previously existed between the observer and the observed 
is obliterated. But here you can engage in the following kind of practice. Once you begin to 
appear in the mirror, gently distance yourself from yourself and try to apprehend the mosaic 
of colours and shapes as they are. You may succeed for a while, but soon enough, you will be 
pulled in again. This is comparable to the practice of tuning-out-tuning-in. To allow the pain 
to unfold as it is, is like being aware of the mosaic. To become entangled with the pain is like 
apprehending the mosaic as yourself. 
 The second analogy resorts back to the dream. Suppose that some pain appears while 
you are in a lucid dream. Being lucid you can come to the understanding that this pain is just 
another manifestation within the mind that is dreaming the dream; that the pain is no more to 
be identified with than anything else in the dream. You can at least imagine standing back 
from the pain and allowing it to be what it is. But, suddenly, you lose the lucid perspective 
and become immersed in the dream. At that moment you become completely bound up with 
the pain, which you apprehend as something happening to your dream character. Imagine now 
that you are not completely drawn in to the dreaming perspective. You still feel the possibility 
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of entering the lucid perspective. Latching onto this possibility, you reenter the lucid 
perspective once more and see the pain as something outside of you. But, soon enough, you 
are drawn in again… Consider the kind of effort required to maintain yourself in the lucid 
perspective, to resist the tendency to build a self-identity around the pain. This is clearly not 
like the effort that goes into changing the dream world in any way; of realising some project 





 Success in tuning-out-tuning-in stabilises the open perspective. One is now tuned-in. 
But that only brings about a temporary freedom from desires and discontent, and in particular 
from the project of escaping the pain (by realising a pain-free state). At any point, the dormant 
project may stir into life again. In order to become permanently free of this project (to cut it 
off at the root) it is necessary to develop the feeling of being tuned-in in the direction of insight 
(vipassanā). In other words, it is necessary to see the truth of the pain, what it really is—for 
that is the only way that the mind will let go of the tendency to identify with it. What is the 
nature of the practice that makes such an insight possible? And how does it arise from within 
the feeling of being tuned-in? What role, if any, does concentration play in this? These are 
some of the questions that the following continuation of our dialogue with Boowa will concern 
 
87 Here it is instructive to contrast this situation (where one is switching back and forth between the lucid and the 
dreaming perspective) with the one where the dream character tries to focus on the pain by controlling his or her 
attention. In the later situation, the pain is apprehended as something within the dream towards which the dream 
character turns and which it tries to keep in view. But this is obviously something very different from the practice 
of entering the lucid perspective, removing the dream character and allowing the pain to be what it is. 
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itself with. 
 In order to develop mindfulness into insight, according to Boowa, the meditator should 
not “…avoid the pain by focusing…attention elsewhere” and should “…resist any temptation 
to wish for the pain to go away” (ibid. p.26). The disappearance of the pain (if it comes) will 
arise as a consequence of insight. But it should not be posited as the goal of the practice: 
…the neutralization of pain is merely a by-product of the clear understanding of the principle 
of truth. It cannot be taken as the primary objective. That will only create the conditions for 
greater emotional stress when the relief one wishes for fails to materialize (ibid.). 
With the vividly presented pain in view, the meditator should avoid “…concentrating single-
mindedly on pain to the exclusion of [other phenomena]…” (ibid. 27). Instead, the task is to 
“…[f]ocus directly on painful feelings when they arise and strive to understand their true 
nature” (ibid.). But is there not a tension here? What is the difference between ‘concentrating 
single-mindedly’ and ‘focusing directly’?  
 Here I will outline two possible interpretations of what ‘focusing directly’ may mean. 
The first interpretation resorts to the idea of mindful attention—the form that attention takes 
within the feeling of being tuned-in. With the primary open horizon in view, the possibility 
exists of foregrounding one of its sub-horizons, which will have the effect of pushing the other 
sub-horizons into the background of the primary open horizon. This is a form of attention that 
can only arise within the feeling of being tuned-in (the disclosure of the open horizon). 
Mindful attention (as the function of foregrounding vividly presented phenomena) is therefore 
something quite different from ordinary attention (which foregrounds actual objects). Mindful 
attention also differs from concentration. The latter narrows down the primary horizon to a 
sub-horizon and this has the effect of removing the other sub-horizons from awareness 
altogether. Mindful attention, by contrast, only highlights or foregrounds a sub-horizon—
while keeping both the primary horizon and the other sub-horizons in the background of 
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awareness (from where they can be foregrounded at any point). According to the first 
interpretation of ‘focusing directly’, then, this expression designates the foregrounding of a 
sub-horizon within the primary open horizon. 
 According to the other possible interpretation of ‘focusing directly’, the development of 
mindfulness into insight does involve the narrowing of the primary horizon to one of its sub-
horizons—here the sub-horizon of pain. But this narrowing cannot go so far as to remove the 
possibility of broadening from awareness altogether. In contrast to this, ‘focusing single-
mindedly’ (which is what the meditator should not do), designates the situation where the 
narrowing is developed to such an extent that the possibility of broadening disappears from 
awareness.88 Focusing single-mindedly is what the meditator should not do because (as we are 
about to see) the practice of insight requires that the meditator is able to zoom in and out of 
the sub-horizons in order to contrast and compare them. 
 It seems to me that both interpretations of ‘focusing directly’ allow for the possibility of 
zooming in and out (albeit in different ways). According to the passage below, however, 
samādhi is not essential to insight practice but only a kind of a complement to it. This suggests 
that by ‘focusing directly’ Boowa was probably referring to the foregrounding function of 
mindful attention: 
When fatigue sets in, experienced meditators know instinctively that the time is right to rest 
the mind in samādhi. So they drop all aspects of the investigation and concentrate solely on 
one object. Totally unburdening themselves, they enter into the cool, composed, rejuvenating 
peace of samādhi. In this way samādhi is a separate practice altogether. No thoughts of any 
kind infringe upon the citta’s essential knowing nature while it rests peacefully with single-
 
88 Boowa (ibid. p. 36) suggest that when the mind converges deep into samādhi, broadening (withdrawing) 
cannot be brought about intentionally but occurs passively “[o]nce the mind is satiated with samādhi, it 
withdraws on its own…” 
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minded concentration. With the citta absorbed in total stillness, the body and the external 
world temporarily disappear from awareness. Once the citta is satiated, it withdraws to normal 
consciousness on its own. Like a person who eats a full meal and takes a good rest, mindfulness 
and wisdom are refreshed and ready to return to the work with renewed energy. Then, with 
purposeful resolve, the practice of samādhi is put aside and the practice of wisdom re-
established. In this way, samādhi is an outstanding complement to wisdom (ibid. pp. 39-40) 
 Mindful attention will play a crucial role in the following description of how the feeling 
of being tuned-in develops into the practice of insight (vipassanā). In order to set the stage, it 
is important to keep in mind that, in this phase of the practice, Boowa is trying to achieve 
insight into the difference between pain (vedanā), materiality (rūpa), and awareness (citta). 
For the sake of simplicity, I will here focus on the path of insight that leads to direct knowledge 
of the difference between pain and materiality. According to my interpretation, the 
development of mindfulness into vipassanā proceeds in three phases, which are represented 
in Figure 10. Keep in mind that this practice presupposes that the practitioner is established 





Figure 10 A representation of the steps involved in the development of mindfulness into vipassanā. 
In phase 1, the task is to: 
 
…[f]ocus clearly…and don’t allow your [mindful attention] to wonder from the specific point 
you are investigating. Keep it firmly fixed on one aspect. For instance, focus your full 
[mindful] attention on the pain and analyze it until you understand its distinguishing 
characteristics… (ibid. 27). 
 
Phase 1 can be divided into three steps. The first involves foregrounding the sub-horizon of 
pain (represented in Figure 10 as the green sub-horizon A). This will involve ‘flowing’ with 
the pain’s natural rhythm—the meditator should “sweep through the areas that hurt and then 
whirl around the most intense ones” (ibid. p. 20). The reason that the meditator is instructed 
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to whirl around the intense pain, I propose, is because those areas are likely to reawaken the 
project of escaping the pain, thereby throwing the meditator out of the open perspective. 
Having become intimate with the natural flow of the pain in this way, the second step of phase 
1 involves isolating the ‘distinguishing characteristics’ of the pain. This, I propose, involves 
explicating the unique way that pain brings its possibilities into being, the unique way in which 
the different phases of the pain unfold-towards, unfold-from, unfold-together-with each other 
(this is represented in Figure 10 under step 2 with the line with arrows at each end). In the 
third and final step of phase 1, the task is to de-focus (another function of mindful attention) 
back into the primary open horizon (and bring all the sub-horizons into view).  
 From here, phase 2 begins. The task now is to “…turn to look at the citta [or materiality] 
and strive to know its true nature directly” (ibid.). The second and third steps of phase 2 are 
the same as those of phase 1, except that the meditator is now working with a different 
phenomenon. In the case at hand, the meditator now foregrounds the material aspect of the 
phenomenon, say the material aspect of the knee that is in pain (represented in Figure 10 by 
the yellow sub-horizon C). In the next step, the task is to discern the way that materiality 
unfolds its possibility. In this way the meditator’s work is to  “separate out and isolate each 
aspect”, “…always working to separate the feeling from the body”, “[h]aving observed the 
body, [mindfulness and vipassanā] quickly shifted their attention to the pain…” (ibid. p. 20).  
This suggests that the movement from phase 1 to phase 2 is not linear but involves a back-
and-forth movement: the meditator investigates the pain, shifts to materiality, investigates it 
for some time before shifting mindful attention back to the pain again and so on. And in this 
way the meditator becomes intimate with both phenomena. One consequence of having 
become intimate with, and understood the way that, these phenomena bring their possibilities 
into being will be that they will stand out in the primary horizon with a certain prominence 
(they will exhort a stronger allure than the sub-horizons that did not feature in the 
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investigation, which will withdraw into a kind of a background). 
 Phase 3 takes off from here and it involves foregrounding both A and C (e.g. pain and 
materiality) within the primary open horizon and putting them into a kind of a relation. The 
task here is to ask “Are the two identical? Compare them” (ibid. p.27) Through this relational 
process, the fact that A is different from B can itself become vividly present. And here one may 
actually come to see: feeling (vedāna) is different than materiality (rūpa). And this opens up 
the space for understanding that, since the body and pain are intrinsically different 
phenomenon, the painful feeling are not a threat to the body. 89  It is only because awareness 
is ignorant of how things are that things appear to be so. And actually seeing this is for 






89 I will note here, however, that this only describes the process of gaining insight into the difference of 
phenomena. Arguably a modification of this process is involved in coming to know other relations between 
phenomena, such as the fact that phenomena A is dependent on phenomenon B. But it is too late in the discussion 
to go into this. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This work set out to accomplish two major objectives: to articulate a phenomenology of 
mindfulness, and related phenomena, and to work out the implications of that phenomenology 
for some of the main themes of classical phenomenology. Having now reached the concluding 
part of the discussion, it will help to present, in summary, the key findings and point the way 
that future investigations of this kind could take. 
What is mindfulness? Mindfulness is the feeling of being tuned-in to the open perspective 
or horizon—a horizon filled-in by thingly possibilities. But just as the state of sleep must be 
distinguished from the experience of falling asleep, so mindfulness must be distinguished 
from the practice of cultivating mindfulness. This is the practice of tuning-out of the 
transcendental horizon—a horizon filled-in by our possibilities—and of tuning-in to the open 
horizon. What kind of effort does the practice of tuning-out-tuning-in call for? It calls for the 
effort to transform oneself from the psycho-physical self (which either incorporates the 
phenomenon into its self-identity or stands opposed to it as something external-to-self) into 
open awareness that allows the phenomenon to be what it is. From a different angle, this is 
the effort required to trust the phenomenon to unfold in accordance with its own possibilities. 
What is the relationship between mindfulness and attention? Mindful attention—the kind of 
attention that can only arise from within the feeling of being tuned-in—is the function of 
foregrounding a sub-horizon within the primary open horizon and pushing the other sub-
horizons into the background (from where they can be foregrounded). Mindful attention 
differs from concentration (samādhi) in that the latter involves the narrowing down of the 
open horizon to one of its sub-horizons—which then becomes the new (secondary) primary 
horizon. This operation is repeatable and the number of repetitions determines the depth of 
concentration. How does mindfulness give rise to insight (vipassanā)? Here it is a matter of 
foregrounding (via mindful attention) a sub-horizon, isolating and discerning its possibility 
246 
structure, zooming out, foregrounding another sub-horizon, isolating and discerning the way 
it brings its possibilities into being and then stepping back and contrasting the two in such a 
way that their difference becomes vividly present. How does this practice relate to 
phenomenological seeing? I tried to show that—at least in so far as Husserl’s 
phenomenological investigations are concerned—there is no difference; Husserl was 
practicing tuning-in-tuning-out, and through insight (vipassanā), bringing into explicit 
awareness the different ways that phenomena realise their possibilities. 
This work does not pretend to be an exhaustive treatment of these phenomena. It only 
represents a beginning and an illustration of a possible way that a dialogue between Western 
phenomenology and Buddhism could proceed. In the remainder of this discussion, I would 
like to highlight four possible paths that future investigations of this kind could take. 
(1) Remaining in the context of Husserlian phenomenology, there are at least two 
important issues on which a future work of this kind could focus. The first would involve 
undertaking a comparison between vipassanā (the kind of insight practice that mindfulness 
makes possible and which, as I tried to show, Husserl actually makes use of in his actual work) 
and the eidetic reduction. To briefly point out one difference that I think separates the two 
approaches: while in the practice of vipassanā the practitioner must at all times remain close 
and intimate with the phenomenon—with the actual, factual reality as it brings its possibilities 
into being—the eidetic reduction, while it also begins with an actual example, quickly moves 
into the sphere of imagination, into the generation of possible variants which (in a certain way) 
takes the eidetic practitioner away from the factual situation. To illustrate, remember how 
essential it was for Boowa to remain present with the actual pain and how this called for a 
strong resolution not to escape the pain in any way—which would include imagining variants 
of the pain that he was currently experiencing. And, counter intuitively perhaps, it is in these 
moments of crisis that true insight and wisdom grow. As Boowa (2012, p. 19) himself says: 
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“Before I found myself cornered like that with no way out, I never imagined that wisdom 
could be so sharp and incisive”. Such a comparison may have important lessons to teach us 
about the very nature and role of philosophical reflection in our lives. Generally speaking, in 
the Western tradition, it seems that the philosopher is allowed to direct his reflective powers 
to anything whatsoever that strikes his fancy. In Buddhism, by stark contrast, the subject 
matter of insight emerges from concrete life itself—from within the feeling of being tuned-in. 
Boowa did not arbitrarily chose pain as his subject matter. Rather, the pain arose with a real 
force, announcing itself as the subject that is to be investigated. Instead of saying that Boowa 
chose the pain, it would be closer to the truth to say that the pain chose him. This line of 
thought—which brings philosophical reflection back into contact with concrete life and with 
a particular kind of practice—could have serious implications for the very meaning of what 
it is to do philosophy and engage in philosophical reflection.90 
From the exposition of Husserl’s phenomenology in this work, the reader may have the 
impression that Husserl was completely blind (in so far as his explicit reflections are 
concerned at least) to the open perspective and its rich phenomenological structure. I actually 
do not think that is the case. I think that Husserl did glimpse the open perspective (but it was 
no more than a glimpse) under the heading of the hyletic data. According to Husserl, every 
intentional experience can be divided into two dimensions: the noetic and the noematic. Where 
the noetic further splits into: the noesis (the apprehending forms) and the hyletic data (the 
material that these forms take up and work over). Now one way, and I think it is the most 
 
90 Ajahn Chah advises that one should not force oneself into insight but should wait until the subject matter arises 
on its own: 
…in meditation, only when something comes up should you investigate. Otherwise, merely 
contemplate your present experience. Simply maintain the mindfulness to be aware of that. If nothing 
comes up, then rest at ease (Jayasaro, 2017, p. 396). 
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productive way, to understand the transcendental, is to restrict it to these apprehending forms, 
the noesis, and their noematic correlates—and I think this is how Husserl’s followers, such as 
Sartre and Heidegger, went on to conceive the transcendental. But I believe that this 
identification of the transcendental with the noesis and noema should not lead us to abandon 
the idea of the hyletic data. For the hyletic data could be interpreted as a manifestation of the 
open perspective.91 To complete the picture, the natural perspective would then arise as a 
consequence of the transcendental perspective ‘imposing itself’ on the open perspective. 
While in his actual investigation Husserl was indeed tuning-in to the phenomenon he was 
studying—to the very impression of those phenomena before they are taken up and worked 
over by our meanings—he never took up the practice of tuning-out-tuning-in for its own 
sake.92 If he did, he may have come to an explicit awareness of the open perspective and of its 
 
91 It is revealing that in certain writings Husserl described the hyle as being ‘alien to (transcendental) 
consciousness’, as something that transcendental consciousness ‘receives’ from the outside (Husserl, 1991, p. 
93). 
92 Why didn’t Husserl (and others, like Sartre) take up this practice of tuning-out of the transcendental and tuning-
in to the open perspective? I suspect that there is a very deep and important reason for this. I believe that the 
transcendental perspective overlaps with what the Buddhist texts speak of as ‘ignorance’ (avijja): the force that 
hides and obscures the truth. Here ‘ignorance’ is not just an absence of some propositional knowledge but a real, 
tangible force, as Bodhi (1994, p. 10) writes: 
 
Ignorance is not mere absence of knowledge, a lack of knowing particular pieces of information. 
Ignorance can co-exist with a vast accumulation of itemized knowledge, and in its own way it can be 
tremendously shrewd and resourceful. As the basic root of dukkha [suffering], ignorance is a 
fundamental darkness shrouding the mind. Sometimes this ignorance operates in a passive manner, 
merely obscuring correct understanding. At other times it takes on an active role: it becomes the great 
deceiver, conjuring up a mass of distorted perception and conceptions which the mind grasps as 
attributes of the world, unaware that they are its own deluded constructs.  
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difference from the transcendental.  And then he may have realised that to see the open 
perspective as ‘hyle’—as material for consciousness to work over—is to see it as if through a 
veil. Nevertheless, Husserl’s investigations into the hyletic dimension could shed further light 
on the structure of the open perspective, the feeling of being tuned-in and other related 
phenomena and it would make for an interesting project to attempt to draw these lessons. 
Given that arguably no other idea of Husserl’s has been attacked more viciously (especially 
by other phenomenologists) than the idea of the hyle, any possible attempt to defend the 
suggestion that the hyletic dimension overlaps with the open perspective would need to 
consider and answer these objections. I personally think that the objection can be answered, 
and that this would be a very worthwhile thing to do. 
On a more general note, I think that this blurred vision of the open perspective is a 
symptom of a wider disease that has taken hold of many thinkers in the Western philosophical 
tradition, especially in the transcendental tradition inaugurated by Kant. In Kant himself, I 
believe, the open perspective only appears under the title ‘sensations’— the very stuff that the 
forms of understanding and intuition shape into the phenomenal world. Arguably this 
blindness to the open perspective (to the open awareness beyond transcendental awareness) is 
most severe in Sartre, who could only conceive the dimension ‘beyond’ the for-itself as the in 
itself—an absurd meaningless mode of being about which nothing can be said, for it has no 
meaning in itself; all the meaning comes from (human/transcendental) consciousness. If Sartre 
had spent some time learning to meditate, he might have acquired the ability to penetrate into 
 
 
 If this is so then there is something intrinsic in the transcendental perspective that prevents us from tuning-in to 
the open perspective and seeing things as they are. And it is this force that we are fighting against when we 
practice tuning-in-tuning-out. I hope to address this at some length in the near future. This important issue arose 
in conversation with Yuko Ishihara, who I would also like to thank for reminding me of it. 
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this “in itself” and to discover a whole new dimension of being, a rich and wondrous reality. 
But, in some sense, it is unsurprising that this general blindness to the open perspective should 
exist. For in order to really experience this reality ‘outside’ the transcendental subject, it is 
necessary to cultivate mindfulness, to practice tuning-out-tuning-in, and as we have seen that 
is no straightforward matter, and it requires nothing less than a transformation of our very 
manner of being (and, as I will discuss below, also a transformation of our ethical life). This 
brings us to Heidegger. 
(2) Remaining in the context of Being and Time93, the question could be raised: what 
implications does this account of mindfulness have for our understanding of the human being’s 
mode of being, and of its relation to other modes of being? Conversely: how can Heidegger’s 
phenomenological/ontological study of the different modes of being in Being and Time help 
further refine our account of mindfulness, and related phenomena? It is well known that in 
Being and Time Heidegger tried to show that the entities that we ourselves are (Dasein) exist 
as being-in-the-world. In my understanding, being-in-the-world is Heidegger’s description of 
the transcendental perspective.94 If that is true, then the open perspective is a mode of being 
on which being-in-the-world is itself founded. Moreover, I think that a strong case could be 
made that what I have been speaking about under the title of ‘open perspective’ is nothing but 
Nature herself— in her true mode of being. This Nature is the reality that lies ‘outside’ the 
human subject and within which the human subject, as being-in-the-world, belongs. (But it is 
also a reality that the human subject is able to tune-in to and, in that sense, this ‘outer’ reality 
is the ‘real’ inside of the human subject). Expanding the investigations in this direction would 
 
93 I realise that Heidegger underwent a ‘turn’ in his thinking and, I have been told, that some of his later ideas 
may overlap with those developed in this work. But since I am not (yet) very familiar with later Heidegger’s 
work, I am afraid that I cannot comment on the ‘later Heidegger’. 
94 See: Crowell and Malpas (2007) 
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require this notion of Nature to be distinguished from the nature as she appears within being-
in-the-world—whether as ready-at-hand, present-at-hand or in any other mode of being that 
is founded on being-in-the-world. Nature in the former sense is not something that appears in-
the-midst-of-the-world: being-in-the-world is itself ‘in’ Nature. In this way, our findings could 
push the philosophy of Being and Time further by introducing a mode of being—the mode of 
being of Nature—that Heidegger (at least in Being and Time) does not take into account and 
whose ontological structure we have already started to disclose in this work. This would set 
up the task of working out the relation between this mode of being and those that do feature 
in the philosophy of Being and Time. 
It is now time to turn to the second question: how can Heidegger’s phenomenological and 
ontological study of what it means to be human help further refine our understanding of 
mindfulness? We have already described tuning-in-tuning-out as the practice of transforming 
our mode of being. In light of the above, this can be rephrased thus: tuning-out-tuning-in is 
the practice of transforming Dasein’s mode of being from being-in-the-world to a mode of 
being that allows the phenomenon to unfold in accordance with its Nature. But what, generally 
speaking, is this phenomena that I have been calling ‘transformation of being’? I think that 
Being and Time contains important clues for addressing this question and therefore for 
shedding light on our particular issue. Recall Heidegger’s description of how an entity (such 
as a hammer) can transform from existing as present-at-hand to ready-at-hand (or 
conversely). As to the possibility of such a transformation for the entities that we ourselves 
are, Heidegger only mentions the possibility that the human being can appear as present-at-
hand (in the mode of being of a mere object). Moreover, for Heidegger this transformation is 
a distortion of the primordial way that the human being exists: as being-in-the-world. But must 
a transformation of our mode of be a distortion? If Nature is indeed foundational for being-in-
the-world, then the transformation of Dasein from being-in-the-world to Nature (a 
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transformation that the practice of tuning-out-tuning-in can bring about) would be a disclosure 
of a more primordial way of being. To shed further light on this, it would be helpful to take 
up the study of this transformation—where an entity alters its mode of being—for its own 
sake, and Heidegger’s work is filled with invaluable (but unrefined) insights regarding the 
nature of this phenomenon.95 
(3) There is a glaring gap in our account that is impossible to ignore: nothing of substance 
has been said about the role of the body within the feeling of being tuned-in. What makes this 
omission even more embarrassing is that, from the very first chapter, mindfulness was 
described as a transformation of the instrumental body into an experience of the body as it is: 
a transformation where (to resort back to Tolstoy’s description) the body becomes “full of life 
and conscious of itself”. And in the Satipaṭṭhāna chapter, we interpreted the instruction to 
contemplate “the body in the body” as the instruction to break “with its instrumental 
hiddenness and to bring the body forth from its withdrawn state”. This is the Natural or the 
Thingly body: the body as it is when it is freed to unfold in accordance with its own 
possibilities. Here the task opens up of describing the relation between: the Thingly body and 
the Instrumental body (which has preoccupied the phenomenologists) and the Object body 
(the body as it appears in-the-midst-of-the-world, which is the way that the scientist relates to 
it). But there exists a more important and urgent reason for giving a phenomenological account 
 
95 While in Being and Time Heidegger does not take the transformation of Dasein’s mode of being—and in 
particular the possible positive significance of such a transformation—as an explicit theme, he does touch upon 
the topic, albeit ever so slightly. In his discussion of death, he says that:  
 
In the dying of the Other we can experience that remarkable phenomenon of Being which may be 
defined as the change-over of an entity from Dasein’s kind of Being (or life) to no-longer Dasein” 
(Heidegger, 1967, p. 281). 
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of the Thingly body, and working out its role in the context of the Buddhist path. This has to 
do with the fact that the Thingly body is deeply intertwined with the ethical implications of 
our discussion. And this is the last point I would like to touch upon.  
(4) We should be aware of a definite tendency in the Western adaptation of the Buddha’s 
teachings, and in the teaching of mindfulness in particular. This is the tendency to divorce the 
mindfulness aspect of the Buddhist path from morality (silā), and especially the code of 
discipline that accompanies the moral teachings. Many different forces are at work behind this 
tendency, and obviously this is not the time to go into the details. But I think that a crucial 
factor here is the assumption that the practice of cultivating mindfulness is in some sense 
independent from the practice of cultivating the moral or ‘wholesome’ mental qualities (such 
as generosity or friendliness). After all, one tends to think, what does my capacity, or lack 
thereof, for being tuned-in to the breath, say, have to do with whether I steal, take intoxicants 
or commit adultery? Do our findings have anything to contribute to this question? I think that 
they do, and what they have to contribute is very important. 
To begin with, it will be helpful to once again reflect on the relationship between 
mindfulness and insight. For mindfulness to be ‘right’ mindfulness in the Buddhist sense, it 
must be developed into insight. To put it differently, mindfulness must occur in a context 
where it is connected up with insight. This context is not imposed upon mindfulness from the 
outside: it is drawn from within it—by cultivating its inherent possibility of being developed 
into insight. This means that the practice of insight (vipassanā) is inconceivable without a 
basis in mindfulness (but the converse is not the case—mindfulness can exist without insight). 
And in this sense it is revealing that mindfulness occurs before insight in the schema of the 
eightfold noble path. Perhaps the reason for that is precisely that insight can only come after 
mindfulness and as a development of it. Following this line of thought, it is instructive to note 
that morality (silā) comes before mindfulness in the eightfold path. This can be taken as 
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suggesting that, just as insight can only arise from within mindfulness, so mindfulness can 
only arise within the mind that has developed the moral qualities to some extent. Morality is 
the soil on which mindfulness needs to grow. If this is true then there is an internal connection, 
an unbreakable bond, between mindfulness and morality, just as there is between mindfulness 
and insight and between mindfulness and (right) concentration. What is the nature of this 
bond? Here I can only begin to sketch an answer to this question.   
To be mindful is to be in tune with the way that phenomena bring their possibilities into 
being. This includes one’s own, Natural or Thingly Body—the body as it is in the feeling of 
being tuned-in. The Thingly body is a necessary sub-horizon in the primary open horizon.96 
This implies that if the body is not freed to unfold its own possibilities then it will be 
impossible to establish the feeling of being tuned-in. Now, up to this point, only one way in 
which phenomena can be prevented from unfolding their possibilities has been discussed. This 
is where the phenomenon is pushed towards our possibilities (and projects in particular). But 
I believe that there is another way: by the means of tensing or closing up—which is a bodily 
phenomenon. Tensing is a closing up of thingly possibilities (and of the open perspective) in 
the dimension of the body. Opening up is the opposite movement of freeing the body to unfold 
its possibilities. Opening and closing up are contrary possibilities. Even if this could all be 
shown to be so, one may wonder: what does it have to do with the question of the relationship 
between mindfulness and morality? 
I think that a phenomenological description of ‘unwholesome’ mental qualities (such as 
anger, greed, hatred, jealously and so on) would show closing up as an invariant structure of 
this class of phenomena. In other words, whenever such qualities appear in the mind they are 
 
96 But, as we have seen, it is possible to ‘withdraw’ from the primary open horizon—and therefore the Thingly 
body—by developing concentration. But it is also true that concentration can only arise once one has tuned-in 
and opened up the body to some extent. 
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accompanied by bodily tension. And I believe that the ‘wholesome’ qualities (such as 
kindness, generosity, and so on) are inseparably bound up with the opening up of the body. If 
all this could be established (and I am not suggesting that merely stating that it is so shows it 
to be so) it would follow that if one is cultivating mindfulness—which implies opening the 
body up—it would be counterproductive and contradictory to not cultivate the wholesome 
qualities, and to allow the unwholesome ones to arise in the mind. It is clear how an ethics 
naturally follows from this—assuming that one understands mindfulness to be the highest 
good, or at least as one of the highest goods. But, if this is all that can be said, how does one 
get to something like a universal ethic? Such an ethic would follow if everyone accepted the 
feeling of being tuned-in as the highest good. But why should one accept that?  
I think that there is a convincing answer to this question, but it would take a whole work 
to justify it. Once again, here I can do no more than sketch out the plan for such an undertaking. 
Again, I think that a phenomenological investigation would show that the phenomenon of pain 
or suffering (any kind of pain or suffering) contains the phenomenon of closing up as an 
essential moment, while pleasure and happiness (any kind of pleasure and happiness) contains 
the phenomenon of opening up as an essential moment. And the higher the degree of opening 
up, the more intense and enduring will be the associated pleasure or happiness. And the more 
intense and enduring the pain or dissatisfaction, the higher will be the degree of closing up. 
To give the reader a taste of where I am going with this, I would now like to briefly consider 
what is arguably the highest worldly pleasure of all: sexual pleasure. 97 
 
97 My intention behind introducing this example is not to shock or hurt anyone. The reader should keep in mind 
that, first and foremost, I wrote this work for myself, in order to sort out and clarify aspects of my life and 
practice. And my intention behind writing about sexual desire is to understand it and thereby hopefully to gain 
some control over it. And in my experience, sexual desire is one of the most powerful—arguably it is the most 
powerful—factors that prevents the feeling of being tuned-in from arising. And one way of combating this force 
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 Consider the following fact about the (male) sexual organ. This is one part of the body 
that is (in a very special sense) outside of volitional control: it cannot be moved in the way 
that the arms or facial muscles can. Nevertheless, it has the possibility of movement: of going 
from some actual state to another in a more or less orderly sequence. But this movement—
sketched out in the organ as its own thingly possibility—can only be brought into actuality 
through some external happening; never as a direct actualisation of our possibilities. 
Moreover, unlike such phenomena as “the beating of the heart” or “the movement of the 
breath”—which are also to a large extent outside of our volitional control—once this part of 
the body begins to move, it is impossible (in normal circumstances) to ignore this movement 
by pushing it into the undifferentiated background of awareness. The pleasure associated with 
the movement is too intense. The sexual organ seems to accomplish its work by giving the 
being no choice but to become tuned-in to its natural rhythm. This opening up and tuning-in, 
I believe, is the foundation of the sexual pleasure.98 And I believe that what is true of sexual 
pleasure is true of pleasure more generally (to some extent, every pleasure involves some 
degree of opening up). But, while compared to other worldly pleasures, the sexual pleasure is 
indeed very intense, it is almost nothing compared to the pleasure that mindfulness as the 
feeling of being tuned-in brings with it. This is because being tuned-in is opening up par 
excellence—it is pleasure in its purity. The key point here is that a person who managed to 
establish the feeling of being tuned-in could come to understand that what he or she ‘really’ 
 
is to reflect on it philosophically. And if philosophy were forbidden from going into such vital issues, I would 
forbid myself from going into philosophy.  
98 This together with the pleasure that arises in dependence on unwholesome concentration that is constitutive of 
sexual desire (see: Part II, Chapter II, Section v.) Also, the pleasure associated with the moment of tuning-in 
necessarily unfolds-together-with the pain associated with an unrealised goal of the craving (a goal that is never 
realised—except temporarily). I suspect that this contrast between the pleasure and the pain in the core of the 
craving plays an important role in determining the unique intensity of the pleasure. 
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seeks (whether through sexual pleasure or in some other way)—the opening up of their 
being—is present in its pure form in the feeling of being tuned-in. Having realised this, this 
person could see that they should nurture the wholesome qualities, and that they should not 
allow the unwholesome to arise. But the development of these important ideas must wait for 




 I have decided to include a glossary at the end of the discussion in the hope that it will 
help the reader keep track of the technical terms introduced through the discussion. The below 
‘explanations’ or ‘definitions’ will not be intelligible independently of the text; they are at best 
only an aid that the reader can use to remind themselves how the term was described earlier. 
It is worth reflecting on the fact that composing a list like this in many ways goes against the 
very spirit of phenomenological work. In this kind of philosophical endeavour, the meanings 
of terms unfold together with the discussion and apprehending every step of this evolution is 
intrinsic to understanding the meaning in question, and to bringing one’s awareness to the 
phenomenon being described. There is no shortcut from this path. In this text also, certain 
technical terms are introduced with a very approximate meanings, meanings that functions 
like seeds that the remainder of the discussion then fertilizes and waters until the meaning 
developed further and further. But no matter how far it develops, it always points back to its 
original definition and cannot be understood without it. In other words, there is no real away 
around the fact that in order to understand what is being said in the text it is necessary to 
carefully follow the discussion and to reflect upon and try to isolate on those aspects of one’s 
experience that are being described. Having said that, the following list may still aid some 
readers, especially in the later chapters, by reminding them of how the terms were earlier 
described. 
I have purposely avoided ordering the below terms in an alphabetical order. I have rather 
chosen to begin with the ideas that should be familiar to most phenomenologists and which 





Transcendental horizon. The horizon disclosed to the phenomenologist after the successful 
execution of the epoche. 
Our possibilities. The kind of possibility that fill in the transcendental horizon. Our 
possibilities are of two kinds: intentional possibilities and projects. Examples of 
intentional possibilities are the possibility of perceiving or touching something. 
Examples of projects are the possibility of repairing a house or becoming a 
philosopher.  
Crystallised mode. The mode that the transcendental horizon assumes in the natural 
attitude. In this mode, our possibilities are not apprehended as such, as moments of 
the transcendental horizon, but rather as qualities of something external. 
Natural perspective. The perspective that one finds oneself in when the 
transcendental horizon is in the crystallised mode. 
De-crystallised mode. The mode that the transcendental horizon assumes when it 
becomes visible as such. In this mode, our possibilities appear as such. 
Transcendental perspective. The perspective that opens up when the transcendental 
horizon is in the de-crystallised mode. 
Crystallisation. The event where the transcendental horizon reconfigures itself from 
the de-crystallised to the crystallised mode. 
De-crystallisation. The event where the transcendental horizon reconfigures itself 
from the crystallised to the de-crystallised mode. 
The epoche. The practice that can leads the phenomenologist from the transcendental 
to the natural perspective. The epoche can be seems from two perspectives: as either 
the project of preventing crystallisation or as the project of realizing de-
crystallisation. 
Thematization. The event where a project that is no longer able to be pursued through an 
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external action manifests as the content of some internal action, such as a thought or an image. 
When that happens the project in question becomes thematized. Thematization precedes and 
conditions the possibility of practicing tuning-out-tuning-in. 
 Disenchantment. The practice of distancing oneself from a thematized project.  It involves 
counterbalancing the projects feeling tone. For example, if the thematized project is pleasant 
then the practice of disenchantment would involve bringing to mind something with the 
opposite, unpleasant quality. 
Tuning-out. The movement of distancing oneself from the transcendental horizon and our 
possibilities. Tuning-out is an abstract moment that can only exist in the context of tuning-in-
tuning-out.  
Open Horizon. The horizon within which phenomena appear vividly present and which is 
disclosed after the successful execution of tuning-in-tuning-out. To tap-in to the open horizon 
is to have the feeling of being tuned-in. 
Thingly Possibilities. The kind of possibility that fill in the open horizon. Thingly 
possibilities are outlined in the phenomenon as its own possibilities. 
Primary open horizon. The open horizon as it appears within the feeling of being 
tuned-in. Here the totality of phenomena present themselves as unfolding in the same 
direction, as being a part of the same, uniform flow. 
 Sub-horizons. The primary open horizon is in fact constituted of a multiplicity of sub-
horizons which make up the primary open horizon. Each of these horizons unfolds its 
possibilities in different ways. This means that the uniform flow that one first discovers 
upon tuning-in is in fact divided into a multiplicity of heterogenous flows. 
Narrowing. (Concentration, samadhi) Narrowing is a (thingly) possibility of the 
primary open horizon. The actualisation of this possibility leads to the narrowing of 
the primary open horizon to one of the sub-horizons that constitute it. After narrowing, 
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the sub-horizon in question becomes the new (secondary) primary horizon. To nurture 
the possibility of narrowing is to cultivate concentration. The depth of concentration 
is a function of the degree of narrowing; the more narrowing, the more concentration. 
Broadening. The event where the secondary primary horizon revers back to its sub-
horizon status, re-establishing the primary open horizon. 
Open Perspective. The perspective that one finds oneself in within the feeling of being 
tuned-in.  
Open awareness. (Mindful awareness, sati in the sense of lucid awareness) The form 
that awareness takes in the open perspective. Contrasts with both transcendental 
awareness of the transcendental perspective and psychophysical awareness of the 
natural perspective. 
Vividly Presented Phenomenon. How the phenomenon manifests within the open 
perspective. A vividly presented phenomenon contrasts with both Objects (the way 
that phenomena manifest in the natural perspective) and Appearances (the way that 
phenomena manifest in the transcendental perspective). 
Thingly Understanding. (intrinsic intelligibility of the phenomenon, sampajāna) The 
kind of understanding that discloses thingly possibilities. Contrasts with Projective 
Understanding which discloses projects. It is a kind of patient listening, an awaiting of 
the phenomenon to become what it is—to unfold its thingly possibilities. Some of the 
structures that make up this understanding are: Unfolding-towards. A structural 
moment of the thingly understanding that listens in to the futural thingly possibility: 
the state that this phenomenon will become or unfolds towards. Unfolding-from. A 
structural moment of the thingly understanding that listens in to the just past thingly 
possibility: the state from which this vividly presented phenomenon is becoming or 
unfolding-from. Unfolding-together-with. A structural moment of the thingly 
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understanding that listens in to the co-present thingly possibility: the state that is co-
current or unfolding-together-with this vividly present phenomenon. 
Tuning-in. (sati as remembering). The other side of tuning-out. It can only exist as in the 
context of tuning-in-tuning-out. It is the positive movement towards the open horizon and the 
thingly possibilities that fill it. 
Tuning-in-tuning-out. The practice of cultivating mindfulness. Its two moments are tuning-
out (distancing oneself from the transcendental horizon and our possibilities) and tuning-in 
(moving towards the open horizon and the thingly possibilities). This practice potentiality 
leads to the establishment of the feeling of being tuned-in. 
Atapi. The kind of effort that is constitutive of tuning-out-tuning-in. This is the effort 
called for in order to bring about a transformation from the human mode of being (from 
transcendental or psycho-physical self-awareness) to a different mode of being (open 
awareness). It can, conversely, be described as the effort necessary to prevent open 
awareness becoming psycho-physical awareness.  
The feeling of being tuned-in. (The mindful state, right mindfulness, sati, the contemplative 
state, anupassanā). The potential fruit of the practice of tuning-in-tuning-out. It is the state of 
tapping-in to the open perspective (while one’s standpoint) remains in either the 
transcendental or the natural perspective. 
The pattern of mindfulness. The unique form that the stream of consciousness takes within 
the feeling of being tuned-in. These are some of its moments: 
Mindful Memory. The form that memory takes within the feeling of being tuned-in. 
Mindful Attention. The form that attention takes within the feeling of being tuned-in. 
This kind of attention is the function of foregrounding one of the sub-horizons within the 
primary open horizon and of backgrounding the other sub-horizons. 
Mindful Reflection. (Vipassana) A kind of discriminative judgment that arises from 
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within the feeling of being tuned-in and which is a modification or development of thingly 
understanding.  It involves contrasting and differentiating the different ways that phenomena 
brings their thingly possibilities into being. It involves foregrounding (via mindful attention) 
a sub-horizon, isolating and discerning its possibility structure, zooming out (mindful 
attention), foregrounding another sub-horizon, isolating and discerning the way it brings its 
possibilities into being and then stepping back and contrasting the two in such a way that their 
difference becomes vividly present. 
Wrong Mindfulness. The feeling of being tuned-in to the primary projective space of the 
transcendental horizon.  
Right Concentration. A state that results from the narrowing of the primary open horizon. 
Wrong Concentration. A state that results from narrowing of the primary projective space of 
the transcendental horizon to one of the sub-projects that constitutes it. 
Tapping-in. The state where while one’s standpoint remains in some perspective A one ‘taps-
in’ to another perspective B. For example, in establishing the feeling of being tuned-in while 
one standpoint remains in either the transcendental or the natural perspective one taps-in to 
the open perspective and is able to make use of it. 
Shifting the Standpoint. The event when one actually shifts one’s standpoint from 
perspective A to perspective B. 
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